Human tissue legislation in the United Kingdom 1952- 2006: a history and comparative analysis of policy development by McNeish, Alexander Stewart
Human tissue legislation in the United Kingdom 1952- 2006: a history and
comparative analysis of policy development
McNeish, Alexander Stewart
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/1323
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
1 
 
 
 
Human tissue legislation in the United Kingdom 1952- 
2006: a history and comparative analysis of policy 
development. 
 
                A Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD 
 
                                                     By 
 
                         Alexander Stewart McNeish 
 
 
                                               To 
 
                     Queen Mary, University of London. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my dearest wife, Joan, for all her support in this endeavour, and 
for much more,  
this Thesis is affectionately dedicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. 
First, my profound thanks go to my supervisors, Professors Emily Jackson and 
Richard Ashcroft, who ‘took me on and saw me through’.  It has been my privilege 
to be able to learn from these outstanding scholars and, at the same time, to have 
such huge fun!  Undertaking this Thesis in this way, in the autumn of my days, has 
been one of the richest experiences of my academic life. 
Second, I wish to acknowledge my great debt to my colleague and friend, Professor 
Peter Hennessy (now Baron Hennessy of Nympsfield).  He encouraged me to 
believe that the topic of this Thesis was approachable through ‘interrogating the 
sources’ and introduced me to the excitements, as well as the practicalities, of 
archival research.  I am very grateful. 
Third, I owe a special debt to the Royal College of Pathologists, which opened its 
doors and gave me privileged access to past proceedings.  I acknowledge and thank 
especially Professors Sir James Underwood, Adrian Newland, Peter Furness and Sir 
Roderick MacSween, and the Deputy Chief Executive, Miss Elspeth Evans.  From the 
Scottish Council of the College, Professor Stewart Fleming and Dr Jeremy Thomas 
gave generously of their time and expertise. 
Next, the staff of a number of institutions were helpful and supportive.  I identify 
particularly the Wellcome Trust, and the help given by Ms Nicola Perrin.  I thank 
also the staff of the National Archives, National Archives of Scotland, Parliamentary 
Archives, British Library, Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, University of 
Birmingham Library, Archive Department of the British Medical Association, 
Freedom of Information Teams of the Department of Health and of the Scottish 
Executive, and  Ms Catriona Robertson of the Central Legal Office of NHS National 
Services, Scotland . 
I have been very fortunate to be able to call on the help and advice of many 
individuals who are, or who have become, friends.  Mr Will Scott of the Scottish 
Executive Health Department, and Mr Hugh Whittall, Director of the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics and late of the Department of Health, took great care to point 
me in the right direction.  In addition, and named in alphabetical order, the 
following helped in a myriad of individual ways.  I ask each to accept an equally 
individual ‘thank you’: Dr George Applebey, Professor Alexander Buchan, Professor 
Sir Graeme Catto, Professor Mary Dixon Woods, Mr Frank Dobson MP, Ms Anne 
Donaldson, Dr Michael Dunnill, Dr Jo Ellins, Dr Tracey Elliott, Mr Frank Field MP, 
Professor Kenneth Fleming, Professor Christopher Ham, Dr Evan Harris, Mr Morgan 
Jamieson, Mr Christopher Liddle, Professor Mavis Maclean, Mr Nigel Meadows, Ms 
Geraldine Mynors, Professor Philip Ogden, Mr Robert Parker CB, Dr Bronwyn Parry, 
4 
 
Mrs Jean Robinson, Mr David Tysell,  Ms Wendy Trevis Smith, Lord Walton of 
Detchant, Mrs Gina Williams. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
DECLARATION. 
 
I declare that the work presented in this Thesis is my own. 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander S McNeish. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
ABSTRACT. 
This is a study of the genesis of the Corneal (Grafting) Act 1952, the Human Tissue 
Act 1961, the Human Tissue Act 2004, and the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006.  
The aim has been to understand why so much had apparently changed between 
1952-61 and 2004-06, both in society and in medical practice, as an explanation of 
why the earlier Acts were essentially ‘enabling/permissive’, whereas the later Acts 
were ‘regulatory/restraining’.  A comparison between the Human Tissue Act 2004 
and the separate Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (both Acts concerned with 
‘human tissue’ and with origins in ‘retention of organs without consent’, but with 
significant differences in their respective provisions), has allowed a finer dissection 
and comparative analysis of the possible factors involved.  
The Thesis focuses on the ‘inspiration’, ‘deliberation/ formulation’ and 
‘legitimation’ phases of the legislative process (using the terminology of Drewry)-
that is, the genesis of the various Acts- and has not sought to study the later 
(Drewry) phases of ‘implementation’ of the law nor subsequent ‘feedback’. 
The methodology has been to ‘interrogate the sources’ through in depth study of 
archived records, using publicly available documents, certain confidential papers 
made available by the Royal College of Pathologists and the Royal College of 
Physicians (London), papers released under Freedom of Information Acts, and 
analysis of the scholarly literature. The findings suggest that a complexity of factors 
contributed to shaping the 2004 and 2006 legislation, in addition to the proximate 
‘organ scandals’. 
The study may contribute specifically to any wish of Government and the 
medical/scientific professions to review their processes of consultation and 
negotiation prior to developing new legislation with an impact on research; and 
more generally to the case for more regular use of pre-legislative scrutiny of Bills. 
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‘Although the parliament has a right to legislate for the people of this country 
while living, yet every man in the country has a right to Christian burial when 
dead, and parliament has no right to pursue people beyond the limits of the 
grave.’ (The Earl of Harewood, House of Lords, June 1829.)1  
 
‘Records, like the little children of long ago, only speak when they are spoken to, 
and they will not speak to strangers.’ (CR Cheney (1906-1987).)2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 (1829) 21 Parl. Deb. (Hansard, 2nd series), HL 1748. 
2
 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.  Volume 11. Oxford.  Oxford University Press, 2004, p303. 
 
19 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Preamble. 
This Thesis concerns the genesis of the Corneal Grafting Act 1952 (‘the 1952 Act’)3, 
the Human Tissue Act 1961 (‘the 1961 Act’)4, the Human Tissue Act 2004 (‘the 2004 
Act’)5 and the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (‘The 2006 Act’) 6. 
 1.1 The origins of this Thesis. 
My original choice of topic for a PhD thesis would have concerned an aspect of 
international research.  I judged that the first chapter of the putative thesis should 
contain a brief review of human tissue legislation in the UK as relevant background.  
I soon came to realise that the picture was more complicated than I had thought.  
From my early reading a number of questions arose which I realised would require 
more than one chapter to try to resolve.  International research was set aside.  Four 
years later, I present this Thesis as an attempt to answer those early questions. 
1.1.1 My core questions. 
First, it appeared that earlier UK Acts, specifically the 1952 Act and the 1961 Act, 
had been essentially enabling, in the sense that they would allow doctors and 
scientists, within the law, to continue to develop the then new science and practice 
of transplantation.  In contrast, legislation in the early 21st century, specifically the 
2004 Act and the 2006 Act, appeared to include a purpose of regulating, (perhaps 
with overtones of restraining), doctors and scientists in certain activities, and to 
                                                     
 
3
 Corneal Grafting Act 1952. (1952, c. 28.) 
4
 Human Tissue Act 1961. (1961, c. 54.) 
5
 Human Tissue Act 2004.  (2004, c.30.) 
6
 Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006.  (2006 asp 4.) 
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impose sanctions for transgressions. What had happened between 1950 and 2000 
to bring about this change in approach within the law?  
Second, in the House of Commons just before the 2004 Act was passed, the 
Minister had said that, in her view, the Bill had achieved the necessary ‘balance’ 
between ‘the regulation that all society wanted us to introduce’, accompanied by 
‘reassurance that the Bill would be based on the principles of consent’, and ‘the 
need to convince the research and medical community that we were not trying to 
stifle some of the excellent work being done’.7 How and why had ‘all society’ come 
to express a wish for regulation?  Why was ‘reassurance’ needed about ‘consent’?  
How had the research community come to feel potentially stifled? 
Third, when I began work in early 2007, I believed, in common with others8 9, that 
the then recent legislation had been the outcome of events in Bristol10 and 
Liverpool (Alder Hey)11 a few years earlier.  Yet there appeared to have been two 
distinct legislative outcomes, as between England and Scotland, from, apparently, a 
common starting point.  Further, it was said by some that the Scottish legislation in 
2006 was a more proportionate response to the problems of organ retention 
revealed at Bristol and Alder Hey than was the 2004 Act.12 13 In 2006-07 this view 
had been endorsed by the Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos 
                                                     
7
 (2004) 426 Parl. Deb. (Hansard, 6
th
 series), HC 896. 
8
 Liddell K, Hall A.  Beyond Bristol and Alder Hey: the future regulation of human tissue. Med L Rev 
2005; 13(2): 170-223.  
9
 Price D.  The Human Tissue Act 2004. MLR 2005; 68(5): 798-821. 
10
 The Inquiry into the management of care of children receiving complex heart surgery at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary: Interim Report: Removal and retention of human material, May 2000. 
11
 The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry Report.  Printed by order of the House of Commons, January 
30 2001. 
12
 Furness P. Editorial. The Human Tissue Act: reassurance for relatives, at a price. BMJ 2006; 
333(7567): 512. 
13
 Underwood JCE. Human Tissue Legislation in the United Kingdom: the need and prospects for 
amendment. Bulletin of the Royal College of Pathologists 2009; no.147: 198-202, at p 202. 
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(Draft) Bill in a recommendation to Government to amend the 2004 Act.14  In what 
ways did the 2004 and 2006 Acts differ?  How did these differences arise? 
Fourth, the areas of legislation which the Joint Committee recommended for 
amendment concerned aspects of medical (diagnostic) and research practice, and 
gave as examples provisions relating to tissues from the living and retention of 
post-mortem specimens after sudden infant death.  This led me not only to 
questions but also to a decision. My Thesis will focus particularly on those aspects 
of legislation which related to diagnostic and research practice. 
Having identified questions which I judged important, were answers already 
available? 
1.2 A brief overview of the scholarly literature. 
The purpose of this overview is to try to place the starting point for this Thesis 
within a larger body of work.  Selected references are discussed in detail as 
appropriate within the text of each chapter. 
1.2.1 Content. 
The scholarly literature concerning the four Acts varies considerably in volume and 
content.  Publications about the 1952 Act in the years following its enactment were 
relatively few, and were mainly to be found in specialist medical journals.  Their 
purposes included acquainting a general medical readership with the [then recent] 
availability of corneal grafting15, making a plea for an increase in the number of 
donors16, describing for the specialist surgeon details of technical advances17, giving 
                                                     
14
 Joint Committee on the Human Tissues and Embryos (Draft) Bill (Session 2006-07). Volume 1: 
Report.  The Stationery Office, 2007. 
15
 Rycroft BW. The corneal graft.  Postgrad Med J 1955; 31: 135-139. 
16
 Rycroft BW. The Corneal Grafting Act 1952. BMJ 1955; 1(4905): 105. 
17
 Sourdille GP. Special methods.  In: Rycroft BW (ed.) Corneal Grafts. London, Butterworth & Co. 
(Publishers) Ltd., 1955, pp 157-168. 
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guidance about how to set up and organise ‘eye banks’18, and identifying the 
biological obstacles yet to be overcome19. 
The passing of the 1961 Act appears to have attracted relatively little attention 
within the medical literature except from transplant surgeons highlighting the 
clinical problems that were arising from a scarcity of [especially kidney] donors20, 
and uncertainties in interpreting the provisions of the 1961 Act21 (which had 
included some well published clashes between coroners and surgeons22).   Instead, 
from the mid 1960s the statute attracted critical comment from predominantly 
legal scholars.23 24 Dworkin, in a magisterial review in 1970 of the law relating to 
organ transplantation in England, noted that ‘as one would expect’ there were 
several aspects of the law which were uncertain and obscure, as a result of which 
‘the legal literature was growing’.25 Skegg was a prominent interpreter of the 1961 
Act throughout the period26, concentrating particularly on the authorised and 
unauthorised use of corpses for medical education and research27 28, and liability 
                                                     
18
 Archer DB, Trevor-Roper PD. Organization and administration of the Westminster-Moorfields eye-
bank. Brit J Ophthal 1967; 51(1): 1-12. 
19
 Billingham RE, Brent L, Medawar PB. ‘Actively acquired tolerance’ of foreign cells. Nature 1953; 
172 (4379): 603-606. 
20
 Calne R Y. Supply and preservation of kidneys.  Brit Med Bull 1965; 21(2): 166-170. 
21
 Editorial. Kidney donation and the law. BMJ 1973; 3(5875):360-362. 
22
 Editorial.  Coroners and transplants. BMJ 1977; 1(6073): 1418. 
23
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for unauthorised removal of cadaveric transplant material29.  Calls for reform of the 
Act centred on the need for clarity in the authorisation procedures prior to 
transplantation30 and for sanctions against doctors acting ‘in defiance’ of the 
provisions of the Act.31  By the beginning of the 1990s, and stimulated by technical 
advances involving the ‘use’ of tissues, a literature began to develop around ‘rights 
in the body and its parts’32 33. 
The 2004 Act had a long and complex history, as Chapters Two and Four will show, 
and it reached the statute book only after ‘five tumultuous years of negotiation’34.  
Not surprisingly, a sizeable literature has been generated which, from my reading, 
may be assembled approximately into four groupings.  The largest arose from 
consideration of the position of the families involved, and explored, for example, 
the nature of and requirements for consent35 36 37 38 39, the law and ethics 
underpinning the use of human tissue40 41 42 43 44, and societal attitudes to dying 
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and bereavement45 46 47.  Second, papers from the medical profession offered a 
defence48, apologies49, or a way forward50: some warned of the damages to 
pathology services of the scandals51, and of the (restricting) consequences of the 
new legislation on specific clinical specialties52 53 54.  Third were papers written 
during the legislative process itself, some of which could be seen as adjuncts to a 
lobbying campaign from the scientific community55 56 57.  Fourth were papers 
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describing and commenting on the content of the Act itself.58 59 60 61 62 63 64.  [There 
is a fifth group of publications which have considered in various ways the 2004 Act 
‘in action’.65  These are largely beyond the scope of this Thesis- see section 3, 
below]  In contrast, the 2006 Act has not (yet) attracted a substantial literature, but 
has been discussed to make points of comparison with the provisions of the 2004 
Act.66 67 
Of those papers which commented on the 2004 Act, two in particular, by their 
differing use of the concept of ‘consensus’, touched on matters of direct relevance 
to the questions I had formulated.  Price wrote that the passage of the Bill had been 
remarkable for a high level of consensus and all party support.  He conceded that 
lack of pre-legislative scrutiny had contributed to ‘initial drafting problems, a hiatus 
of four and half months between Committee and Report stages in the House of 
Commons, and steady revisions up until the very culmination of Parliamentary 
deliberations’68.  This suggested to me that his identification of a ‘consensus’ had 
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been somewhat overdrawn.   Within a major paper which explored the ramification 
of the 2004 Act for the future regulation of human tissue samples, Liddell and Hall 
analysed the amendments which were made during the passage of the Bill against a 
proposition that legal policy on ethically controversial issues should be based on 
norms which represented ‘an overlapping consensus’ amongst competing ethical 
positions.69  The authors concluded that the ‘much criticised first version of the Bill 
suggested that the Government had misjudged the nature and difficulty of the 
task.’ Further ‘it had erroneously assumed that reasonable citizens agreed that 
specific consent should be required in every field of tissue based medical research 
and research training, and that this was a practical policy to implement’.70 
1.2.2 A gap to be filled. 
In summary, many of the published papers had dealt with aspects of the Acts as 
they were, and/or with implications for the law in action.  Papers which discussed 
antecedents to the Acts had tended to concentrate on the passage of the Bill in 
Parliament itself, or had considered broad moral and ethical underpinnings from a 
theoretical point of view.  With the exception of Kennedy (as lawyer, academic, 
activist), Skegg, and a few others, I was unable to establish that lawyers as a cadre 
had taken much interest in reform of human tissue regulation for much of the later 
20th century (until perhaps the rise of interest in ‘rights’ and ‘ownership’ in the 
1990s). Even taken together, the literature failed to explain adequately to me why 
the recent legislation in England and Wales was seen as controversial (as between 
those who thought it had not gone far enough71 and those who thought its 
provisions attempted too much72), or why the Scots had taken their own line (with 
an outcome that was later approved as having ‘achieved a far better result’ by a 
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Parliamentary Joint Committee73).  In short, my core questions had not been 
answered. 
Law making is complex. My hypothesis was that answers might lie within a greater 
understanding of the processes by which new legislation had occurred, the climate 
of the time and the institutions and even individuals who had been involved, within 
an essentially narrative account: and that much might be revealed by a study of 
available records.  
3. Aim of the Thesis. 
I hope to understand, through analysis of the contribution of forces, interests, 
issues, organisations and individuals, how the specific pieces of legislation came 
into being, in two planes: vertically across time between 1952 and 2006, and 
horizontally as between England and Scotland in the early 21st century.  More 
speculatively, I hope to place the findings within an (inevitably partial) analysis of 
changing relations between medicine, the public and the state.    
 Specifically, this Thesis concentrates on the processes of planning, consultation and 
negotiation prior to developing new legislation with an impact on research.  It does 
not provide an analysis of the Acts in detail, nor does it cover all issues regulated by 
the [recent] Acts.  It is concerned with the genesis of the legislation.  Consideration 
of the implementation phase, and of the institutions which had to operate within 
the law, is confined to the 1952 and 1961 Acts, and only to the extent that they 
might have influenced the genesis of the 2004 and 2006 Acts. Consideration of the 
implementation phase of the latter Acts (including, in the case of the 2004 Act, the 
establishing and subsequent activities of the Human Tissue Authority), is beyond 
the scope of this Thesis.  
4. Methodology. 
The methodology has been essentially two-fold.  First, I have ‘interrogated the 
sources’ through in depth study of: archived records: publicly available documents; 
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certain confidential papers made available by the Royal College of Pathologists, the 
Royal College of Physicians (London), and the Wellcome Trust; papers released 
under the Freedom of Information Act74 and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) 
Act75; and analysis of the scholarly literature.  I have been guided in my searches by 
informal discussions with a number of colleagues, but no formal or structured 
interviews took place.  Second, with regard to analysis of the findings, I judged that 
‘analysing public policy in terms of a process framework’ might usefully be applied 
to the task in hand.  
4.1  Analysing public policy in terms of a process framework.76 
The main methodological innovations in this field were led by the work of Riggs77, 
and Almond and Coleman78, who developed ‘structural-functional’ and ‘systems’ 
approaches, which owed much to the field of anthropology, and to the work of 
sociologists such as the Canadian social scientist David Easton.79  80 81 
According to Hogwood and Dunn, the advantages of using a process framework in 
analysis are: first, that it is dynamic, in that both forward movement can be 
measured and, via feedback, modifications can be made at many points in the 
process; second, process frameworks can aid the identification and study of 
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interactions, not only among the various stages in the process but also among 
various participating organisations and between organisations and the larger social 
and economic environment; third, the approach is flexible in that it allows existing 
knowledge to be systematised without precluding the integrating of future insights 
(for example, about stages, influences, or interactions) to the framework. 82 
Easton’s model (derived from cybernetics, and outlined here in a simplified form83) 
depicted a political system as a ‘box’, with precisely defined boundaries, in which 
decision making involved a series of steps.  First, there are various ‘demands’ for 
‘outputs’ in the form of policies or resource distribution, ‘supported’ by various 
individual and group actors.  Second, these competing groups and their demands 
are processed by the system and converted into authoritatively binding decisions- 
‘outputs’.  Third, these policy outputs interact with the wider ‘environment’, 
including political culture, social structure, prevailing economic conditions, level of 
national security, international law, and opinion, to generate, fourth, a new set of 
demands and supports through, fifth, a ‘feedback’ mechanism.  At which point the 
cycle begins anew.  
There are also some general limitations and potential dangers within this approach. 
84  Care must be taken to avoid imposing an explanatory scheme derived from past 
research upon future events, when it would be inappropriate or constricting to do 
so. There is an associated danger that the use of a model with clearly defined stages 
may lead to false rationalisation or justification of past events, in that, instead of 
the neat cycle which the model comprises, in practice ‘policy is often a seamless 
web involving a bewildering mesh of interactions and ramifications’85.  There have 
been further criticisms of a ‘systems’ approach, and variants of it, on a number of 
counts (for example, it could not be shown to be unfalsifiable; its claims of 
universality notwithstanding, it less easily accommodated non-democratic 
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authoritarian systems; it laid too much stress on stability, and was therefore of 
limited use in analysing circumstances of conflict and systems failure).86  
Nevertheless, the systems approach is thought to have enduring value as a means 
of describing political processes and arrangements.87 
4.2 Application to law-making processes. 
 Drewry proposed that the ‘systems’ or ‘framework’ approach may be useful in 
describing and comparing law making processes which generate and consolidate 
those ‘authoritative policy decisions’ to be found at the centre of Easton’s systems 
model and which involve many kinds of actor apart from elected ‘legislators’.88  
Easton depicted decision making in a political system as a series of sequential steps.  
Drewry modified the approach for the specific purpose of describing the law 
making process.  In his approach there are five steps or stages (he described ‘four’ 
by linking ‘application’ and ‘feedback’).   Each could be considered to be a ‘process’ 
in its own right, as follows: 1) ‘Inspiration’; 2) ‘Deliberation and formulation’; 3) 
‘Legitimation’;  4) ‘Execution and application’; 5) ‘Feedback’.89  
 The first step is the initial idea for a policy or new law; the second is the firming up 
of the idea into a formal legislative or policy proposal; the third is the process by 
which the proposal is converted into an authoritative decision, that is, a law 
recognised as binding and accepted as such by the courts and by those responsible 
for putting it into effect; the fourth stage encompasses the means by which the law 
or the policy is made to work in practice; and the fifth is the process of feedback 
whereby the whole system can learn from the  successes or failures, not only of the 
ultimate output (law or policy in practice), but of the antecedent steps as well.90 
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Who are the stakeholders in the law making process in the UK?  According to 
Walkland:   
 The legislative process is now complex: it comprises deliberative, parliamentary 
 and administrative stages, over all of which executive influence is predominant.  
 Legislation is now an almost exclusively executive function, modified, sometimes 
 heavily, by practices of  group and Parliamentary consultations.91 
Drewry has drawn up a more detailed list, and has considered the actors under the 
following categories: 
 Ministers, politicians and civil servants, who have a direct professional stake 
in policy making and legislation; 
 Citizens (voters and taxpayers).  At an individual level, most are ill informed, 
and not much concerned about political issues: but collective opinion, as 
expressed through political parties and pressure groups, can exert serious 
influence. 
 ‘Public opinion’- an elusive phenomenon, gauged by opinion polls and 
sometimes through processes of official consultation- can make an impact 
on politicians, and which increases in the run up to elections. 
 The mass media claim to reflect public opinion, and ministers are sensitive, 
perhaps over sensitive, to the views of the mass circulation tabloid press.  At 
the same time, serious media coverage of policy issues can have an 
important informative and educational role to play in the legislative process. 
 Pressure groups (sometimes distinguishable as between ‘cause groups’ and 
‘interest groups’, and as between ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ groups).   More 
recently, there has been a growing tendency to depict policy making as 
involving ‘policy networks’ and ‘policy communities’, containing both 
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governmental and non- governmental actors, and constituted differently for 
each policy sector.92 
 Political parties have the function of aggregating individual and group 
interests into the policy programmes which form the basis of electoral 
competition; 
 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and parastatal bodies, which, in 
some contexts, overlap in their roles with those of ‘insider’ pressure groups, 
and are allowed privileged access to the corridors of government power.93 
 [In recent times, the relevant arms length body or regulator could be added 
to the list of ‘actors’ (for example, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority was a principal adviser to the Department of Health94 during the 
revision of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 199095by the 
amending Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 200896]. 
How do these dramatis personae perform in the play in five acts that is the UK 
legislative process as described by Drewry?  
‘Inspiration’. 
Inspiration for legislation can come from many sources, inside or outside 
government.  These include political parties (through pressure groups, conference 
resolutions, manifesto pamphlets and the like), sometimes involving interest groups 
en route.   Government departments are often the apparent source of the ‘idea’, 
but they in turn may be responding to a Commission, a Committee of Inquiry, or 
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another government institution (including the EU).  Private members’ Bills may 
have their origin in the inspiration of individual MPs, but many will have been 
prepared by pressure groups, and some are Government Bills in disguise.  There 
may have been feedback from the judicial or administrative processes.  In addition, 
the perceived need for legislation may arise from what Drewry styled ‘an 
emergency’- usually resulting in early involvement of the relevant  Ministry.97 It 
should also be noted that calls for legislative reform can also fall on deaf ears, as for 
example in the aftermath of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland98. 
‘Deliberation and formulation’. 
According to Walkland, writing in the late 1960s, in so far as there was a 
deliberative stage in the legislative process, this was to be found much earlier than 
the Parliamentary stages than in previous generations, in the interplay between 
political parties, pressure groups, Departments and the Cabinet, which together 
formed a complex decision making structure, involving a variety of social and 
political forces.99   
In the Westminster Parliament, once an idea has been accepted as a basis for 
action, and there is thought to be Parliamentary time (in the case of proposed new 
statute law, this will require the approval of the appropriate Cabinet Committee), 
the lead ministry will have the responsibility for expanding the idea into a formal 
policy document and/or a draft law.  The ministry will usually set up a committee 
(ministers plus civil servants) in order to draft instructions for Parliamentary 
Counsel (who are the specialist drafters).  Consultation documents may be issued 
widely.  It is also at this early stage that non-governmental organisations make their 
contribution.  The cooperation, expertise and input of the most influential and 
relevant ‘insider’ pressure groups may be sought, in order to ensure their feeling of 
involvement in, and if possible commitment to, the final proposals.   Parliamentary 
                                                     
97
 Drewry G.  Legislation.  In Ryle M, Richards PG (eds.) The Commons under scrutiny. Third edition. 
London. Routledge, 1988, at p124. 
98
 [1993] 1 All ER 821. 
99
 Walkland SA.  The legislative process in Great Britain.  London.  Allen & Unwin, 1968, at p71. 
34 
 
select committees may sometimes conduct their own inquiries into proposals.  If 
the Government publishes a draft Bill, this can give a valuable opportunity for pre-
legislative scrutiny by Parliament and its committees.100 101 
There are significant differences in the detail of procedures in the Scottish 
Parliament which will be discussed in Chapter Five.  Evidence will be presented that 
the differences in procedure played a pivotal role in ensuring that the content of 
the legislation was different. 
‘Legitimation’. 
The process of turning a Bill into a legally authoritative and binding Act is a major 
function of any legislature: in the UK it is the major function of the Parliament at 
Westminster.  By the time a Bill reaches Parliament, it will already have been 
subject to much discussion and negotiation, with the result that ministers are 
usually reluctant to concede new amendments, either in debates, or in the clause 
by clause analysis which take place in the standing committees.  It is here that the 
opposition parties, often informed by ideas and concerns of ‘outsider’ pressure 
groups, will try to influence the detailed content of the proposed legislation, but 
often, it has been said, without much effect.102 
‘Execution and application’. 
An Act of Parliament must work, and be seen to work.  Well planned legislation and 
policy will have made proper allowance for how it is to be made effective, including 
the provision of sufficient manpower and resources.  Parliament and its committees 
nowadays are taking an increasing interest in post-legislative scrutiny, an area of 
activity which has been reviewed by the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
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Constitution103 and the Law Commission104, and accepted in principle by 
Government105.  
‘Feedback’. 
The experiences of those professionally involved in implementing or interpreting  
the legislation, and the findings of post- legislative scrutiny by select committees, 
form important components of a feedback loop into the early stages of the 
legislative process- as does the response of the public to the legislation or policy as 
experienced ‘on the street’.  The activities of the mass media in interpreting or 
influencing public opinion can also have a major impact on ministers.106 An 
essential feature of efficient ‘closed loop’ systems as described by Easton is that the 
data in the feedback arm are analysed systematically and the results used to modify 
the subsequent output from the system.107 108 109.  Evidence is presented in Chapter 
Two which indicated that, as recently as 2006, ‘feedback’ was far from being 
systematic in the Westminster Parliamentary system. 
5. Scope and structure of the Thesis. 
It is on the first three of the five components of Drewry’s framework that the 
account in this Thesis will mainly concentrate, namely ‘inspiration’, ‘deliberation 
and formulation’, and ‘legitimation’.   The processes of ‘execution and application’ 
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and ‘feedback’ are considered with respect to the 1952 and 1961 Acts, but only in 
as far as they appeared to play a role in the prelude to the 2004 (and 2006) Acts.  
 Chapter One considers the background to, and the passing of, the 1952 and 1961 
Acts, and relies especially on an in depth study of files in the National Archives.  In 
the process some new insights on that legislative process have emerged, including 
findings that I have already published elsewhere.110 
Chapter Two examines the 1961 Act ‘in action’ up to the millennium. There was no 
systematic post-legislative scrutiny.  Evidence is presented, which I have 
characterised as accumulations in an ‘in-tray’, of:  pressures by politicians and 
clinicians to change the law relating to organ transplantation; recognition by 
officials as early as 1970 of a need for amending legislation in regard to retaining 
tissues from post mortems; pathologists’ ignorance of the law; contraventions of 
the 1961 Act both by doctors and government agencies; and a dawning awareness 
in official circles of the voice of the public. 
Chapter Three steps outside the chronological narrative to consider changing 
relationships between medicine, the public and the state, particularly: changing 
attitudes to doctors in the UK (and for comparison in the USA); consideration of 
wider societal changes outside the health field (relying in particular on the survey 
data of Inglehart, the analysis of ‘a new public philosophy’ of Beer; and the seminal 
studies of Giddens, with their emphasis on reflexivity and active trust).  The threat 
of deprofessionalisation of the medical profession, and their steps to avoid it, are 
also considered. 
Chapter Four takes the narrative from organ retention ‘scandals’, through ‘five 
tumultuous years’, to the passing of the 2004 Act. A commonality of features is 
identified, involving families and their beliefs, medical practice, coronial ‘fiefdoms’, 
and the role of the press, on the background of an uncertain law.  The inspiration, 
formulation, and deliberation phases are examined in detail, and a lack of pre-
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legislative scrutiny noted, to try to explain why the scope of the 2003-4 Bill was 
more broadly drawn than might have been expected as a response to irregularities 
in post-mortem practices.  Aspects of the legitimation process are seen as a 
struggle between a government which had made a prior and overriding 
commitment to families, and which was very influenced by the Bristol Interim 
Report and perhaps by ‘past history’, and a medical and scientific community 
which, initially demoralised and sidelined, eventually formed an effective lobby. At 
several stages in the narrative a pivotal role is identified for certain individuals 
(including Professor (now Sir) Ian Kennedy, Rt Hon Alan Milburn MP, and Mrs 
Michaela Willis). 
Chapter Five moves to Scotland, and considers the 2006 Act.  Organ retention, 
parental outcry and press coverage led to the setting up by the Scottish Executive of 
an Independent Review Group.  The influence of this Group, and of the multiple 
layers of consultation (including pre-legislative scrutiny) which followed are 
analysed in an attempt to explain the narrower focus and the wide acceptance of 
the new legislation. The importance of parallel involvement of NHS quality 
assurance bodies, and of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, is also 
discussed. 
Chapter Six attempts to synthesise the analysis of processes, climate, institutions 
and individuals in earlier Chapters to explain the changes over time, and to 
understand how alternative ‘solutions’ to the ‘same’ problem were possible at 
other times and places.  It is concluded that the outcomes can be understood as 
having been contingent on the influence of all four factors, with differences in 
‘climate’ being most important in the vertical axis between approximately 1950 and 
2000, and in ‘process’ between the 2004 and 2006 Acts.  The findings may have 
relevance for any future negotiations between government and researchers.  
Pointers towards the more general worth of pre-legislative scrutiny of 
Parliamentary Bills have emerged. 
 
The starting point for the present study took account of Drewry’s warning that: 
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 When we try to discover the source of the original idea that led to a new policy or a 
 new piece of legislation, we usually find a tangled tale that offers a confusing 
 mixture of different possibilities- and indeed, with most legislation, there is 
 seldom a single inspirational source.  Finding the true origin is not helped by the 
 fact that, if the policy turns out to be popular and successful, then everyone 
 wants to claim some of the credit; and, conversely, if it fails, then everyone 
 will want to deny responsibility.111 
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CHAPTER ONE. 
The development of human tissue legislation in the mid-20th century. 
 
 This account of the sometimes turbulent history of human tissue legislation in the 
United Kingdom between 1952 and 2006 begins with events leading to the Corneal 
Grafting Act 1952.   At first reading, it is difficult to see a smooth connection 
between, on the one hand, the Corneal Grafting Act 1952 (‘the 1952 Act’) and the 
Human Tissue Act 1961 (‘the 1961 Act’), whose associated Bills were introduced in 
the House of Commons as follows, respectively: 
 Surgical science is doing its job and now it is asking the legislators to help it to carry 
 on further.1 (Corneal Grafting Bill 1952), and 
  [one which is] mainly concerned with the removal of doubt, but [which] may 
 nevertheless be described as wholly beneficial and in some cases a life-saving 
 measure.2 (Human Tissue Bill 1960); 
  
and its successor, the Human Tissue Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’), whose associated Bill 
was described at Second Reading in the Commons in these terms: 
 The background to this Bill is scandal...A practice that resulted in such tragedy for 
 so many families may once have had its place, but it certainly has no place in 
 today's health service.3  
 
The story began much earlier.  
 
1. Medical (including transplantation) research in the 1950s.  
The 1950s were years during which the activities of medical science, internationally, 
began to rise exponentially, and received the increasing support of Government.  In 
the USA, medical research expenditure by the National Institutes of Health 
increased from $0.706m in 1945, to $36.06m in 1955, and by 1965 had reached 
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$436.6m.4  Expenditure in the UK showed a similar trend, albeit on a more modest 
scale: Government grant- in aid to the Medical Research Council increased from 
£295,000 in 19455, to £2.33m in 19556, and to £9.05m by 19657. 
Transplantation was one of the many fields in which progress was made during 
these years.  At a clinical level, by the mid 1950s transplantation of homografts 
(human to human) was ordinarily limited to: cornea and cartilage, which could 
persist for a prolonged periods because they were avascular; skin, which was of 
temporary value in severely burned patients; and bone, and segments of blood 
vessels, which provided scaffolding for regenerating tissues in the recipient.8 9 
These human grafts were taken by a postmortem procedure from the recently 
deceased, for undoubted reasons of beneficence, but in circumstances of 
questionable legality in the UK, under the Anatomy Act 183210 (‘the 1832 Act’.).  
This Act had had as its main purpose the expansion of the legal supply of cadavers 
for anatomical examination by dissection in support of education and research.  
Section 15 of the 1832 Act made a saving for postmortem examinations ‘required 
or directed to be made by any competent legal authority’.11  The Act gave no 
consideration to the retention of parts of a body following anatomical examination.  
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 Doubt had existed about whether the provisions of the 1832 Act prohibited all 
post-mortem examinations (‘PMs’; ‘autopsies’), other than those required or 
directed to be made by a competent legal authority, or whether the provisions of 
that Act was limited to anatomical examinations carried out in schools of anatomy.  
Certainly by 1953, experts had been expressing the need for clarification of the law 
as it related to PMs.  According to Coulson and colleagues, who were experienced 
pathologists, it had not been suggested that any of the many thousands of 
examinations had been made from other than laudable motives.  Their probable 
illegality had not been appreciated even by the employing authorities, who not 
infrequently had used experience of PMs as a necessary criterion for appointment 
to a post of consultant pathologist in the NHS.  As put by Coulson and colleagues:  
 These unofficial and apparently unlawful examinations have become an accepted 
 practice.  There appears to be no instance of any prosecution having been 
 instituted, or any civil cause decided, because of their performance.  The 
 situation, however, is unsatisfactory and should be regulated by suitable 
 amendment of the Anatomy Acts or by entirely fresh legislation.12 
 
2. The Corneal Grafting Act 1952 (‘1952 Act’). 13 
2.1 The legislative process. 
The international nature of medicine, and of medical research, imposes pressures 
which are not confined to one legislature.  By the early 1950s, remedial legislation 
to permit corneal grafting had been passed, or was in the process of being passed, 
in several countries, including the Union of South Africa, France, Tunis, Morocco, 
Syria, Spain, and the Territory of Alaska.14  France had been the pioneer: a 1947 law 
removed an earlier requirement for a 24 hour delay before removal of tissue from a 
cadaver.  It authorised prompt excision of eyes from the dead in certain specified 
hospitals, even in the absence of permission from the family, whenever, in the 
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opinion of the medical director, a scientific or therapeutic purpose was to be 
served.15  It was recorded that, prior to 1947, eye surgeons in France had been 
‘compelled (sic) to perform their grafts outside the law’16.   
The legal uncertainties and practical difficulties in regard to corneal grafting in the 
United Kingdom were first confronted in Parliament in 1952.  For some time 
previously there had apparently been a climate of ‘the less said, the better’.  
Kenneth Robinson MP recalled a time when, as a young Member of Parliament, he 
was contacted by certain members of the medical profession about the difficulties 
of getting sufficient corneas for grafting.  He had approached the then Minister of 
Health and asked if there was anything that he, Robinson, could do by way of 
publicity and Parliamentary Questions.  The Minister had returned, having seen his 
advisers, and said: ‘For heaven’s sake, do not raise this matter.  Corneal grafting is 
going on, but the moment we give it any publicity, there will be religious objections 
and the whole matter may come to an end.  So please leave it alone’.17 
Similar reservations had also been expressed to other Members of Parliament, 
notably Dr Horace King MP and Gerald Williams MP, who were also interested to 
promote the cause of corneal grafting.  Happily for blind patients with corneal 
disease, these MPs pressed ahead nonetheless. Their fears of opposition turned out 
to be unfounded, probably due in no small measure to the prior lobbying of fellow 
MPs that they themselves undertook.18  When the Corneal Grafting Bill itself was 
presented as a Private Members’ Bill under The Ten Minutes’ Rule on May 14 1952 
by Gerald Williams MP, he spoke for six minutes only, and the House gave leave to 
introduce the Bill.19  A week later, it passed through its Second Reading, its 
Committee Stage, and its Third Reading, all in the space of thirty seconds, ‘on the 
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nod’, without a single word being spoken on either side of the House.20 The House 
of Lords was equally welcoming.  At Second Reading, there was unanimous support 
for the Bill.21 Committee Stage produced no amendments.22 The Bill was reported 
and passed two days later.23  The Corneal Grafting Act 1952 received Royal Assent 
on June 26, 1952.24 
The provisions of the Corneal Grafting Act 1952 were simple and direct.  The person 
in lawful possession of the body after death may authorise the removal of eyes 
after death by a registered medical practitioner: if the person, either in writing at 
any time, or orally in the presence of two or more witnesses during his last illness, 
expressed a request that his eyes be used for therapeutic purposes25; or, to the 
knowledge of the person in lawful possession, the deceased had never expressed 
an objection to such use; provided in the latter case that the surviving spouse or 
any surviving relative had no objection to their being so used.26  It is of note that 
the Act did not require an enquiry in regard to objections to be made. 
Of the greatest practical significance was the lifting of the 48h embargo.  If it were 
the case that the work of transplant surgeons fell within the scope of the 1832 Act, 
a crucial restriction imposed by that Act inhibited the likelihood of a successful 
operation.  The 1832 Act required that 48h should elapse after death before the 
body ‘shall be moved for anatomical examination’; and this after at least 24h 
following notification to the authorities of intent to proceed; and after receipt of a 
death certificate from a physician, surgeon or apothecary27.  Such delays inevitably 
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altered the chemical and physical composition of cadaveric tissues such as would 
have limited their usefulness as grafts.  With the passage of the 1952 Act it became 
legal for eyes to be removed by a medical practitioner as soon as he was satisfied, 
after examination, that life was extinct28, and that the necessary authorisation had 
been given. 
The years that followed allowed corneal surgery to be further developed, in support 
of which most of the leading eye hospitals developed ‘eye banks’ in which cadaveric 
corneas were stored awaiting use.  
2.2 Unintended consequences of the 1952 Act. 
2.2.1 Experimental grafting of other tissues. 
One of the unintended consequences of the 1952 Act was to add doubt about the 
legality of using other parts of a dead body during a decade in which further 
progress was made in understanding, for example, the immunological basis of 
tissue rejection following experimental transplantation, and how it might be 
ameliorated.   Despite concern about the legality of transplanting non-corneal 
tissues, clinicians and experimentalists continued to explore the possibility of 
grafting other organs and tissues through the 1950s, many probably in complete 
ignorance of the law.  
It is beyond doubt that these activities were known at high levels by the latter years 
of that decade, and that blind eyes were turned in a manner akin to that 
experienced earlier by Kenneth Robinson MP with regard to corneal grafting in the 
early 1950s. In 1958 at a meeting of the Presidents of the several Royal Colleges, Sir 
James Paterson Ross (PRCS (Engl.)) and Professor John Bruce (PRCS (Ed.)) were 
asked to approach the Lord Chancellor and the Lord President of the Court of 
Session respectively about the legal position with regard to homografts.  The 
matter was subsequently discussed by Dr George Godber, Deputy Chief Medical 
Officer (DCMO), with Sir James Paterson Ross in his capacity as the Consultant 
Adviser in Surgery to the Ministry of Health.  While it was agreed that sooner or 
                                                     
28
 Ibid., s.1(3). 
45 
 
later something would need to be done it was thought that the time was not right 
for legislation and that any action in that direction might cause some curtailment of 
the work already being done.29  In January 1960, the DCMO wrote to the Under 
Secretary at the Ministry of Health, following a meeting of Senior Administrative 
Medical Officers (the senior representatives of the Chief Medical Officer in each 
Health Region in England and Wales, referred to as ‘SAMOs’): 
 
 It was clear from what we were told yesterday that the practice of preserving 
 tissues taken at autopsy is widespread and increasing.  The taking of tissues is 
 clearly regarded as of uncertain legality, although in many cases Coroners know 
 what is  going on and do not object.  If an autopsy is to be performed on the 
 Coroner’s instructions removal of artery or bones is unlikely to cause any comment 
 because it may not be known.30 
 
There were (and are) two types of post mortem examination- those requested or 
directed by a coroner to be performed (‘CPM’), and those performed in hospital as 
part of hospital practice (‘HPM’).  The coroner would have known (and, according to 
the DCMO, had not objected to) ‘what was going on’ only in those PMs under his 
jurisdiction. An internal memorandum within the Ministry of Health in June 1960 
went further in allocating a role for coroners by recognising that ‘much of the 
success of the present arrangements is due to the cooperation of the coroners’.31  
However, not all the ‘success’ could be attributable to the action or inaction of 
coroners.  Coroners would not have known, and would not have needed to know, 
what had been the practice in relation to HPMs.  If, as seems likely, HPMs had also 
been a source for obtaining experimental grafting material, presumably it was the 
cooperation of the hospital pathologists that would have been essential in those 
cases.  
2.2.2 Researchers ‘go public’. 
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The meeting of SAMOs had been called to discuss recent correspondence between 
the Medical Research Council (MRC) and the Ministry of Health about the use of 
freeze dried cadaveric human bone as grafting material.  It was this activity that 
arguably was the trigger for the legislative process concerning tissue 
transplantation to begin. 
In late October 1959, Dr HA Sissons of the Institute of Orthopaedics wrote to the 
MRC about the promising results he and colleagues had obtained from the 
experimental use of freeze dried human bone sterilised by gamma irradiation as 
bone grafting material- work which the MRC had supported through a research 
grant.  Dr Sissons proposed that a small number of centres should be established to 
prepare supplies (banks) of freeze dried irradiated bone for clinical use.  He 
suggested that the MRC should consider endorsing and underwriting the scheme.32 
A copy of this letter was sent from the MRC to the DCMO who, in welcoming a 
meeting to discuss the subject further, indicated that: 
 
  If cadaver bone is to be used here, we are up against the old (sic) problem of the 
 legality of taking human tissue.  The legal position is only clear for corneal grafting, 
 and we are beginning to think that we may have to get a clarification of the law  on 
 the taking and storing of other tissues33. 
 
A meeting over lunch at the Athenaeum had already been arranged on November 
16, 1959, between Sir Harold Himsworth (Secretary, MRC), Mr FJC Herrald (MRC), 
Dr Godber (DCMO) and Dr HJ Seddon, Director of the Institute of Orthopaedics, to 
discuss artificial limbs.  It was agreed to add the issue of bone grafting to the 
discussion points.  This was not the first or the last time that the Coffee Room 
[dining room] of ‘the Club’, as Himsworth described it, would be used for gentle 
lobbying and exchange of information.  After discussion, it was agreed that no 
action should be taken on the matter that had been raised in Sisson’s letter until an 
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already scheduled meeting in the Ministry of Health to discuss legal aspects of 
grafting had taken place.34 
Over the following months there were further exchanges of letters, the researchers 
expressing frustration at ‘lack of action’, and the Ministry insisting that it was still 
‘involved in a re-examination of the legal position’.35  On April 1 1960, Dr HJ Seddon 
vented his impatience in a letter to the MRC, saying: 
 Banked bone of some kind or another has been used in this and other countries  for 
 ten years or so.  And now, just when we are ready to put the thing on a proper 
 footing, this legal question crops up…if the MRC and the Ministry of Health do 
 not move soon then I think we shall have to consider taking independent action 
 [unspecified] and damning the consequences.36 
Seddon’s next independent action was to write a letter to the Lancet about ‘*being+ 
compelled to mark time’, and finding it ‘regrettable that, apart from corneal 
grafting, we are six years behind New Zealand’.  The letter concluded ‘it is in the 
interest of many patients that legislation to permit the removal of various tissues 
from the cadaver for surgical use should be permitted without delay’.37    This 
provoked an internal memorandum to the Secretary of the MRC: ‘I am doubtful 
whether he [Seddon] is advancing his cause by bringing the matter to public notice 
in this way …he has effectively prevented the Council from taking any active steps 
in promoting work on this problem until the legal position has been officially 
determined’38 39. 
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Seddon’s letter was not the only communication to the medical press around that 
time about the legal difficulties posed by homografting.  Two weeks previously, 
Professor MFA Woodruff had written to the Lancet, highlighting recent 
developments in the potential for kidney transplantation, and drawing attention to 
the Medical Amendment Act 1954 of New Zealand, which, subject to appropriate 
conditions, regularised the removal of all tissues and organs for therapeutic 
purposes and for education and research40.  Woodruff described this as ‘a shining 
example of enlightened legislation [but of] no help to patients in the United 
Kingdom’.  He thought it ‘clearly desirable’ that both doctors and laymen should 
have a proper appreciation of the situation, and recommended that a working party 
should be set up to advise the Government on appropriate legal action.41 
The content of Woodruff’s letter was the subject of an editorial article in the 
Scottish medical press which could not find ‘any valid reason’ for delay in 
introducing legislation akin to that in New Zealand, legislation which was ‘urgently 
required’.42  The contents of this editorial were relayed to the wider public in The 
Scotsman under the headlines ‘Working party needed. Grafting operations raise 
problems. Legislation needed.’43 
3. The response of the Ministry of Health 
3.1  Inspiration for new legislation. 
Archival resources have revealed that the thinking in the Ministry of Health moved 
from ‘we are beginning to think that we may have to get a clarification of the law’ 
(November 1959)44, through ‘the difficulty *associated with+ homograft material… 
has been included in a list of possible subjects for legislation, [but with] no 
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assurance of time’ (April 1960)45, to ‘if it is accepted that the legal position ought to 
be clarified…there does not seem to be anything to be gained by delay’ (July 1960: 
Briefing for Minister of Health)46.  
 It is difficult to be certain of all the factors which contributed to this stage of 
‘inspiration’ for new legislation.  The inexorable march of scientific progress, led by 
sometimes impatient scientists; an anxiety about being able to continue to turn a 
blind eye (for example, SAMOs who ‘were aware of various attempts to maintain 
tissue banks, but were avoiding learning too much because they were really 
uncertain of the legal position’47, and  ‘coroners who were aware of what was going 
on’48); a sincere wish, on behalf of both clinicians and civil servants, to ensure 
clinical advances for the benefit of patients (the briefing for the Minister in July 
1960 spoke of ‘a practice which is already of importance in saving or prolonging life, 
and which is likely to develop further and increase in importance’); all are likely to 
have been influential in perceiving the need for legislation.  Articles in the medical 
and lay press may also have played a role.49  
It was at this time that advice was sought from the Department of Health in New 
Zealand.50  A letter from a Ministry of Health official indicated to his counterpart in 
New Zealand that ‘we contemplate something very much on the lines of your Act’51.  
It is of interest that nearly two years previously, officials in the Scottish Office had 
separately sought information about the background to, and provisions of, the New 
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Zealand legislation on human tissues52, and had received a bundle of papers in 
response, which included a summary of Explanatory Notes prepared for 
Parliamentary use in New Zealand.53 It would appear that they had omitted to share 
this with colleagues in England. 
In New Zealand, the Medical Act 190854, through the Medical Amendment Act 
195455, came to permit inter alia: first, the removal of healthy tissue (eyes or any 
other part of the body) after death for therapeutic purposes, if either the person 
had expressed such a request during his last illness (and was not known to have 
withdrawn it), or the person in lawful possession of the body authorised the 
removal of healthy tissue, provided that person had no reason to believe that the 
deceased had expressed a prior objection, or that the surviving spouse or any 
known relative required that the body be buried or cremated without such 
removal56;  second, a post mortem examination for the purposes of medical 
research or the teaching of pathology to be carried out, with similar provisos to be 
satisfied as were to be operative in the removal of tissue for therapeutic purposes- 
with the important requirement that ‘the surviving husband or wife, or if there is no 
husband or wife known to be surviving and there is known to be a relative, any such 
relative, consents (my emphasis) to a post mortem examination57.   
It is difficult to believe that the publicity in the professional and lay press in the UK 
did not play a role in determining the timetable.  The civil servant who drafted the 
Ministerial Memorandum for the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee noted to a 
colleague that ‘it is noticeable [from the files] that since early 1959 there has been 
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some change in the view of our medical colleagues on the desirability for 
introducing new legislation, partly because the practice is increasing and partly 
because the interest in the subject indicated by recent articles in the medical and 
lay press make it not impossible that we may be challenged…it seems to me that 
there is considerable risk in allowing matters to go on as they are doing at present 
and that there is everything to be gained by introducing legislation at a time chosen 
by us rather than being forced into an embarrassing cover up’.58 
3.2 Further deliberation, and formulation of a Bill. 
In Drewry’s terms, the stage of ‘deliberation and formulation’ of new legislation 
was now well underway to the extent that the skeleton of the future Bill could 
already be found in the memorandum which had been prepared for the Cabinet 
Home Affairs Committee (‘HAC’; ‘the Committee’) in July 196059, and in the 
accompanying briefing notes for the Minister of Health, the Rt Hon J Enoch Powell 
MP60.   
The need for a new Bill was explained in the memorandum in these terms: 
 It is uncertain whether the removal of tissue from a dead body is lawful, even 
 when consent is given: and, further, if retention with consent is lawful, whose 
 consent is required.  It is doubtful whether there is property in a dead body, 
 and the precise legal effect of the bequest of one’s body is not certain.  The 
 Corneal Grafting Act, 1952, was  introduced in order to remove these doubts in 
 respect of the corneas of the eyes.  That Act authorises the corneas of deceased 
 persons to be used for therapeutic purposes- (i) if they have so expressed an 
 objection or that his surviving relatives might object.61 
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The memorandum, having highlighted the then recent advances in surgery and the 
preservation of tissues, predicted the likelihood that whole organ transplantation 
into gravely ill patients would become feasible in the near future.  It drew attention 
to the legal uncertainty and to related ‘comment in the national and medical Press’, 
which might make the then present activities, taking place in an increasing number 
of hospitals, difficult to justify if legally challenged. Such an eventuality would 
jeopardise the great progress being made in this field of surgery.  It was anticipated 
that a Bill which attended to the issues ‘would be generally welcomed by the 
medical profession and well received by Parliament and by informed public 
opinion’. The memorandum noted that there had been no opposition in Parliament 
to the Corneal Grafting Bill,  but recognised that there could be opposition from 
certain religious denominations such as Orthodox Jews.  However, it was 
anticipated that the safeguards contemplated should be sufficient to meet any 
objection on that score.62  It is worth noting in passing that, in 1953, the Presiding 
Rabbi of the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations had written to the Home 
Secretary about their concern about post-mortem examinations.  He had asked for 
an interview to consider protection for the bodies of deceased strictly orthodox 
Jews.  During 1960, officials in the Ministry of Health were unable to find evidence 
that this had been followed up.63 64 There is no evidence in the HAC papers that 
there had been specific discussion about ‘consent’.  The Minister had been briefed 
on provisions relating to consent in these terms:  
 Shortly before the Corneal Grafting Act came into force the Ministry advised that 
 hospitals should not take advantage of the power given by that Act to remove a 
 dead person’s eyes in the absence of any known or presumed objection from 
 himself or his relatives, and that wherever relatives were available their consent 
 should be obtained.  In a letter to Secretaries of Hospital Boards and 
 Management Committees it was said that if relatives were known to exist but  
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 were unavailable to give consent the eyes should not be removed.65  It was 
 realised that it might be difficult and embarrassing to seek consent so soon 
 after death but this was thought to be better than the alternative of relying on 
 absence of objection.  This advice (which is disliked by the Faculty of 
 Ophthalmologists, who have been pressing the Ministry  to ‘apply the Act’) was 
 given because it was felt that at that time public opinion was not sufficiently 
 advanced to accept the full application of the Act. Consideration has been given to 
 so as to require consent to be sought in every case, since as matters stand, the 
 been felt, however, that this would be a retrograde step and that the Act should be 
 left in its present form, in the hope that public opinion will eventually become 
 sufficiently enlightened to permit the full powers of the Act.  In the same way it is 
 considered that any Bill introduced now should contain consent provisions on the 
 lines of those in the Corneal Grafting Act.66   
I have no evidence about whether or not the Minister of Health shared these hopes 
for the coming of more enlightened times, but there is evidence from the 
Parliamentary debates on the Human Tissue Bill, which will be discussed below, 
that he understood at least some of the sensitivities which surrounded ‘consent’ 
and ‘an absence of objection’.67 
The driving force for proposed legislation was the progress being made in 
transplantation.  Because it was recognised in the memorandum that the best 
source of human tissue for therapeutic purposes was from the young who had been 
involved in fatal road traffic accidents, officials had thought it desirable, subject to 
the views and agreement of representatives of coroners, to legalise the removal of 
tissue in such circumstances, recognising that the permission of the Coroner 
(Procurator Fiscal in Scotland) would be required in each case.  
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On July 22, 1960, HAC, in discussion, ‘showed general agreement with the 
proposals; and approved the proposal in [the Ministerial memorandum68] for a 
Tissue Grafting Bill’ to be handed to a private member in the Session of 1960/61’69. 
There is archival evidence that provisions regarding post mortems were not 
included in the Bill until late in the process of ‘formulation’.  At a meeting in the 
Minister’s room on November 29, 1960 to discuss the draft of the Bill, on the very 
morning of a meeting of the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee, there was some 
discussion about the legality of post-mortems as such. The minute read:  
 The view hitherto of all concerned had been that post mortems carried out in 
 hospitals to establish the reasons for the death of a particular patient were legal 
 and were not affected by the Anatomy Acts; it was, therefore, unnecessary to 
 make specific provision in the present Bill to establish their legality.  The Minister 
 however was having increasing doubts about this, in view of a recent case in a 
 Nottingham mortuary where a dead body had been the subject of an assault by a 
 mortuary attendant.  Apparently the position was that there was no law governing 
 what might or might not be done to a dead bodies (provided there was no offence 
 to public decency) and he thought that there might be Parliamentary pressure for 
 some more specific legal control about what might be done to dead bodies.  It was 
 agreed that Parliamentary Counsel might be asked to produce a draft clause 
 establishing the legality of post mortem examinations in case, on further 
 consideration, it was thought necessary to incorporate this in the Bill.70 
This explains why the memorandum to HAC also recommended, under ‘related 
provisions’, that the new legislation should deal with certain shortcomings of the 
Anatomy Act, 1832: 
   Doubts had been felt in some quarters’ about the legality of post-mortem 
 examinations for the purpose of medical research and teaching of pathology, 
 outside the provisions of the Anatomy Acts 1832 and 1871.   This doubt had arisen 
 because Section 15 of the Anatomy Act, 1832, had made a saving only in respect of 
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 post mortem examinations ‘required or directed to be made by any competent 
 legal authority’.71  
 It was pointed out to the HAC that it was the regular practice in many hospitals, 
with the consent of the relatives, to have a routine PM of a patient who had died in 
hospital, even where the cause of death may be certain, in order to study the effect 
of disease on the body.  Tissues required for grafting were often removed in the 
process of such examination, and it was considered essential to remove any doubt 
about the legality of these activities, including the removal of tissues, where there 
was no objection.  The memorandum also commended taking the opportunity to 
cover the retention, with consent (my emphasis), of anatomical specimens removed 
for purposes of teaching and research during post mortem examinations carried out 
outside the Anatomy Act, as well as during anatomical dissection.72 
The minutes of the two meetings of HAC which considered the proposal to 
introduce new legislation appeared to reflect a quickening pace.  At the meeting on 
November 24, 1960, the supporting papers from the Minister of Health and the 
Secretary of State for Scotland warned that the need to introduce the Bill urgently 
may arise either because the Medical Research Council may be pressed to develop 
new facilities for storing tissues taken from dead bodies, or the legality of current 
practices may be challenged, directly or indirectly, in a court.73 The Minister was 
also mindful of the ‘Nottingham case’, as described above, although no specific 
mention was made of it either in his memorandum to HAC in November 1960, or in 
the minutes of the HAC meeting.   HAC minuted that ‘in view of the rapid 
development of the practices, now of doubtful legality, which the Bill would 
legalise, its introduction might at any time become a matter of urgency’.  HAC 
changed its previous decision that the Bill would be suitable for introduction by a 
Private Member and approved instead that it should be introduced by the 
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Government.74 The Chairman of HAC (Rt Hon. RA Butler MP, Home Secretary) 
agreed in his capacity as Chairman of the Future Legislation Committee that a Bill 
should be drafted.75  The path was clear to instruct Parliamentary Counsel. 
3.3 Instructions to Parliamentary Counsel. 
Parliamentary Counsel was requested to prepare a Bill: 
 to authorise the removal and retention of human tissues from dead bodies for 
 therapeutic purposes or use in connection with medical and pathological research 
 and education; 
 to clarify the law so as to ensure that post-mortems can be conducted, whether to 
 ascertain the cause of death in a particular case or for the purposes of medical and 
 pathological research and education, although not exempted from the provisions 
 of the Anatomy Act, 1832, by section 15 of that Act; and 
 to amend Section 13 of the Anatomy Act, 1832, so as to enable bodies which have 
 been the subject of anatomy under that Act to be cremated as an alternative to 
 burial and to enable tissue obtained from such bodies to be retained for such 
 period as may be required.76 
In the explanatory paragraphs that followed, attention was drawn to the Medical 
Amendment Act 1954 of New Zealand, which ‘followed to some extent the *UK+ 
Corneal Grafting Act 1952’ but which was made to extend to removal of tissue from 
all parts of the body.  Counsel was asked to consider whether the object of the Bill 
would be best achieved by amending the 1952 Act, or by repealing it and 
incorporating its provisions into the forthcoming Bill.  The need to authorise the 
removal and retention of tissue for research and education, as well as for 
therapeutic purposes, was emphasized, as was the need for the cooperation of the 
coroner in allowing tissue removal for therapeutic cases in certain circumstances 
(for example, road traffic deaths) where an inquest was mandatory. 
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With regard to PMs, the Instructions pointed out the doubt which existed about 
whether the provisions of the Anatomy Acts of 1832 and 1871 prohibited PMs, 
other than those required or directed to be made by a competent legal authority, 
or whether the provisions of these Acts were limited to anatomical examinations 
carried out in schools of anatomy.  The Instructions described the regular practice 
in many hospitals over many years to carry out routine PMs to discover the cause of 
death or for pathological research, ‘unless there are express objections’, and noted 
that these examinations had not conformed to the provisions of the Anatomy Acts.  
Furthermore tissues were often removed in the course of such examinations for the 
purposes of grafting and research.  The Bill was to ensure that the Anatomy Acts did 
not in any way prohibit PMs carried out by a medical practitioner for the purposes 
of discovering or confirming the cause of death, medical or pathological research or 
education, or removal and retention of tissue for grafting, teaching or research.  It 
was nevertheless desirable, the Instructions stated, that PMs carried out for 
medical or pathological purposes should be subject to similar authorisation as in s.1 
of the Corneal Grafting Act, 1952.77 
There are several features, and some inconsistencies, in the Instructions to Counsel 
(which will have relevance later in this narrative), both as to the place of ‘consent’ 
and to the desirability of following the provisions of the Corneal Grafting Act 1952 
and/or the then recent New Zealand legislation. 
First, there was no mention in the Instructions of ‘consent’ (except for the need for 
the coroner’s ‘consent’ in certain circumstances).  Instead, the everyday practice of 
carrying out post-mortem examinations, ‘unless there were express objections’, 
was described.  This was in contrast to the case which the Home Affairs Committee 
had approved, where the supporting Memorandum had mentioned consent 
explicitly78.   In the first paragraph of that Memorandum , headed ‘Need for Bill’, 
the first sentence approached the subject somewhat obliquely: ‘It is uncertain 
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whether the removal of tissue from a dead body is lawful, even where consent has 
been given: and further, if retention with consent is lawful, whose consent is 
required’79.  Later in the Memorandum, when discussing post mortem 
examinations, the need for consent was expressed unequivocally: 
  It would be desirable to…cover the retention, with consent, of anatomical 
 specimens for teaching and research…Any such provision should apply to the 
 retention (with consent) for purposes of teaching or research, of specimens 
 removed during post mortem examinations carried out outside the Anatomy Act, 
 as well as during anatomical dissection.80 
There were repeated references in the Instructions to Counsel to the provisions of 
the Corneal Grafting Act and the need for the Bill to incorporate its provisions.  At 
the same time, Counsel was asked to note that the amendments made to the New 
Zealand Medical Act, 1908 by the Medical Amendment Act, 1954,  ‘followed to 
some extent the Corneal Grafting Act, 1952’.  Specific attention was drawn to the 
new s.24A of the 1908 Act.81   
When s.1(2) of the Corneal Grafting Act 1952 and s.24A of the New Zealand Medical 
Act 1908 (as amended)(‘the NZ Act’) are compared there is little difference in the 
conditions attached to  ‘removal for therapeutic purposes.’  Both Acts provided that 
a person, or the party lawfully in possession may authorise the removal of the eyes 
*‘or any other part of the body’ at s.24A of the NZ Act+ from the body for 
therapeutic purposes unless the person in lawful possession had reason to believe 
that a) the deceased had expressed a prior objection and had not withdrawn it 
subsequently; or b) that the surviving spouse or any surviving relative objected.   In 
s.1(2)(b) of the 1952 Act this objection had been stated directly in the phrase 
‘objected to the deceased’s eyes being so dealt with’; in s.24A of the NZ Act the 
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proviso was ‘ that there was no reason to believe that the surviving spouse or any 
known relative required that the body be buried or cremated without such 
*tissue+removal’. 
However, the amended NZ Act, unlike the Corneal Grafting Act 1952, had a further 
section, s24B, which legalised non coronial post mortems by providing for a post 
mortem examination for the purposes of medical research or the teaching of 
pathology to be carried out, with similar provisos to be satisfied as were to be 
operative in the removal of tissue for therapeutic purposes- with the important 
requirement that ‘the surviving husband or wife, or if there is no husband or wife 
known to be surviving and there is known to be a relative, any such relative, 
consents (my emphasis) to a post mortem examination’82.   
3.3.1 Whatever happened, in drafting the Bill, to ‘retention’ and ‘consent’? 
It will be noted that the Instructions to Parliamentary Counsel referred to 
‘retention’ but not (except in a limited sense) to ‘consent’-in contrast to the 
memorandum to HAC, discussed above, which had specifically recognized the need 
for consent83.   Because both concepts were later to play such a prominent role in 
the scandals at Bristol84 and Liverpool (Alder Hey)85, as will discussed in detail in 
later chapters, it is important to trace now why neither term came to appear on the 
face of the Bill or in the subsequent Act. 
On receipt of the instructions from the Ministry of Health,  Parliamentary Counsel 
who was responsible for drafting the Bill (HF Rowe), raised some points in 
preliminary correspondence, which are worth quoting directly because, in my view 
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(and published by me elsewhere86), they represent the very beginning of the ‘tissue 
retention’ controversies of later years.  Rowe wrote:  
  I hope it will not be necessary to authorise the retention as well as the removal  of 
 tissue.  Since the law does not recognise a right of property in a dead body it is 
 difficult to see why such a provision should be necessary.  S.13 of the Anatomy Act 
 1832 requires provision to be made for the interment of bodies removed under the 
 Act...If this is all the law bearing on the point we can surely forget about retention?  
 What the section requires is disposal of ‘such body’ ie a body which has been 
 dissected.  One does  not have to go into details to see that, in the nature of things, 
 the body cannot be as  complete as it was before it was removed for ‘anatomical 
 examination’.  This is perhaps a matter of degree and I am not suggesting that the 
 section would allow you to withhold whole limbs from interment; but so long as 
 what was interred is ‘such body’, in ordinary parlance, I should have thought that 
 the letter as well as the spirit of the law would be obeyed, notwithstanding that 
 some part is retained.  I need not remind you that the observations of Portia J on a 
 related subject have been severely criticised by jurisprudents.87  
I have been unable to find any challenge from the Ministry to Counsel’s proposal to 
remove ‘retention’ from the Bill.  Instead one may note the response of the senior 
civil servant involved in preparing the Instructions, on receipt later of copies of the 
draft Bill (which contained no ‘consent’ and no mention of ‘retention’).  ‘Thank you 
for… the prints of the very neat Bill you have drafted.  It seems to us to cover 
admirably all that is required’.88 
Neither in Counsel’s preliminary letter, nor in any further correspondence about 
the draft Bill, was ‘consent’ mentioned, save where the role of the coroner was 
being discussed.  Instead, there was a telling section in Counsel’s letter, which 
showed that, in his mind, legislation about postmortems was being clearly linked to 
the provisions of the Anatomy Act 1832.  Rowe wrote:  
 Post mortem examinations seem to be rather more difficult than the removal of 
 parts of the body.  It would be easy enough (although probably not worthwhile) to 
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 say something about post mortems carried out for the sake of finding or 
 confirming the cause of death.  When it comes to post mortems for the purposes 
 of medical research and education I wonder how much of the 1832 Act can survive.  
 This is perhaps the most difficult point, and a discussion would be very helpful.89 90 
The Anatomy Act 1832 did not refer to ‘consent’.  Rather, when referring to the 
veto of relatives in regard to an ‘Anatomical Examination’ which otherwise had 
been legitimised under the terms of the Act, it stated at sections 7 and 8: ‘*u]nless 
the surviving Husband or Wife, or any known Relative of the deceased Person, shall 
require the Body to be interred without such Examination’91.  It is of interest that 
this is the form of words used in the New Zealand Amendment Act 1954 (‘the NZ 
Act’), an Act to which Counsel’s attention had been specifically drawn.  It is clear, 
however, that Counsel ignored the use of ‘consent’ as it appeared elsewhere in the 
NZ Act, but chose instead to be influenced by the Instructions that had been given 
to him which had indicated that it was considered desirable that postmortems 
carried out for medical or pathological purposes ‘should be subject to similar 
authorisation as in s.1 of the Corneal Grafting Act, 1952’92 (which required ‘an 
absence of objection’ from spouse or relatives). 
There was one internal memorandum within the Ministry regarding consent which, 
in retrospect, went to the heart of a major misunderstanding which would be 
revealed at the Bristol Inquiry forty years later93, but which, at the time of drafting 
the Bill, did not receive an extensive airing.  The memorandum concerned the use 
of tissues from bodies subject to coroners’ post mortem examinations, and had 
been written following a meeting between officials and the Minister about the draft 
                                                     
89
 The National Archives.  Ref MH58/497.  Letter from HF Rowe (Office of the Parliamentary Counsel) 
to SD Musson, October 11, 1960, op.cit. 
90 I have been unable to find evidence that further discussion ensued on this point. 
91
 Anatomy Act, 1832 (c.75). ss7 and 8. 
92
 The National Archives. Ref. MH 58/497.  Human Tissue grafting Bill: instructions to Parliamentary 
Counsel. Ministry of Health, op.cit. 
93
 The Inquiry into the management of care of children receiving complex heart surgery at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary: Interim Report: Removal and retention of human material. May 2000, op.cit. 
62 
 
Bill and a subsequent conversation with an official from the Home Office.  The note 
is worth quoting in full. 
 Provided the consent of the coroner is obtained in each individual case, the Home 
 Office would not see any objection to the removal of tissues for  therapeutic, 
 educational or research purposes, either before, during or after a post mortem 
 examination ordered by a coroner.  You [SD Musson, Principal Assistant Solicitor of 
 the Ministry of Health’s legal division+ consider that this is already covered by the 
 terms of the draft bill but that we would want to ensure that, in such cases, the 
 necessary consents were obtained under clause 1.94  
The context in which this memorandum was written was mainly a concern that 
tissue from victims of road traffic accidents (whose deaths would fall within a 
coroner’s jurisdiction) should be able to be used for grafting. 
It would appear that the Ministry officials who had drawn up the Instructions to 
Parliamentary Counsel, who were the same officials as had supplied briefing notes 
for the Minister in preparation for the meetings of the Home Affairs Committee, 
had also overlooked, when drawing up these Instructions, much earlier guidance 
from the Ministry of Health.  As had been summarised in the Minister’s briefing 
notes under ‘provisions relating to consent’, in 1952 the Ministry of Health had 
advised Hospital Boards and Management Committees that, the provisions of the 
Corneal Grafting Act 1952 notwithstanding, ‘it was realised that it might be difficult 
and embarrassing to seek consent [for removal of eyes] so soon after death, but 
this was thought to be better than the alternative of relying on absence of 
objection’.95  It is possible than the minds of officials really had been suffused by 
the hope, expressed in a still earlier internal memorandum, that, ‘as enlightenment 
progresses public opinion will advance to the point where the consent of relatives 
need not be specifically sought’.96 
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And so it was that neither ‘retention’ nor ‘consent’ appeared in the Bill which came 
before Parliament in late December 1960, by which time it had become 
mechanically possible (in experimental animals) to transplant organs, including 
lungs, kidneys, liver, and even heart, although immune rejection remained an 
impenetrable barrier to prolonged graft survival.97  Indeed, in the months before 
the Bill came before Parliament, there had been newspaper reports of ‘another’ 
successful transfer of a kidney from one identical twin to the other98, the first 
successful kidney transplant between two unrelated persons99, and the award of 
the Nobel prize to Medawar and Burnett for the discovery of ‘acquired 
immunological tolerance’100 (the basis of avoiding graft rejection).  The stage was 
truly set. 
4. The Human Tissue Act 1961 (‘1961 Act’).101 
4.1 ‘Legitimation’: passage of the 1960-61 Human Tissue Bill (‘the Bill’)102  
At 10.56pm on the evening of December 20, 1960, in the House of Commons, the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health, Miss Edith Pitt MP, introduced 
the  1960-61 Human Tissue Bill at Second Reading, whose purpose was two-fold: 
first, to authorise, subject to a number of safeguards, the removal of parts of 
human bodies after death for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of medical 
education or research; and second, to put beyond doubt the legality of postmortem 
examinations, carried out by, or on the instructions of, registered medical 
practitioners.103  Miss Pitt’s opening speech, which described the Bill as ‘*one which 
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is] mainly concerned with the removal of doubt, but [which] may nevertheless be 
described as wholly beneficial and in some cases a life-saving measure.’104, set a 
tone of optimism and confidence which permeated the ensuing debate.  Most MPs 
who spoke that evening focused on organ and tissue transplantation.  Questions 
about the clauses that concerned post mortem examinations were largely for the 
purpose of clarification only, and provoked little discussion.   
A striking illustration of the change in attitude that must have occurred throughout 
the 1950s, towards cadaveric transplantation at least, was given by Kenneth 
Robinson MP early in the debate during Second Reading of the Bill.  Having 
reminisced about the circumstances in which the Corneal Grafting Act 1952  had 
been passed following a Private Member’s Bill, he said: ‘We have come some way in 
that today this Bill is being brought forward openly and officially  by the Minister of 
Health as a Government Measure.  This is a revolution in thought that we can all 
welcome’.105 
The Bill had three clauses.  Clause 1 authorised, subject to important safeguards, 
the removal of any part of a dead body for therapeutic purposes, or for purposes of 
education and research.  Clause 2 made lawful postmortem examinations carried 
out by, or on the instructions of, a doctor and performed for the purposes of 
determining or confirming the cause of death, or for investigating the nature of 
underlying disease or abnormality in the interests of teaching and research; thereby 
removing doubts about the legality of such examinations under the Anatomy Act 
1832.  Clause 3 amended the 1832 Act by permitting a body which had been 
anatomically examined under that Act to be cremated. 
The atmosphere throughout the second reading of the Bill in Parliament was 
uniformly supportive of the objects of the Bill, and at times it bordered on the 
euphoric.  Although the driving force behind the development of new legislation 
was the wish to enhance opportunities for transplantation, the needs of research 
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and education were also recognised in the debate.  Miss Edith Pitt MP, when 
presenting the Bill, emphasised the importance of disseminating knowledge and 
encouraging research106, and of putting beyond doubt the lawfulness of what the 
medical profession required for the improvement of treatment, education and 
research.107  Miss Joan Vickers MP endorsed these points, recognising that, not only 
could tissues be used to cure people who were ill, but they could also be used for 
research into diseases about which little was known.108 To the mind of Lord Balniel 
MP, it was infinitely wonderful that, by this Bill, medical science would be able to 
create something approaching the immortality of the living cell, because the living 
cell would be able to be transferred from generation to generation, creating with it 
new health.109  Dr Horace King MP suggested that the Government might raise the 
matter with the United Nations, with the aim of building up, as part of world 
civilisation, a great tissue bank whereby the dead would be helping the living.110 
The tone of the evening was perhaps best summarised by the view of Miss Vickers 
MP that the name of the Bill was unfortunate, and should be changed to the 
‘Human Aid to Medical Science Bill’.111 
There was a delay of nearly six months before the Committee stage in the House of 
Commons was reached, balked by other [non tissue related] controversies.112 
During the Committee stage, nine amendments were proposed, which focused on: 
a definition of ‘last illness’; a wish to define the Hospital Management Committee 
as ‘the person in lawful possession’; a requirement that the person in lawful 
possession ‘shall’ (rather than ‘may’) authorise; the possible illegality of moving the 
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body from one hospital to another in order that research may be carried out; a 
consent [sic] form, agreeing to the use of body parts in the case of death while in 
hospital, to be endorsed by the relatives; a need to specify procedures to determine 
death; ability for donor to specify the purposes for which his or her body parts will 
be used; the need for publicity to increase the number of donors; the need ensure 
that the jurisdiction of coroners was not encroached upon.113  The Minister of 
Health, in response to a question about the amendments from the Chief Whip 
before the Committee stage of the Bill, had written ‘There are nine altogether.  
None is wrecking.  I would propose to accept two or three for peace’s sake’114.  This 
exchange gives a small insight into how amendments may be viewed by the 
relevant Ministry, and is a partial illustration of Drewry’s point that, by the time a 
Bill reaches Parliament it will already have been subjected to much discussion and 
negotiation, so that ‘Ministers are usually reluctant to concede new 
amendments’115 116.  In the end, no amendment to the Bill was accepted. 117     
The Bill’s passage through the House of Lords stages was equally smooth118 119 120, 
with no amendments.  As in the Lower House, such debate as there was 
concentrated on organ transplantation: with Peers welcoming the advances in 
science, and the opportunity no longer to need despair that one’s life’s work had 
been valueless to the community- because the Bill would allow another chance 
after death in this world.121  
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There were only two significant contributions in the House of Lords concerning 
‘consent’, which gave further illustration of the prevailing attitudes of the time.  
Lord Newton, when introducing the Bill at Second Reading, referred to the Minister 
of Health as having been:  
 [a]t great pains to consider the feelings of those who may have scruples about its 
 provisions. There are careful safeguards. I know that some people think they are 
 too careful. But, my Lords, even though public sentiment to-day may be far 
 removed from what it was in 1829 or 1832, it is still essential, in my judgment, to 
 avoid the risk of causing offence.  To cause offence would not only be wrong but 
 might even defeat the whole object of the exercise.122 
Lord Amulree, a medical doctor, having stressed the importance of post mortem 
examinations for investigation or research, recalled the manner in which ‘obtaining’ 
a post mortem was carried out in his younger days, and compared it with then 
current practice as he observed it: 
 One wonders whether the actual mechanism for obtaining a post-mortem is not 
 now a little complicated and difficult. When I was young it was in a way simpler, 
 but perhaps rather more callous. A notice was put up at the entrance to the 
 hospital saying that supposing a patient were to die in the hospital a post-mortem 
 examination would be carried out provided the relatives did not object. That 
 sounds somewhat callous, I agree, but I wonder whether it is more callous or more 
 difficult than what is done at the present time. When a patient dies the 
 examination has to be carried out fairly soon after death and sometimes the 
 relatives are approached by a rather embarrassed and  often young doctor with a 
 request that a post-mortem examination should be carried out. It is difficult for 
 relatives to make up their minds within such a short time of the death of someone 
 who is dear to them, and on a number of occasions they refuse because they say, 
 quite sincerely, that their relative has suffered enough and they do not want 
 anything more to be done. I wonder whether something more approaching  the 
 other practice could not be made possible, because no relative need, or should, be 
 able to see any of the signs of the examination when the body is given back to 
 them for burial.123 
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The proceedings in the House of Lords were completed after Third Reading on July 
26, 1961, the Human Tissue Act 1961 received Royal Assent the next day and was in 
force two months later.124 
4.2 Further consideration of aspects of the 1961 Act which would reappear as 
issues of concern in the years to come. 
 4.2.1 Retention of organs and tissues. 
With regard to retention, the view of Counsel prevailed, as described above, in that 
the Bill (and the 1961 Act) ‘made provision with respect to the use of body parts of 
deceased persons’, whereby a person, or after death the person in lawful 
possession, could authorise ‘removal…for use’ of any part of the body for 
therapeutic purposes or for medical education or research.  It is arguable that the 
minds of MPs were so concentrated on organ transplantation, a procedure in which 
the organ is taken and has to be used with the minimum of delay, that ‘removal for 
use’ appeared to describe an operational necessity, and the concept of ‘retention’ 
did not arise.  Yet it has to be noted that, in the years following the Corneal Grafting 
Act 1952, ‘banks’ of corneas had been established in several important Eye 
Hospitals125, without the term ‘retention’ appearing in that Act, and without 
adverse comment subsequently. 
The brief prepared by officials for Miss Pitt contained one reference to retention.126  
Miss Pitt adhered faithfully to that brief by stating in the early paragraphs of her 
introduction of the Bill the importance of encouraging the dissemination of 
knowledge and the progress of research by ‘the study and, if need be, the retention 
of parts of the body, essential for this purpose’.127  However, when she came to 
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introduce the contents of the Bill, clause by clause, ‘retention’ did not reappear.  
When outlining the clause on post-mortems (the section which would lead to so 
much grief forty years later), Miss Pitt confined her remarks to emphasising that the 
purpose of the Bill was to set to rest the doubts that such examinations, which 
were carried out for the purpose of establishing the cause of death or of 
investigating the existence of any abnormal condition of the body, were entirely 
lawful.  
4.2.2 ‘No objection’. 
With regard to ‘no objection’ as compared to ‘consent’ during passage of the Bill 
through the House of Commons, it is possible that MPs were deflected by remarks 
made by the Under Secretary, Miss Pitt, early in her introduction of the Bill.  She 
drew attention to the requirement to ‘make such reasonable enquiry as shall be 
practicable’, a requirement which had been absent from the Corneal Grafting Act 
1952, and then recalled the strong advice which had been given by the Ministry to 
hospital management about that Act, that they should not rely on the powers given 
in the Act to remove eyes in the absence of known objection, but, wherever 
relatives were available, to seek their consent.128 Miss Pitt went on to say that it 
was proposed to recommend to hospital authorities to adopt the same procedure 
of obtaining the consent of relatives where they were available in relation to any 
part of the body as authorised by the present Bill.129  No speaker returned 
subsequently to this issue.  [The document (H.M.(61) 98)130 that was later sent to 
Regional Boards, Boards of Governance and Hospital Management Committees was 
at variance with Miss Pitt’s expressed proposal.  H.M.(61) 98, issued by the Ministry 
of Health on September 19, 1961, one week before the Human Tissue Act 1961 
came into force, stated: 
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 The nearest relative available should be asked if he objects, or has reason to 
 believe  that any other relative would object, but hospital authorities are not 
 expected to ask that relative for a statement that no other relatives object.  Every 
 care must be taken to record, and give effect to objections from patients or 
 relatives…]131 
Lord Balniel had said in his speech in the Commons ‘Permission under the Bill has to 
be obtained from any surviving relative.  My Rt. Hon. Friend (the Minister of Health) 
shakes his head, but I think I am right- that permission has to be obtained from the 
spouse or any surviving relative’.132  Later, in his closing speech, the Minister 
corrected his noble Friend, pointing out that the expression ‘permission of a 
surviving relative’ was not strictly accurate.  ‘The reference is to having “no reason” 
after “reasonable enquiry” “to believe” that “any surviving relative” objects’.133 The 
Minister did not enlarge on Lord Balniel’s misreading, or perhaps misinterpretation, 
of the wording of the Bill, (nor did it become clear how many MPs, if any, endorsed 
his Lordship’s interpretation of the Bill), but instead went on to deal with the scope 
of ‘any surviving relative’, which in fact had been his Lordship’s substantive point. 
A small number of speakers took the opposite tack and regretted that the Bill would 
allow relatives to veto the wishes of the deceased.  This was said by the Minister to 
be a misreading.  In correcting it, the Minister said that the surviving relative only 
came in where there had been no specific desire known of the deceased person, 
and where therefore it was right to be sure that the deceased had not objected 
himself to his body being so used, and that this being done would not ‘outrage the 
surviving spouse or any- I repeat any- surviving relative’.134 Earlier, in response to a 
question as to why ‘any surviving relative’ had not been defined, the Minister 
believed that it would be wrong to need to inquire into the degree of consanguinity 
of any relative who expressed objection, because he was ‘convinced that far more 
harm would be done to the cause which the House of Commons had at heart that 
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night by a single case in which a strongly held scruple was overridden than a 
temporary loss of opportunity’.135 The emphasis on the respect which the negative 
views of any surviving relative should be shown, together with Miss Pitt’s earlier 
indication that it would be preferable to seek positive consent (a recommendation 
repeated by Lord Newton when introducing the Bill in the House of Lords136), are 
clear indications to me that the Government had wished such reasonable inquiry as 
may be practicable to be made assiduously, and for strongly held objections to be 
respected without demur. 
4.2.3 Expressions of concern from members of the public. 
After Second Reading of the Bill, the Ministry received a number of letters from 
members of the public which have been preserved in the National Archives.137 138 
139 All expressed concerns: many were abusive.  One is worthy of quotation, 
because its contents could have contributed to the debate, then and subsequently.  
The writer had proposed that only written permission from the donor should be 
acceptable.  He was suspicious about the scale of ‘such reasonable inquiry as shall 
be practicable’, opining that ‘no surgeon is likely to make more than perfunctory 
efforts to defeat his own object’.140  The official reply restated the objects of the 
Bill, and indicated the Minister’s view that, if, in the years ahead, sufficient people 
bequested their eyes, then the involvement of relatives would be spared.141 I have 
found no evidence, direct or indirect, that these expressions of ‘public opinion’ had 
any influence on the content of the Bill, or on the debates: a situation in complete 
                                                     
135
 Ibid., 1256. 
136
 (1961) 233 Parl.Deb. (Hansard, 5th series) HL 57. 
137
 The National Archives. Ref. MH58/497.  Letter from HC Evans to the Prime Minister (Rt Hon 
Harold Macmillan MP), undated. 
138
 Ibid. Letter from N B---[illegible] to ‘Ministry of Health’, July 4, 1961. 
139
 Ibid.  Letter from WL Mancey to the Minister of Health. January 2, 1961. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 Ibid. Letter from PH Hardwick to WL Mancey, undated. 
72 
 
contrast to that which would be dominant in the aftermath of the ‘organ scandals’ 
forty years later and discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
4.2.4 ‘The person in lawful possession’. 
4.2.4.1 Identity. 
Several members of both Houses emphasised the need for clarity in defining the 
identity and scope of responsibility of ‘the person lawfully in possession of the 
body’ who may under the Act (s.1) authorise removal of any part of the body for 
purposes made legal under the Act142; and whose authorisation was necessary, 
under s.2, before a (non- coronial) PM could be carried out.143  The phrase had had 
its origin in the Anatomy Act 1832, where, at s.7, the relevant person had been 
defined as ‘any Executor or other Party having lawful Possession of the Body of any 
deceased Person, and not being an Undertaker or other Party intrusted (sic) with 
the Body for the Purpose only of Interment.’144  
Kenneth Robinson MP ‘had not been able to discover very much about this person 
who appeared for the first time in the Anatomy Act’ except to understand that he 
was not the next of kin, but might be the executor, a group of persons, a body 
corporate, the master of a workhouse or even a mortuary keeper (acting as agent 
for some authority).145  In reply, the Minister of Health reminded the House that in 
law there was no property in a dead body.  He had been advised that the person in 
legal possession ‘would include’, in the case of a person dying in hospital, a hospital 
authority, but not a mortuary attendant.146 The Minister made no comment about 
the other examples on Robinson’s list.147 In the House of Lords, at Second Reading, 
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Lord Newton had indicated that the ‘person’ in lawful possession, although not 
defined in the Bill, was, in the case of a hospital, the managers, until the executors 
or relatives come to claim the body.148  A wish, by way of a proposed amendment 
at Committee stage in the House of Commons that the Bill should define that, in the 
case of a death in hospital, the hospital management committee or equivalent was 
the body ‘in lawful possession’, had been resisted.  The Minister said that such 
designation could have denied the relatives or the executors possession of the body 
and could have allowed the hospital committee to take their stand against all 
comers.149 
4.2.4.2 Does the person in lawful possession have discretion? 
The question of whether the person in legal possession had discretion in 
discharging his or her duties was considered in both Houses.  Both clauses1(1) and 
1(2) of the Bill stated that the person ‘may’ authorise removal of the body, or its 
parts. In the House of Commons, the Minister emphasised that there was no 
question of vetoing a deceased person’s declared wishes.150  In the Upper House, 
Lord Newton, replying for the Government, said that, if it were made compulsory 
by substituting ‘shall’ for ‘may’, there would have to be a penal clause in the Bill – 
and to punish non-compliance would be inappropriate in the circumstances.151  
Substituting ‘shall’ for ‘may’ had also been raised at the Committee stage in the 
House of Commons, but an amendment had been resisted.152  
5. Summary. 
The approach taken in the 1961 Act was permissive, and overtly utilitarian, and 
aimed to enhance opportunities, particularly for transplantation, but also for 
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education and research. By building on the experience of the Corneal Grafting Act 
1952 (which had recognised that there was a small minority of altruistic individuals 
who desired to benefit mankind by putting their eyes to use after death), it 
established a mechanism whereby the deceased’s wishes, expressed during life, 
could be respected.  Hope was expressed by several members during the debates 
that, over time, increasing numbers of people would indicate their wish to have 
their organs and tissues used after death.153 154  The need for publicity and 
‘propaganda’ to increase public awareness was repeatedly emphasised by both 
Houses, with the hope that it would result in increasing numbers of people willing 
to permit their body, or its parts, to be used under the provisions of the Act.  The 
hope was that relatives would come to share the views expressed by Lord Balniel 
MP.  His Lordship had resolved his initial instincts, ‘some of the most deeply felt 
instincts of man’155-  that the human body, once life has been extinguished from it, 
should be treated with the utmost dignity and respect, and that, pending burial or 
cremation, it should be left in peace- by the knowledge that tissues and organs 
from the dead could in future be used to bring health (he hoped for happiness also) 
‘to those who, because of misfortune or disease, are deprived of the good health 
that most of us enjoy’.156 
The account so far has supported the usefulness of Drewry’s model of the law 
making process, or at least of the first three (of five) steps, which have taken the 
analysis as far as ‘legitimation’.  The boundaries between the steps may have 
appeared a little blurred, in that, for example, the internal exchanges among the 
civil servants when assembling components of the ‘inspiration’ phase were 
‘deliberative’, and soon began to contain the outline of what would become the 
framework for new legislation- the stage of ‘formulation’.  However, from the 
evidence so far, the model is sound, and is applicable to the task in hand. 
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As predicted by Drewry, it has been difficult to identify a single source for the 
original idea that led to new legislation.  However, I believe it has been possible to 
untangle to some extent the ‘confusing mixture of different possibilities’ which 
Drewry described as the usual outcome of such an endeavour157.  
With regard to the unsatisfactory state of the law per se as a primary factor in 
triggering new legislation, there is no question that the success of the 1952 Act 
brought, at the same time, its narrowness into focus- at least for those who were 
knowledgeable about such matters.  Dr George Godber, the then Deputy Chief 
Medical Officer, in a letter in late 1959 about bone banking, recognised that ‘ we 
are up against the old (sic) problem of the legality of taking human tissue from 
cadavers’158.  Professor MFA Woodruff, a distinguished renal surgeon, had been 
able to draw attention to the Medical Amendment Act 1954 in New Zealand as a 
shining example of enlightened legislation but of no help to patients in the United 
Kingdom.159  Senior figures in the medical Royal Colleges had been concerned, and 
had communicated their concern to the highest law officers in the land in 1958.  
One of their number, the President of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, 
was also, ad hominem, the Consultant Adviser in Surgery to the Ministry of Health, 
which double appointment reinforces, it may be noted in passing, apparent 
evidence of a close and interconnected advisory (and sometimes advocatory) 
network surrounding the Ministry. 
 The position of the SAMOs, agents of the Ministry of Health in each Health Region 
of England and Wales, was particularly uncomfortable as they apparently tried to 
reconcile their professional allegiance (as medically qualified doctors working in 
proximity to clinical colleagues) with their employment as government officials.  Dr 
Godber, to whom they reported, described their dichotomous position in regard to 
tissue banks in early 1960 as being aware of various attempts to maintain tissue 
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banks, while ‘ avoiding learning too much because they were really uncertain of the 
legal position’.160 
It is interesting to observe the ‘blind eye’ that had been turned in several quarters 
throughout the decade that preceded the decision to legislate.  It had occurred, on 
advice, in Parliamentarians, as recounted by the Rt. Hon. Kenneth Robinson MP.161  
It had been found in the senior law officers in both England and Scotland, at least as 
recorded in Ministry of Health memoranda.  It had almost certainly been a feature 
of coronial practice, although the evidence for complicity or acquiescence is 
indirect.  It certainly had been the shared view of senior ministry officials who had 
believed that an attempt to clarify the legal position would have made the then 
current work in surgical research difficult before it could be concluded that the 
work did have a future in established clinical practice.162   
Alongside those ‘in the know’, one can imagine that there must have been many 
conscientious doctors and researchers who had gone about their daily routine 
unaware that their work might have been of questionable legality.   Even when new 
legislation was before Parliament, there were those who thought it would be of 
little importance.  An internal memorandum of the time between colleagues at the 
MRC reported that ‘the Human Tissue Bill has now passed its Second Reading but is 
not being given great priority because it will have little importance in practice’.163  
Here perhaps is a clue which helps to confirm that the ethos of the legislation was 
permissive, ‘to put beyond doubt what the medical profession requires’, in the 
words of Edith Pitt MP164.  
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It is difficult to express on paper the power of advances in scientific and clinical 
research to generate excitement and focused commitment in its professional 
exponents and devotees.  The climate was described graphically if parochially by a 
distinguished Professor of Pathology in the early 1950s, that ‘the last fifty years 
have seen greater advances in the treatment of disease than in all the rest of the 
five hundred years since this [Glasgow] University has been founded [in 1451], and 
that that progress has been almost wholly the outcome of pursuit of knowledge in 
the basic sciences’.165   In the field of tissue grafting, the prime focus of the 
legislation, the publicity given to early successes in kidney transplantation and the 
award of the Nobel prize for fundamental work in the field were timely, to say the 
least. This excitement had been picked up by civil servants, who described tissue 
grafting as a practice which was already of importance in saving or prolonging life, 
and which was likely to develop further and increase in importance.166  Focused 
commitment, combined perhaps with the sentiment that nothing should be 
allowed to stand in the way of medical progress, was exemplified by the tone of Dr 
Seddon’s letter to the MRC, already referred to, ‘And now, just when we are ready 
to put [bone banking] on a proper footing, this legal question crops up…if the MRC 
and the Ministry of Health do not move soon then I think we shall have to consider 
taking independent action and damning the consequences’.167  Indeed, this letter, 
and the surrounding issues concerning freeze dried bone for grafting, may be seen 
as true tipping points in the decision to proceed with legislation. 
It is difficult to be certain about the role of the Press in shaping or timing the 
legislation.  There is no doubt that, during early months of 1960, Ministry officials 
were aware of: ‘the advantages of choosing our own time rather than risk being 
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forced into action by some mischance’168; and ‘the increasing use of tissue (which 
naturally receives publicity in the medical press) makes it clear that action will need 
to be taken soon’169; and ‘the interest indicated by recent articles in the medical 
and lay press make it not impossible that we may be challenged’170.  The late 
inclusion in the Bill of provisions regarding post mortem examinations appears from 
the archives to have been influenced by the chance misbehaviour of an errant 
mortuary attendant, albeit against a background of some general unease about 
whether or not the saving by virtue of s.15 of the Anatomy Act 1832 applied to 
hospital post mortems. 
The archival papers which relate to the formulation of the Bill have similar 
emphases to the Parliamentary debates which followed, namely, that this was a 
piece of legislation which was required to allow the exciting developments in tissue 
and organ transplantation to succeed; and that the legalising of hospital post 
mortem examinations was a tidying up exercise.  To my reading, it was the primacy 
of ‘grafting’ in everyone’s mind which led to ‘retention’ and ‘consent’ being lost 
from the face of the Human Tissue Act 1961.  
 I have already suggested that the terms of the Act- removal of tissue for use- fitted 
the operational reality of a transplant procedure in which the concept of ‘retention’ 
was irrelevant.   With regard to the absence of ‘retention’ as it might otherwise 
relate to hospital PMs,  it would have been common knowledge to those who 
understood the detail of what was involved that tissue would be retained for 
microscopic and other detailed examination as part of the normal PM process (my 
emphasis).  Such persons with expert knowledge would have seen no need to 
embellish a reference to the process, and I stress process, of post mortem 
examination with the term ‘retention’.  With regard to coronial post mortems, Rule 
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6 (later 9) of the Coroners Rules required that the person making a post mortem 
examination shall have made provision, so far as was possible, for the preservation 
of material which in his opinion bore upon the cause of death for such period as the 
coroner thought fit.171  It would be many years later before it emerged that 
communication between pathologist and Coroner (Procurator Fiscal in Scotland), in 
retrospect self evidently needed to determine the required period of ‘preservation 
of material’, was imperfect, or even absent from routine practice (see Chapters 
Four and Five).  In 1960, details of what was involved in a PM would have been 
unknown to the majority of Parliamentarians, and perhaps to Parliamentary 
Counsel, and any possible advantages of amending the wording of the Bill in this 
regard could not have been recognised.  Further, the minority of Parliamentarians 
with medical qualifications may have wished, as would emerge later as a 
widespread medical view, to spare their colleagues from the details of what 
happened at post-mortems. 
It is likely that the use by Parliamentary Counsel of the content of the Corneal 
Grafting Act 1952 as a template for the Human Tissue Bill was the main explanation 
for the use of ‘no objection’ in the Bill.  In addition, it may have been easy for 
readers of the Bill to have invested the two terms, ‘consent’ and ‘no objection’, 
with an equivalence in their minds- a mistake which Lord Balniel had made when he 
used the phrase ‘permission of relatives’ before having to be corrected by the 
Minister.  It will be recalled that, the concept of an absence of objection 
notwithstanding, that it had been the explicit intention of the Government, as 
stated by Miss Pitts MP at second reading in the House of Commons, to give to 
hospitals the same advice as had been given to them after the passage of the 
Corneal Grafting Bill, namely that that they should actively seek the consent of all 
available relatives [for grafting to be carried out].  The intention to reissue such 
advice was reiterated by Lord Newton in the House of Lords.172   I have been unable 
to find evidence that such advice was given to hospitals.  Instead, circular H.M. (61) 
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98, which was issued to hospital authorities one week before the Human Tissue Act 
1961 came into force, and which has already been referred to above, was couched 
in terms of ‘objections’173.  [It should be noted for reference that, in 1975, 
H.M.(61)98 was superseded by a circular from the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS), HSC(IS)156, which was sent to Regional Health Authorities, Area 
Health Authorities, Boards of Governors, and Family Practitioner Committees.174  
The purpose of the new circular, issued fourteen years after the 1961 Act had come 
into force, was to ‘clarify points of doubt which have arisen from experience of 
operating the Act’.  The document reiterated the earlier position, namely that, 
when the views of surviving spouse or nearest relatives were being sought, ’specific 
consent is not necessary, merely an absence of objection’175.  I shall return more 
fully to this document and its significance in Chapter Two.] 
Finally, what of the likely longevity of the 1961 Act, which had been launched in 
high hope?   Dr Dickson Mabon MP believed that the general terms of the Act were 
such as would be able to meet almost any foreseeable developments in medical 
science.176   In contrast, Baroness Summerskill supposed that, a hundred years 
hence, the Act would be seen as unprogressive because it had been unable to 
anticipate the tremendous progress that had come about in the meantime.177   Was 
either right? 
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CHAPTER TWO.  
 
Human Tissue Act 1961: execution, application and feedback.  
 
1. Preamble: the desirability of post- legislative scrutiny. 
 The main driving force behind the 1961 Act was the need to legitimise organ 
transplantation.  At the time, clinical feasibility was virtually confined to kidneys, 
but doctors hoped that it would become possible in due course to be able to 
transplant other organs and tissues as well.  Two Parliamentarians had taken 
opposing views as to whether or not the provisions of the Act would prove in the 
long run to be adequate to meet the consequences of further and inevitable 
advances in clinical science.1 2 Assessing who was right would require ‘feedback’. 
Within Drewry’s ‘systems’ model of the legislative process, the composite of 
feedback and its analysis could be termed post-legislative scrutiny.  The 
components of a feedback loop might include experiences of those professionally 
involved in implementing or interpreting the legislation, the response of the public 
to the legislation as experienced ‘on the street’, and the activities of the mass 
media in interpreting or influencing public opinion.3   However these measures fall 
far short of a systematic approach to post -legislative scrutiny, an area of activity 
which has been reviewed in recent years by both the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution4 (‘HL Select Committee’) and the Law Commission.5 
In evidence to HL Select Committee in 2004, Jean Corston MP, Chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, wrote: 
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  As legislators, we need to pay as much attention to what happens after we have 
 finished our specialised task of making the law as we do to the process by which we 
 achieve the law.  The professional deformation against which we perhaps have to 
 be most wary is supposing that legislating is the most effective way to achieve our 
 ambitions, and that law making is a precise science which can result in a perfect 
 product.  Our responsibility does not begin with a Bill’s introduction into 
 Parliament or end with the Royal Assent.6 
One might have expected that a process with the importance ascribed by Corston 
would already have been used regularly, or even systematically.  Evidence given to 
HL Select Committee suggested otherwise.  As Sir Michael Wheeler-Booth and 
Professor Vernon Bogdanor put it, ‘all too often Parliament forgets about legislation 
once it has reached the statute book’.7  The Select Committee’s Report recognised 
that there were occasions when some post-legislative scrutiny had occurred but, it 
was ‘patchy at best’8, and tended to occur because of a realisation that something 
had gone wrong.9 
The HL Select Committee defined post-legislative scrutiny as: 
              [a] broad form of review, the purpose of which is to address the effects of the 
 legislation in terms of whether the intended policy objectives have been met by the 
 legislation, and if so, how effectively. However, this does not preclude 
 consideration of narrow questions of a purely legal or technical nature.10 
and recommended that: 
 Most Acts, other than Finance Acts, should normally be subject to review within 
 three years of their commencement, or six years following their enactment, 
 whichever is the sooner.11 
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 The Government agreed in principle, subject to resources being available, and 
provided that the process of post legislative scrutiny did not prevent the 
Government from carrying out the work it was elected to do.12 The Law Commission 
was asked to consider the options which could strengthen post-legislative scrutiny 
further.  The Commission’s recommendations will be considered further in Chapter 
Six. 
The HL Select Committee and the Law Commission reported in 2004 and 2006, 
respectively, many years after the era of implementation of the Human Tissue Act 
1961.  In the light of the HL Select Committee’s finding of only patchy post-
legislative scrutiny in the ten years before 2004 covered by its Report, it would be 
unreasonable to expect evidence of a systematic process of review of the 1961 Act 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  Nevertheless, there will inevitably have been at least an 
erratic flow of information back to the Ministry of Health and its successor 
Departments as to whether or not the objectives of the 1961 legislation were being 
achieved, and whether any problems had occurred.  I believe that it is not too 
fanciful to imagine the flow of information as accumulating in a Departmental ‘in 
tray’, over which officials would at least have cast an eye from time to time, and 
might, or might not, have been spurred to further action. 
The main purpose of this Chapter is three-fold:  first, to determine what 
accumulated in the ‘in tray’ and what responses, if any, followed; second, to follow 
the Law Commission’s definition of post-legislative scrutiny and consider whether 
and to what degree the intended policy objectives of the 1961 Act were met; third, 
to consider narrow questions of a purely legal or technical nature, as relevant. 
2. The 1961 Act: execution and application in relation to developments in 
transplantation. 
2.1 Clinical developments. 
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The main driver behind the 1961 Act had been the need to make possible, within 
the law, foreseeable developments in cadaveric tissue and organ transplantation.  
Two biological obstacles then stood in the way of further clinical development: the 
structural and functional deterioration of tissues in the hours following death which 
rendered them useless as transplants; and the biological defence mechanisms in 
the recipient of a transplant which tended to ‘reject’ the foreign tissue by 
destroying it.  Finding ways of overcoming the process of rejection would prove to 
be a continuing challenge over the ensuing decades (and indeed has not been 
completely solved to this day).  In contrast, it was quickly realised that the early 
post mortem deterioration of tissues could be overcome by speed of removal of the 
tissues or organs after death, to be followed either by immediate transplantation 
into a recipient or placing in an effective storage facility. 
Within the decade following the 1961 Act, kidney transplantation had reached the 
development stage and was becoming an established therapeutic measure. 
Grafting of other organs, such as liver, heart, and larynx, had become possible by 
the late 1960s but had still to be considered to be in the research phase.  Tensions 
had arisen between:  the desire of surgeons to obtain more kidneys to treat more 
patients; the need for speed in obtaining organs as soon as possible after death; 
‘delays’, as seen through surgical eyes, in the difficult, and still novel, area of 
identifying potential donors among the dying; the presence (and sometimes the 
absence) of relatives; identifying and having discussions with ‘the person in lawful 
possession’; making reasonable and practicable enquiries; in addition to ensuring 
that complex clinical arrangements were in place.  
Examination of some of the provisions of the 1961 Act can help to explain some of 
the practical difficulties encountered by transplant surgeons. 
2.2 Uncertainties about the 1961 Act revealed. 
2.2.1 The power to donate a body for medical purposes. 
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There were two provisions of the 1961 Act which dealt with the power to donate.  
The first covered the situation where the donor had made an express wish before 
death: 
 s.1(1) If any person, either in writing at any time, or orally in the presence of two or 
 more witnesses during his last illness, has expressed a request that his body or any 
 specified part of it be used after death for therapeutic purposes or for purposes  of 
 medical education or research, the person lawfully in possession of the body after 
 his death may, unless he has reason to believe that the request was subsequently 
 withdrawn, authorise the removal from the body of any part or, as the case may 
 be, the specified part, for use in accordance with the request.’13 
The need for speed of communication meant that it was essential for the family 
doctor and the close relatives to know in advance of the deceased’s wishes, and 
this was not always the case- for example, direction in a will, although well 
meaning, was useless.  It was for this reason that voluntary ‘donor card’ schemes 
began to be discussed, with the Automobile Association being the first body to 
present such cards to the public.14  There followed several years of divided opinion 
as to whether or not signed cards fulfilled the requirements of s.1(1) of the 1961 
Act.15  The Medical Defence Union advised its members that it did not16, while a 
senior judge, speaking extra-judicially, and several academic commentators, opined 
that it did.17 18   Further, it should be noted that the person lawfully in possession 
was not bound to carry out the deceased’s wishes.  He or she was empowered but 
not obliged to act: if there appeared to be any reason for withholding permission, 
rational or not, he or she could do so.19  
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The second provision dealt with the (then and now) more common situation where 
the deceased had not made an express request: 
 s.1(2).  [T]he person lawfully in possession of the body of a deceased person may 
 authorise the removal of any part from the body for use for the said purposes if, 
 having made such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable, he has no reason to 
 believe- 
 (a) that the deceased had expressed an objection to his body being so dealt with 
 after his death, and had not withdrawn it: or 
 (b) that the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the deceased objects to 
 the body being so dealt with.20 
Surgeons, concerned with speed of removal, found the requirements of s.1(2) to be 
a hindrance.  First, who was ‘the person in lawful possession of the body’ who could 
give them permission to proceed?  Second, who were the surviving relatives who 
could object?  Third, what inquiries was the person in lawful possession required to 
make in order to comply with the Act? 
2.2.2 The identity of ‘the person in lawful possession of the body’. 
The term ‘person in lawful possession of the body’ had its origin in the Anatomy Act 
1832, which referred to ‘the executor or other party having lawful possession of the 
body’.21  In R v Feist22 , it had been held that the master of a workhouse was the 
person in lawful possession of the body of an inmate for the purposes of permitting 
anatomical examination under the Anatomy Act 1832.  It was possible that the poor 
law authority itself, rather than its agent, should have been identified as the 
‘person in lawful possession’.23  Nevertheless the case confirmed that someone 
other than the executor or administrator may be in lawful possession of a body. 
                                                     
20
 Human Tissue Act 1961, s.1(2). 
21
 Anatomy Act, 1832, s.7. 
22
 R v Feist (1858) Dears. & B. 590. 
23
Skegg PDG. The interpretation of the Human Tissue Act 1961.  Med. Sci. Law 1976;16(3): 193-9, 
p195.  
87 
 
Of great practical importance was the legal position when a person died in hospital. 
Could a hospital authority be capable of being in lawful possession? It will be 
recalled that Parliament had resisted the case for defining the hospital authority, in 
the case of hospital deaths, as the body in lawful possession for fear that this could 
be interpreted as an enforceable right to possession against the executors.24  
Although in general a dead body cannot be owned, the law did recognise a right to 
possession and was prepared to protect that possession.  The key case was 
Williams v Williams25, in which Kay J affirmed that English law recognised no 
property in a corpse, but that, prima facie, the executors were lawfully entitled to 
possession and were responsible for the burial of a dead body.26  In R v Fox the 
executors were able to enforce their right to possession against a gaoler who had 
refused to hand over the body of a dead prisoner.27 But the fact that the executors 
or administrators had a better right to possession than the person in whose custody 
the body lay did not mean that the latter person was not in lawful possession until 
someone with a better claim came along.28  
Further, as argued by Lanham29, there were cases30 31 32 33which, in aggregate, 
supported the conclusion that, in common law, the person who had actual physical 
custody of the body had lawful possession (and the duty of disposal of it) until 
someone with a higher right (for example, an executor or a parent) claimed the 
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body.34  Although not authoritative in law, this conclusion had been supported by 
the statement in Parliament during the passage of the 1961 Act that ‘in the absence 
of executors, there is a common law duty to see that the body is buried and the 
person lawfully in possession is normally the occupier of the premises where the 
body lies, or the person who has the body’.35  Support also came from the wording 
of s.1(7) of the 1961 Act which stated that: 
 s.1(7). In the case of a body lying in a hospital, nursing home or other institution, 
 authority under this section may be given on behalf of the person having control 
 and management thereof by any officer or person designated for that purpose by 
 the first-mentioned person.36 
This provision clearly presumed that that the hospital authorities were normally in 
lawful possession of a body lying in hospital.  Belief that this was the position in law 
had been encouraged by Circular HM(61)98 which had been sent to Hospital 
Management Committees (HMC) and Boards of Governors (BG) by the Ministry of 
Health at the time when the Human Tissue Act 1961 came into force, which 
advised, in the case of deaths occurring in hospital, that, until relatives claimed the 
body, the HMC or BG or anyone designated so to act on their behalf, was ‘the 
person lawful possession’, and therefore could lawfully authorise, subject to the 
conditions of s.1(2) of the 1961 Act, the removal for use a part of the body.37 
It was the duty of the person in lawful possession to make inquiry.  There were 
tensions as between hospital authorities who were not clear as to the span of their 
obligation to inquire, and surgeons (especially those who, in their hearts, supported 
the introduction of amending legislation to require ‘contracting out’ of potential 
donors). 
2.2.3 The meaning of ‘such reasonable inquiry as may be practicable’. 
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In determining the span of enquiry required by the law, the key words were 
‘reasonable’ and ‘practicable’.  To help to characterise ‘reasonable’ inquiry, it might 
have been helpful to consider what was ‘unreasonable’.  In one view, it would have 
been unreasonable to inquire of young children, or even of a very distressed spouse 
or parent whose health might have been detrimentally affected in consequence, or 
who was seriously ill as a result of the accident from which the potential donor had 
died.38  As to making inquiry ‘as may be practicable’, Skegg opined that this must be 
determined with reference to the purpose, specified in the Act, for which it was 
desired to use the organ.39  By this reading, the urgency surrounding 
transplantation, and the wish to ensure that the organ was as fresh as possible, 
would have implied that lesser inquiry needed to be made than, say, in a case 
where the extracted tissue was intended for the purposes of education.   At best, 
this was a controversial view.  A better reading would have placed the need to 
inquire as an obligation to respect the wishes of the relatives, and to avoid the risk 
of harm to the wider cause.  The latter view was supported by Dworkin: the 
practicability of the inquiry must relate to the steps taken to trace the relatives, and 
not to the practicability of using the body, since the basis of the provision was to 
allow the relative to object if he or she so wished.40 [It will be recalled that the 
Minister had confirmed in Parliament that the obligation to seek objections had 
been deliberately drawn broadly, and the term ‘any surviving relative’ undefined41].   
Further dilemmas were posed.  If the identity of the deceased was not known, 
could the body be used? If the surviving spouse or other close relatives expressed 
consent, must the hospital fear a more distant relative claiming that he or she 
would have objected had an opportunity been given? 
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It is of interest that, although HM(61)98 had advised that ‘relative’ should be 
interpreted in the widest sense to include those who claimed a quite distant 
relationship42, the wording of that circular could be interpreted as suggesting that 
inquiry about the views of distant relatives could be sought through a close relative.  
As stated, ‘the nearest relative available should be asked if he objects or has any 
reason to believe that any other relative would object, but hospital authorities are 
not expected to ask that relative for a statement that no other relatives object.’43 
There were calls from the transplant community for the Act to be amended to 
clarify the breadth of meaning of ‘relative’ and to clarify whether there were 
circumstances in which it might be deemed that no inquiry was practicable.44  The 
attention of officials was drawn to the clear provisions of s.44B(2)(b) of the Victoria 
State Medical Act 1958 as amended by the Medical (Organ Transplants) Act 1968, 
which provided that: 
 [t]he person lawfully in possession shall consult the first in order of priority of the 
 following persons available at the time of making inquiry, and may authorise 
 removal if the person available did not object, or there was no reason to suppose 
 objection on the part of a prior class, that is (in order) spouse, adult son or 
 daughter, a parent, adult brother or sister, a guardian of the deceased.45 
These matters were brought to the attention of certain Parliamentarians who 
determined in the late 1960s that changes to the legislation were required to deal 
with ‘difficulties’ within transplant procedures. 
2.3 Pressures to amend legislation with regard to transplantation, 1968-73. 
2.3.1 The efforts of Parliamentarians. 
 Sir Gerald Nabarro, Tam Dalyell and Norman St John Stevas, Members of 
Parliament, made a number of attempts, singly and in concert, to introduce Private 
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Members’ Bills to redress what they perceived to be inadequacies in the 1961 Act 
as it related to, specifically, kidney transplantation.  The main stimulus for their 
action was the reported shortage of donor kidneys for transplantation, and the 
main obstacle they wished to overcome was the apparent difficulty of obtaining the 
permission of relatives within the brief window of time after death in which the 
kidney would remain viable.  
On March 13, 1968, the Conservative Member of Parliament Sir Gerald Nabarro 
MP, an enthusiastic proponent of Private Members Bills (he introduced six in 
twenty years46), sought leave in the House of Commons to introduce a Private 
Members Bill, to be called the ‘Renal Transplantation Bill’.  The Bill would have 
permitted the removal from the dead of a kidney or kidneys for therapeutic 
purposes, unless there had been reason to believe that the deceased, during his or 
her lifetime, had instructed otherwise.47   Sir Gerald believed that kidney 
transplantation had reached a stage of such technical feasibility as to justify 
amendment of legislation for that procedure immediately, and thought that his Bill, 
if successful, would condition public opinion in favour of later, wider amending 
legislation for organ transplantation48; noting that the entire civilised world had 
been moved by the then very recent medical achievement of successful heart 
transplantation49.  In spite of an occasional dissenting voice50, the Bill was 
supported through First and Second Readings.51  
During Second Reading, the Minister for Health, Rt Hon. Kenneth Robinson MP, said 
that, in his view, the Human Tissue Act 1961 at the time of its enactment had gone 
as far as had been reasonable at that time to strike a balance between facilitating 
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the possible use of organs to save another life and the feelings and religious beliefs 
of the dead person’s family; and that changes which may be desirable to keep pace 
with advances of medical science would not be generally acceptable unless such 
feelings were treated with due respect.52  The Minister was clearly sympathetic to 
the idea that new legislation might be needed.  Having acknowledged that there 
was a clear need for safeguards, he told MPs that he was awaiting advice from a 
private conference he had convened, before deciding on the precise form new 
legislation should take, in the event of the conference advising, as he believed was 
likely, that some change in the law was desirable.53 
2.3.2 The 1968 Conferences and immediate aftermath. 
The private, multidisciplinary conference which the Minister had convened 
accepted at its first meeting in March 1968 that s.1(2) of the Human Tissue Act 
1961 restricted the availability of donor organs to an extent that prevented the 
treatment of patients who would otherwise die.  However conference also 
recognised that there were people, including those of certain religious groups, who 
would object to removal of their own, or a relative’s, organs after death.54  After 
further discussion, it was agreed that if neither the deceased nor next of kin had 
expressed any objection, the views of other relatives need not be sought; but that if 
either the deceased or next of kin had objected, that objection had to be respected.  
With regard to the ‘road traffic accident case’, opinion was divided about whether 
or not it should be permissible, where no relatives could be contacted within a 
short time of death, and the prior wishes of the deceased were not known, to 
remove organs for transplantation (but not for other purposes).55 
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In a meeting with his officials, held to discuss the conference recommendations, the 
Minister, further informed by independent polls of public opinion56 , concluded that 
public opinion would not support the removal of organs without permission.  57  A 
few days later the Minister used a written answer to a Parliamentary Question to 
publish the conclusions of his conference and to announce that, while he accepted 
that it should not be necessary to seek the views of relatives other than the next of 
kin, he was not convinced that the suggestion about the recording of objections 
could be made effective at that stage.58  Privately, the Minister had noted that the 
content of Sir Gerald’s Bill had gone further than the proposals made by the 
conference, and decided then to stop the Bill at Committee stage.59 Whether or not 
these reasons were passed on is not clear- Sir Gerald recorded in his autobiography 
that it was only a lack of Parliamentary time which prevented his Bill’s further 
progress.60   
Nonetheless, officials at the Ministry of Health had been sufficiently exercised by Sir 
Gerald’s efforts, and by the conclusions of the conference, to begin the process of 
obtaining permission to prepare a Bill which would have amended the Human 
Tissue Act 1961 in respect of all human tissue,  providing that: where the wishes of 
the deceased were unknown, inquiries need only to be made as to objections held 
by the deceased or his next of kin; for the purpose of the Act, the hospital authority 
was the person in lawfully in possession of the body of a person who had died in 
hospital until the body was claimed by a person entitled to do so. A memorandum 
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was prepared for submission to the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee. 61   However, 
at a preliminary meeting between the Lord President of the Council, Rt Hon Fred 
Peart MP, and the Secretary of State for Social Services, Rt Hon Richard Crossman 
MP, it was concluded that it was not yet possible to judge which way public opinion 
would move on the transplant question, and therefore the time was not ripe to 
introduce legislation which would bring about a major change in the law.  It was 
minuted that ‘possibly it might be appropriate for the Government itself to 
introduce more substantial legislation in a year or two’s time’.62   
As had been anticipated63, Sir Gerald Nabarro was not a man who was readily 
rebuffed.  Early in the next Parliamentary session he sought to introduce an 
amended Renal Transplantation Bill, which included proposals for a national ‘opt 
out’ registry.64  At Second Reading on January 31 1969 the Under-Secretary  of State 
in the Department of Health and Social Security, Julian Snow MP, opposed the Bill 
on the grounds that: public opinion ‘had not progressed far enough’. 65 The Bill was 
subsequently voted down. 
It was next the turn of Mr Norman St John Stevas MP.  On February 26, 1969, his 
Organ Transplants Bill, to cover the transplant of all organs, had its first (and only) 
reading.66  He sought to establish the primacy of the deceased’s wishes, and a veto 
on relatives’ views being considered.  His Bill was denied a Second Reading on no 
fewer than ten occasions over the next four months, and was then dropped. 
2.3.3 Advisory Group on Transplantation Problems (‘MacLennan’), and its outcome. 
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Although the efforts of individual MPs had failed, Ministers were clearly of the 
opinion that some form of amended legislation would be required.  In December 
1968, the Health Ministers had invited Sir Hector MacLennan, then currently 
President of the Royal Society of Medicine (and who had chaired the Minister’s 
conferences), to chair an on-going Advisory Group on Transplantation Problems 
which included professionals, ethicists and lay members(‘MacLennan’).67  At its first 
meeting on February 14, 1969, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Security 
said that he hoped to have early advice from them which would enable him to 
introduce legislation early in the next Parliamentary session.68  MacLennan was 
given no formal terms of reference, ‘so that complex problems with medical, legal 
and moral aspects could be considered broadly’.69   
The MacLennan Report was unsatisfactory in that it identified problems but failed 
to identify solutions.  Uncertainties in the law were met by articulating a series of 
questions which needed to be answered, but by whom was not made clear. 70   
Tensions within MacLennan had prevented any firm recommendations- only a set 
of options was produced.71 72 73 
 The advice of MacLennan was relayed to the Cabinet in a memorandum from the 
Health Ministers.74  Cabinet  took the view that the public would find the 
recommendation of the [slim] majority of the Advisory Group, who had advocated 
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an ‘opt out’ approach, wholly unacceptable, and would object to the proposal that 
the rights of the hospital over the body of a deceased person should be clarified.  
The Cabinet agreed that the advice should simply be published, but not as a White 
Paper, and with no statement.75  These decisions were later described by a 
commentator as allowing the advice of MacLennan to gather dust.76 
The quality of the advice from MacLennan must have been a disappointment to the 
Secretary of State, because he had taken the anticipatory step of securing a place in 
the draft legislative programme for the 1969-70 Parliamentary session for a Human 
Tissue Act (Amendment) Bill.77  In March 1969 the Bill was deleted from the list, on 
the grounds of lack of Parliamentary time78, but a month later it was placed on the 
reserve list, where it remained until the then current administration changed as a 
result of the General Election in June 1970.79 
2.3.4 A miscellany of other factors 
 2.3.4.1 The further efforts of Parliamentarians 
MacLennan was not quite dead.  In May 1971, Tam Dalyell MP sought leave to 
introduce a Bill under the Ten Minute Rule, with all-party support, ‘to implement 
the recommendations of the Committee chaired by Sir Hector MacLennan on the 
transplant of human organs’.80  Mr Dalyell’s Bill favoured the ‘contracting in’ option, 
about which, he said, it was important to let the public know that it had the support 
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of the country’s leaders and was not just the notion of a few crack-pot professors of 
surgery.81 To further his belief in the need for publicity, Mr Dalyell had published 
news of his proposed Bill in the New Scientist.82  Although Mr Dalyell’s Bill was 
approved for Second Reading it did not progress to that stage.  One month later, in 
response to a Parliamentary Question, the Prime Minister (Rt Hon Edward Heath 
MP) indicated that his Ministers were continuing to keep under review proposals to 
amend the Human Tissue Act 1961, but that the Government had no plans at that 
time to legislate.83 
In November 1971, Sir Gerald Nabarro MP, perhaps hoping for a favourable 
response from his (now) colleagues in Government, indicated to the Secretary of 
State, Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP, that he wished to table his Bill, modestly 
amended from that of the previous session, three weeks later!84  A flurry of 
correspondence followed, which ended by the Secretary of State’s setting out in a 
letter what had become the Ministry’s ‘line’, namely that it would be wrong to 
amend the Act, and there was no necessity to do so, in order to secure an improved 
supply of organs for transplantation.85 The fact that around 200 transplants were by 
then being carried out each year without legal challenge suggested that it was not 
the law itself that was the chief obstacle.  Motivation and education were needed, 
and steps were being taken urgently to establish whether an effective and 
acceptable donor recruitment scheme could be devised.86   Sir Gerald agreed to 
cooperate.87 
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In February 1972 Tam Dalyell was still pursuing his wish for amended legislation.88  
In reply to a Parliamentary Question, The Secretary of State said that, after careful 
consideration,  he had concluded that the provision of an adequate supply of 
kidneys was not a question of legislation but of motivation and education.89 
As far as the transplant community was concerned, practical routines gradually 
developed within the existing law.  Transplant surgeons were in practice unwilling 
to take organs for transplantation until the relatives had been interviewed.  Indeed 
the British Transplantation Society in 1975 proposed and later adopted a code of 
practice which required ‘the informed consent of available relatives’.90 
2.3.4.2 The Report of the Committee on death certification and coroners91 
(Broderick Report; ‘Broderick’). 
 Broderick and the Peel Report (see next section), while still in gestation, were used 
by Ministers as additional reasons why Parliament should delay consideration of 
the proposals being put forward by Sir Gerald Nabarro and Tam Dalyell.  The 
conclusions of Broderick that were relevant to human tissue legislation did not call 
for new legislation in this area, but were of interest because of its recommendation 
that the Coroner should refuse consent to removal of organs only if the possibility 
of criminal proceedings made it necessary to preserve the body for evidence. That 
part of Broderick was later taken up by the Home Office who issued a Circular in 
197792 which gave guidance on the circumstances in which a coroner should delay 
                                                     
88
 (1972) 831 Parl.Deb. (Hansard 5
th
 series) HC, 251. 
89
 Ibid. 
90
 British Transplantation Society.  The shortage of organs for clinical transplantation: document for 
discussion.  BMJ 1975;1:251-5 op.cit., at p252. 
91
 The Report of the Committee on death certification and coroners. Cmnd 4810, 1971, paras 17.20- 
17.34. 
92
 Home Office. Circular No. 65, 1977. 
99 
 
or refuse giving his or her consent for the removal of material for transplantation, in 
circumstances where his own or other legal considerations were involved.93 94 
2.3.4.3 Report of the Advisory Group on the use of fetuses and fetal tissue for 
research95 (Peel Report; ‘Peel’), December 1971. 
Peel noted that there was then no statutory duty to obtain permission of parents 
for the use of fetal tissue for research, but equally no statutory power to ignore 
parents’ wishes. The Group felt that undue distress might be caused to parents if 
there were a specific requirement for their consent to be given for research, and 
suggested that the difficulty should be overcome by adding to the form of consent 
for the operation (termination) an appropriate clause which offered an opportunity 
to declare any special directions about the disposal of the fetus. Officials in the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) noted that, if this 
recommendation provoked a hostile reaction by the public, and there was a 
balance of opinion in favour of a statutory requirement to seek consent, there 
would be pressure for an early amendment of the 1961 Act on this point.96  
3. Contraventions of the 1961 Act. 
A small number of clinical cases in the 1960s and 1970s alerted officials in DHSS to 
contraventions of the 1961 Act and the need to take remedial action.  In addition, a 
body of evidence accumulated which suggested that at least some pathologists, and 
others, did not fully understand the law. 
3.1 Clinical cases. 
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3.1.1 The ‘Couve de Murville’ case.97 
The first complaint on record concerned a deliberate disregard of the provisions of 
the 1961 Act.  On October 17 1968, Andrew Skeffington MP wrote to the Rt Hon 
Kenneth Robinson MP, Minister of Health, about an elderly lady who had died in 
Hillingdon Hospital.98  She had only distant relatives whom the hospital had been 
unable to contact.  The next day a hospital official spoke to the son of one of these 
relatives and asked permission to take eyes for research.  He gave an unequivocal 
refusal.  Two days later when the relatives arrived to arrange the funeral, they 
discovered that the eyes had been removed.  Investigation instigated by the 
Minister eventually decided that: ‘a step daughter and her son’ were not ‘relatives’ 
within the meaning of s.1(2)(b) of the Act; and that Dr Couve de Murville, a locum 
Senior House Officer from Mauritius, had claimed no knowledge of the need for 
consent.  He had been reprimanded by the consultant, and had later moved 
overseas.  The Minister issued a note of deep regret to the family.  
 Dr Couve de Murville (CdM) was reported by an official to the General Medical 
Council.  The reply gave a flavour of the thinking, and the procedures, of that 
august body at that time. 
 The President has carefully considered the matter, and appreciates your reasons 
 for writing to the Council.  The Council could however only take action in this 
 matter if the circumstances were such as to raise a question whether the doctor 
 had been guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect.  In the opinion of 
 the President this question is not raised by the matters set out in your letter, and 
 the Council accordingly could not intervene in exercise of their disciplinary 
 jurisdiction.99 
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At the same time officials in the DHSS began to explore wider issues.  These and 
subsequent Departmental activities are summarised below at section 4. 
3.1.2 Mrs AH Howard, deceased.100 
On July 8 1970, Mr L Howard wrote to the Home Secretary about his recently 
deceased wife. 
 My wife, who had spinal muscular atrophy, died unexpectedly on June 30 1970.  Dr 
 J Turpin [a clinical assistant in the hospital] ordered a post mortem.  On the 
 morning of her  death, and again the next day, Dr Turpin asked me to agree to 
 cerebral tissue being taken and sent to the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases 
 in Queen Square, London. 
 I categorically refused on both occasions. 
 In spite of this, tissue was taken. This was confirmed by the local hospital 
 pathologist, who said that tissue had been taken on instruction of Dr Turpin – who 
 denies this. 
 I wrote to the Coroner.101 
During the subsequent inquiry by the Home Office, the Deputy Coroner for 
Montgomeryshire confirmed that the tissue had not been taken on his authority.102  
An official of the DHSS whose advice was sought asked rhetorically whether consent 
under s.2 of the Human Tissue Act constituted authority for removal of tissue under 
s.1(2).  He opined that ‘whilst we have had advice that it does not, Government 
Departments cannot of course give a binding interpretation of a statute’.103 
Mr Howard received an official apology. 
3.1.3 Patrick Joseph O’Sullivan, deceased.104 
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Mr O’Sullivan died in hospital 12h after a road traffic accident.  His kidneys were 
removed without permission, and the relatives only learned of the transplant 
procedure during the inquest.  The hospital claimed that they had made repeated 
efforts to trace relatives through the police, and while the patient was in intensive 
care, but without success.  The police evidence on the breadth of their enquiry was 
opaque.  The hospital had contacted the coroner for advice.  According to a hospital 
spokesman the Coroner ‘gave permission’ for the kidneys to be removed after 
death ‘provided the necessary conditions of the Human Tissue Act 1961 had been 
fulfilled’. 
A later enquiry by the Regional Hospital Board concluded that the hospital had 
acted in good faith. 
3.1.4 Nigel Peter Ford, deceased.105 
This case provoked a Parliamentary Question in the House of Commons106 , much 
press comment, and correspondence to the DHSS from members of the public.107  
Nigel Ford, a 17y old youth, was badly injured in a road traffic accident and died in a 
Birmingham hospital.  His parents were on holiday overseas. The surgeon 
concerned gave permission for the youth’s kidneys to be removed for 
transplantation without having obtained consent from anyone.  The surgeon told 
the inquest that the kidneys had to be taken within an hour of death, and he had 
accepted at the time that attempts made to contact relatives had been adequate.  
A year later, the Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Dr David Owen MP, 
wrote to the MP of one of Ford’s relatives to say that, having considered full 
reports, he did not feel that any action should be taken in this case. However it was 
his intention that further advice should be issued to health authorities later that 
year, ‘because of the concern expressed by transplant surgeons that they need 
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guidance on the interpretation of the Human Tissue Act’.108 [This guidance 
subsequently appeared in June 1975 as HSC (IS)156109]. 
3.1.5 Michael McEldowney, deceased.110 
The issues in this case were well summarised by a headline in the Sun: ‘Swop team 
operated on man who wasn’t dead: coroner probes case of crash victim.’111  Mr 
McEldowney, who had been injured in a road traffic accident, and whom two 
doctors presumed dead, began breathing again in the operating theatre of a 
Birmingham hospital when an attempt was made to remove his kidneys for 
transplantation.  Strenuous efforts to resuscitate him failed and he died 15h later. 
The jury at the Inquest returned a verdict of death by misadventure and added the 
following rider:  
 We would recommend that the provisions of the White Paper [sic- reference to the 
 MacLennan Report] of July 1969, suggesting safeguards in the procedures under 
 the Human Tissues (sic) Act 1961, be implemented by law, especially in respect of 
 the certification of death by two doctors and the creation of formal records.  We 
 further suggest that, in  transplant cases, one of the doctors certifying death should 
 be of consultant status.112  
 The coroner sent a copy of the verdict and rider to the Chief Medical Officer, Sir 
Henry Yellowlees, who replied that he would ensure that the matter received 
careful consideration within the Department.113 
3.2 The Human Pituitary Collection. 
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Largely as a result of the transplantation cases described above, the DHSS issued 
guidance to NHS Authorities in June 1975 by way of circular HSC(IS)156 to clarify 
points of doubt that had arisen from experience of operating the 1961 Act.  The 
need for authorisation of the person in lawful possession was emphasised.114  In 
addition the circular recommended that, with regard to PMs under s.2 of the Act, 
consent forms might routinely include a brief general reference to the removal of 
tissue for the purpose of s.1 of the Act. 115  Within a year, it became clear that this 
advice had not been universally followed.  The revelations involved the Human 
Pituitary Collection.  
In 1966 the Medical Research Council (MRC) had established a clinical trial of 
Human Growth Hormone (HGH) in children with growth failure and HGH deficiency.  
The results were highly successful, and by 1976 450 patients were being treated.  
DHSS officials advised Ministers that the time had come to effect a smooth 
transition from the trial stage to service development within the NHS through 
central machinery centred on DHSS. The paper noted that approximately 60,000 
pituitary glands were required to be obtained each year at autopsy to produce 
enough processed HGH for the then current patients, and that this number was 
projected to rise to around 100,000 in the coming years.  The total number of 
autopsies being carried out in England and Wales each year was estimated to be 
130,000.116 
On August 29 1976 a popular newspaper carried the headline ‘Body Robbers 
Scandal – we expose a hospital’s traffic in human flesh’.117  A mortuary technician at 
Nottingham General Hospital had revealed that he and his colleagues routinely 
collected and stored pituitary glands in batches of 500, at which point they were 
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dispatched to a laboratory for payment of £100.  The money was divided among 
mortuary staff.  It was alleged in the article that this practice had taken place 
without permission of the relatives.  It was further alleged that, when the attention 
of the senior pathologist had been drawn by the investigating journalist to the 
requirements of the Human Tissue Act 1961, he had replied that the Act ‘applies 
only to transplantation, as opposed to mushing up a little gland’.118  An MRC 
spokesperson was reported as saying that consent was necessary, and that MRC 
accepted tissue on the assumption that pathologists had been complying with 
legislation and with guidance laid down by DHSS.  Twenty pence (20p) per gland 
was paid as a handling charge to cover the extra labour incurred by the technicians. 
The Shadow Health Minister, Dr Gerald Vaughan MP, described the practice as 
‘appalling...a sophisticated form of body snatching’. 119  The Secretary of State 
wrote to Dr Vaughan, committing his Department to producing a new standard 
post-mortem consent form and to issuing a further Health Circular.120  These 
documents appeared subsequently in August 1977 as (HC(77)28) and 
attachments.121 
3.3 Continued ignorance of, and non-compliance with, the law.  
3.3.1 Evidence that the problem was widespread. 
Evidence later came to light that non compliance with the guidance of HSC(IS)156 
(June 1975) on tissue removal was widespread.  Following the Nottingham 
headlines, the CMO, Sir Henry Yellowlees, sought the advice of Regional Medical 
Officers (RMOs) about the extent to which Health Authorities had complied with 
the requirements of the 1961 Act, and specifically about compliance for the 
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purposes of therapy, research and teaching.  Dr James Scott, RMO for Trent 
Regional Authority, reported that 
  [f]rom my enquiries of Area Health Authorities in Trent Region] I regret to say that, 
 for the most part, the advice in HSC(IS)156 has been overlooked... I expect RMOs’ 
 replies will generally bear out that [doctors in] Nottingham were not sinners in 
 isolation, and their main fault was being exposed (sic).122 
In May 1977 Ms Barbara Rashbass, an MRC official, wrote to Robert Blowers, 
Secretary of the Royal College of Pathologists (RCPath): 
  [following] the unfavourable recent publicity about the Human Pituitary 
 Collection...  it  seemed to me (BR) that... the need to consider ethical aspects of 
 research involving human tissue as a whole was not too far-fetched.  You (RB) 
 thought that this whole issue was one which the College might want to consider.’123   
Blowers replied that College Council had established a Working Party (WP) to 
consider issues of tissue retention.124    
The WP, in its Report in October 1977, approved in general the DHSS Circular 
HC(77)28 which had been issued in the meantime125, noting that the circular 
offered guidance on the removal of tissue which did not appear to be mandatory 
(my emphasis).  The WP had ‘found difficulty’ with  paragraph 7 of the circular 
which  had clearly indicated that, in coroners’ autopsies, permission to remove 
tissues for therapeutic use, medical education or research must be obtained from 
the coroner and the relatives.  The WP raised the problem of how the relatives’ 
consent was to be obtained for the removal of tissue for non diagnostic purposes at 
a necropsy to which they had not given legal consent, nor been asked to sign an 
appropriate form.  The WP proposed as a possible solution a consent form for the 
removal of tissues for non diagnostic purposes which the Coroner’s Office could ask 
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the relatives to sign, noting that such a mechanism would depend entirely on the 
good will of the officer concerned.  The Report concluded with the cryptic comment 
that: 
 [i]t seems to us likely that either selected tissues will be retained under the proviso 
 that they are needed for diagnosis or that valuable material will be lost because no 
 mechanism exists for gaining a relative’s consent to their removal.126 
 The Report suggested that College might consider discussing these problems with 
the Coroner’s Society or the Home Office.  I have been unable to find any evidence 
in the RCPath records made available to me that such discussions took place 
subsequently. 
3.3.2 Royal College of Pathologists: the Bernard Knight review paper. 
Evidence continued to accumulate that practising pathologists were uncertain 
about the legal requirements in connection with the post-mortem retention of 
tissue.   In 1985, as the result of a legal action which had been brought against a 
pathologist in respect of a coroner’s autopsy127, the Forensic Pathology 
Subcommittee of RCPath commissioned Professor Bernard Knight, a distinguished 
forensic pathologist, to write a review paper, which was disseminated to 
pathologists via their College Bulletin.128  Knight’s paper confirmed that, with regard 
to coroners’ autopsies, the pathologist  was required to retain those tissues, and 
only those tissues, whose examination had relevance in determining the cause of 
death or an interpretation of the events leading up to death.  The retention of 
tissues for teaching and research was not covered by the coroner’s permission and 
the coroner could not grant such permission- indeed he could forbid the use of any 
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tissues for such purposes (Knight’s emphasis). Positive permission had to be 
obtained under the Human Tissue Act 1961.129 
With regard to non- coronial autopsies, to Knight the position was clear.  The 
retention of tissues was exactly the same in its legal aspects as for the donation of 
tissues for transplantation under the Human Tissue Act 1961.130  With regard to 
determining the absence of objection by a near relative, in the case of a wish to 
retain tissue for research or educational purposes, Knight recommended that ‘the 
usual post mortem consent form’ should have a sub-clause, which could be deleted 
by the relatives if they so wished, which would allow tissues to be retained for 
therapeutic, research or teaching purposes.  Once signed with the sub-clause intact, 
opined Knight, the pathologist was entitled to remove and retain any organs which 
he deemed necessary or suitable for the stated purposes.’  He conceded that this 
recommended practice had not yet (at the time of writing in 1985) been put to the 
legal test.131 
 Despite publication of this authoritative article, the pathologists’ dilemma appears 
to have persisted.  In April 1990, RCPath felt it necessary to republish Knight’s 1985 
paper for its Fellows and Members, noting that ‘the situation regarding the 
retention of tissues from post-mortem examinations continues to generate letters 
to the College, and obviously some pathologists are still not clear as to the legal 
situation.’132  
It is difficult to explain why tissues continued to be retained in contravention of the 
1961 Act.  Continued ignorance of the law played a part.  An apparently inexorable 
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fall in the number of hospital post-mortems133 and the continued challenges (as 
doctors saw it134 135) of education and research may also have contributed.  Would 
doctors have behaved differently if there had been sanctions for failure to comply 
with s.1(2) of the 1961 Act?  Academic commentators, by implication, may have so 
believed when writing in the mid 1970s about the possibility of a case being 
brought under the then existing law. 136 137   
Despite his academic analysis, Kennedy in particular concluded that it was 
extraordinarily difficult to be certain that the fundamental provisions of the 1961 
Act could be guaranteed in practice, and that ‘such a conclusion should not any 
longer be allowed to pass unnoticed by those charged with making and changing 
the law’.138 139 
 3.4 Radiation studies. 
Early in the 21st century two separate examples of research involving tissue taken 
apparently without consent came to light.  These studies had had their origins in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and are relevant to be considered at this stage of the 
narrative as further examples of practices which apparently had deviated from the 
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then current legal requirements.  One may also try to answer questions of the form 
‘who knew and when did they first know?’ 
3.4.1 Strontium 90 (‘Sr.90’) research. 
On Sunday June 17, 2001, the Sunday Herald published an article which began ‘The 
thigh bones of more than 2100 children who died during the 1960s in Scotland 
were secretly removed from their bodies without the knowledge of their parents as 
part of an international scientific study into the dangers of radiation from nuclear 
weapon tests’.140  The Scottish Executive’s immediate response was to ask the 
Independent Review Group on the Retention of Organs at Post- Mortem 
(‘IRG’;‘Review Group’; chaired by Professor Sheila McLean)141, then already in 
existence and engaged in a review of previous post- mortem practice in Scotland, to 
investigate the allegations. 
The following account relies heavily on the Review Group’s Report on Strontium- 90 
(‘Sr.90’) research142, which itself relied for historical background on a scientific 
paper published jointly by senior previous investigators in Scotland.143  In the early 
1950s a global study of Sr.90 (a radioactive product of nuclear bomb testing) 
began.144  In July 1957 the MRC became responsible for obtaining samples of 
human bone in the UK and for their initial processing.  The first public report on the 
study was published in 1957, and inter alia, described the results from 59 samples 
of human bone, many from infants and children.  The report was placed in the 
library of the House of Commons, published in a scientific journal and submitted as 
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evidence to the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.145 The 
then Prime Minister, Rt Hon Harold Macmillan MP, referred to the importance of 
this ‘comprehensive’ report.146  The MRC published annual reports entitled ‘Assay 
of Strontium 90 in human bone in the United Kingdom’ from 1960 to 1973, covering 
the research years 1959 to 1970.147 The Sr.90 research programme was 
discontinued in 1972.148 
With regard to information and consent, IRG found that the parents would 
probably have had little, if any, idea of the assumptions which were made by 
pathologists about what a parental signature on a post-mortem consent form 
covered or authorised.149  IRG found no evidence that the passing of the Human 
Tissue Act 1961 had made any difference to practice- indeed one witness had said 
that, by 1961, ‘the research had acquired a momentum of its own’.150  
 MRC’s understanding appeared to have varied over the years of the study.  
Correspondence in the late 1950s between the MRC and HM Inspector of Anatomy 
had illustrated the erroneous belief by MRC that the legality of the collection of the 
Sr.90 research samples lay in terms of the Anatomy Act 1832.  HM Inspector of 
Anatomy had drawn attention to the fact that it was a common assumption in the 
pathology community, albeit without legal foundation, that parental (or any) 
consent to a post mortem examination in essence gave consent to removal of 
samples for research.  He referred to an article in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) 
in 1954 which supported the existence of such an assumption by pathologists.151 
MRC told IRG that they were aware of a widespread belief that the 1961 Act 
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provided that any consent to a post-mortem examination gave implicit permission 
to remove tissue for research, citing in support an article in the BMJ of September 
3, 1966 by its then legal correspondent, which had stated unequivocally that the 
doctor had no need to consult relatives unless there was some prior reason to 
suppose that there might be an objection.152   
In response to the later criticism of the studies, the MRC set up an inquiry chaired 
by Rabbi Julia Neuberger to look at the ethical concerns which had been raised.153  
The Inquiry concluded that: 
 [a] wide range of tissues were often removed during the period for research 
 purposes, without the consent of relatives.  However, the boundaries between the 
 requirements of an autopsy to establish the cause of death and those for extending 
 the range of knowledge and understanding of disease are blurred.154  
 The MRC issued a press release which conceded that, even allowing for the 
different attitudes that prevailed in the 1950s, ‘the failure to seek consent was 
unnecessarily distressing to the relatives of people whose bone samples were 
used’.155 
In the summary of its findings, the Review Group stated that it did not know 
whether or not there had been any other such studies, and urged anyone with any 
knowledge of such studies to contact the Review Group as a matter of urgency so 
that these could be brought into the open.156  In due course, further such studies 
did come to light. 
3.4.2 Workers in the nuclear industry. 
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In August 1986 the New Scientist had alerted its readers, under the headline 
‘Massive plutonium levels found in Cumbrian corpses’, to studies based on the 
bodies of ‘typical former workers at the Sellafield nuclear plant’ which had revealed 
concentrations of plutonium hundreds, and in one case thousands, of times higher 
than in the general population.  The study had also found that concentrations of 
plutonium in the bodies of Cumbrians who had not worked at the plant averaged 
50 to 250 percent higher than elsewhere in Britain.157 
In 1972, scientists at the UK’s National Radiation Protection Board had been asked 
by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd to measure the levels of plutonium in tissue removed at 
autopsy from several of their former employees who had worked in the plutonium 
processing industry at Sellafield.  At that time there was very little information 
available on the amounts of plutonium present in the bodies of the general public 
of Great Britain.  The scientists decided to collect tissues taken at autopsy from 
members of the general public who had lived in the hinterland of the Sellafield 
plant and also from other regions of the country.  According to the paper published 
subsequently on this work by Popplewell and colleagues, ‘autopsy tissues were 
obtained from pathologists acting in coroners’ inquests in central Scotland (sic), NE 
England, W Cumbria and Oxfordshire’.158  The ‘subjects’ had to have been at least 
fifty years old at the time of death, with no previous employment in the nuclear 
energy industry.  Cardiovascular disease had been the cause of death in most cases. 
Bones, liver and lung were examined by gamma-ray spectroscopy.  The authors’ 
summary of their findings was that ‘tissues removed from members of the general 
public [at autopsy] contain significantly higher concentrations of plutonium and Cs-
137 in west Cumbrians than in people from three other regions of Great Britain.  
Several autopsy cases from Cumbria showed unusually high values of plutonium.  
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Subsequently it was found that the subjects had been former employees of British 
Nuclear Fuels’.159 
The importance of this paper to the general themes of this chapter is two-fold.  
First, the studies of autopsy tissue were carried out in, and published from, a 
Government research establishment. Second, the authors stated that the tissues 
were taken from coroners’ inquests for what were clearly research studies.  It is 
inconceivable that studies of the tissue content of plutonium and Cs-37 could have 
formed part of an inquiry into the cause of death of individuals who had not been, 
or who at the time of autopsy were not believed to have been, workers in the 
nuclear industry.  Were the circumstances of these cases examples of pathologists, 
wittingly or in ignorance of the law, retaining for research purposes tissue obtained 
under s.2 of the Human Tissue Act, without respecting s.1?  Further, was it possible 
that, with regard to coronial post-mortems, the coroners concerned has 
cooperated or had turned a blind eye? 
3.4.2.1 The Redfern Inquiry 2010.160 
On April 18 2007, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,Rt Hon Alistair 
Darling MP. told the House of Commons that he had asked Michael Redfern QC to 
establish the facts and report to him.161 [Michael Redfern QC had chaired the Royal 
Liverpool Children’s Hospital Inquiry which reported in 2001, and which will be 
discussed in Chapter Four.  These proceedings and report have been termed the 
Redfern Inquiry and the Redfern Report. I shall refer to the inquiry into workers in 
the nuclear industry as Redfern 2]. 
Terms of reference for Redfern 2 were announced on April 26, 2007162 and were 
modified ten months later, on February 26, 2008, at the request of Mr Redfern in 
                                                     
159
 Ibid., at p321. 
160
 Department of Energy and Climate Change. Redfern Inquiry into human tissue analysis in UK 
nuclear facilities.  Volumes 1 and 2. London. The Stationery Office.  Ordered by the House of 
Commons to be printed, November 16, 2010. 
161
 (2007) 459 Parl.Deb. (Hansard, 6
th
 series) HC, 302. 
162
 (2007) 459 Parl. Deb (Hansard, 6
th
 series) HC, 28ws. 
115 
 
the light of the inquiry team’s work to that date.  The revised terms of reference 
were, in summary: 
  [t]o enquire into the circumstances in which, from 1955, organs/tissue were  
 removed from individuals at NHS or other facilities, and sent to and analysed at 
 nuclear  laboratory facilities. 163  
Redfern 2 was in gestation for three years.  The Report was published on November 
16, 2010. 
Findings. 
The bulk of Redfern 2 report concerned post mortems on 64 current or former 
Sellafield workers, of which 60 were coronial examinations.  The findings echoed in 
many ways those of the Bristol and Alder Hey Inquiries, which reported in 1998 and 
2001 respectively, and which are described in detail in Chapter Four.  Briefly, 
Redfern 2 found that families had little knowledge about the nature of a post 
mortem examination, and certainly had no understanding that organs might be 
retained with their permission.  In the instant cases, no permission from relatives 
had been sought, and they had not known that organs had been retained for later 
analysis of levels of radiation.  The Inquiry found that the pathologists concerned, 
(in common with the pathologists involved in the separate population studies of 
Popplewell described above) had been ‘profoundly ignorant’ of the law *the Human 
Tissue Act 1961] under which they had performed post mortem examinations.164  
Redfern 2 also had significant criticisms regarding the practices of the coroners 
concerned. One may recall Professor Knight’s authoritative article in 1985 in which 
he reminded pathologists that the retention of tissues for teaching and research 
was not covered by the coroner’s permission and the coroner could not grant such 
permission- indeed he could forbid the use of any tissues for such purposes. 
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Positive permission had to be obtained under the Human Tissue Act 1961.165 
Redfern 2 found that coroners had actively ‘assisted British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, the 
National Radiation Protection Board and the Medical Research Council to obtain 
organs for [the] research, heedless of whether the necessary consent was 
obtained’.166  This and other deficiencies in coronial practice revealed by the Inquiry 
were ‘inexcusable’.167 
4. Coroners’ ‘fiefdoms’. 
 Throughout the archival and other studies that I was able to make concerning the 
aftermath of the Human Tissue Act 1961, a number of instances came to light which 
suggested that coronial practice in the years under discussion, as far as tissue 
retention was concerned, had been inconsistent and, at times, individualistic.  Each 
of the examples has been or will be described as they arise in the chronological 
narrative.  However, there is an argument to present a summary en bloc, now, as 
evidence which accumulated in official ‘in-trays’ and which could (or should) 
eventually have influenced legislation. [Redfern 2, although published in 2010, 
described practices in the 1960s to 1980s which reinforce the content of this 
section]. 
Before the introduction of the Coroners  Rules 1984 and the Coroners Act 1988, and 
for almost all of the period of the cases under question, the activities of coroners 
were guided by the Coroners Acts 1887 to 1954168, and the Coroners’ Rules 1953 to 
1980169.  Briefly, a coroner may direct or request a registered medical practitioner 
to make a post-mortem examination to exclude or investigate any criminal or civil 
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responsibility for a death not due to natural causes, or one which is sudden, 
unexpected or otherwise obscure.170  The medical practitioner may then make a) a 
post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased; or b) a special examination 
by way of analysis, test or otherwise of such parts or contents of the body or such 
other substances or things as ought in the opinion of the coroner to be submitted 
to analyses, tests or other special examination, with a view to ascertaining how the 
deceased came by his death; or make both such examinations ; or may request any 
person whom he considers to possess special qualifications for conducting such a 
special examination as aforesaid (in the Acts referred to as a ‘special examination’) 
to make such special examination.171 
The Coroner’s Rules 1953 set out requirements regarding the retention of post-
mortem material which implied the need for an interaction between the coroner 
and the examining pathologist, and which would come to feature prominently in 
the Inquiries from Bristol and Alder Hey, to be discussed in later Chapters, to 
Redfern 2.  The 1953 Rules stated: 
 A person making a post- mortem examination shall make provision, so far as is 
 possible, for the preservation of material which, in his opinion, bears upon the 
 cause of death for such  period as the coroner thinks fit.  (Rule 6); 
and 
 A person making a special examination shall make provision, so far as is possible, 
 for the preservation of the material submitted to him for examination for such 
 period as the coroner thinks fit. (Rule 9). 
[Confusingly, a later version of the Coroners Rules, in 1984, contained the above 
Rule 6 as Rule 9, and the above Rule 9 as Rule 12.172  In the Bristol, Alder Hey and 
Redfern 2 Inquiries, and in the vernacular subsequently, tissue retention at coronial 
post mortem came to be referred to as ‘Rule 9 procedures’.+ 
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In principle, the requirement for post mortem material to be retained by the 
pathologist ‘for as long as the coroner sees fit’ could result one of several scenarios.  
The pathologist might wait passively until he heard from the coroner ‘I no longer 
have need for you to retain that *specified+ material’.   This would require the 
coroner to have knowledge of what, if any, material was being retained. The 
pathologist might take the initiative and ask the coroner ‘do you have a date in 
mind after which your interest in this *specified+ material will have ceased?’; or, as a 
variant ‘I am still holding on to this *specified+ tissue- do you want me to continue 
so to do?’.  This would require the pathologist to have known, and have 
interpreted, the content of ‘Rule 9’.  Even if one of such exchanges had taken place, 
consideration would remain about the subsequent fate of the retained material.  
May the pathologist retain it for his research?  Must it be destroyed/disposed of?  
Should/must it be returned, and if so, to whom? 
These are the issues for later Chapters.  In general I have been able to find only 
scant evidence of any such interactions between coroners and pathologists having 
taken place in the mid twentieth century.  Instead, one may recall on the eve of the 
1961 legislation ‘coroners knowing what was going on but not objecting’173; medical 
officers ‘avoiding learning too much’174; researchers impatient to implement tissue 
banking175; attitudes which I submit were swayed by a concern for ‘public benefit’.  
The latter expression was used twice in confidential and informal conversations I 
had: by a senior retired pathologist who, like his colleagues, ‘routinely’ retained 
post mortem tissue for research in the 1960s and 1970s, whether from coronial or 
non-coronial autopsies; and by a currently practising coroner when explaining 
variations in the practice of individual coroners. 
Further evidence on past practices was given in a letter from Professor Bernard 
Knight (the author of the 1985 paper for the Royal College of Pathologists) to a 
senior member of the staff of the MRC at the time of the revelations in 1977 about 
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the collection of pituitaries.  Having set out the requirement that the taking of 
pituitaries from hospital post mortems required the permission of relatives, 
Professor Knight wrote ‘*t+he matter is further complicated in coroner’s cases *in 
which+ the autopsies are done without the permission of the relatives… Thus the 
only Act under which pituitaries are taken is the ‘Blind Eye Act’ which has operated 
for many years but which, due to the adverse publicity of this past year, is now 
becoming unsafe’.176 
The evidence in Redfern 2 was mixed. On the one hand, it was found that coroners 
had often failed to read post mortem reports and as a consequence remained in 
ignorance of the inappropriate removal of organs.177 On the other hand the report 
found that the relationship between the pathologists, the coroners and the medical 
officers became ‘too close’178. 
5. Continued work by officials to prepare for amending legislation.  
5.1 Work with the Joint Consultants Committee and others. 
Immediately following the Couve de Murville case (3.1.1 above), a paper (JC65), 
entitled ‘Human Tissue Act 1961: paper by the Department’, was prepared for the 
Joint Consultants’ Committee (JCC). 179 The drafting official noted in an internal 
memorandum: 
  I understand that Medical (sic) are unhappy in particular about extending the paper 
 to cover non forensic post-mortems as well as the removal of tissue for therapeutic 
 purposes.  But  this only reflects the Human Tissue Act itself, which applies the 
 same procedures to both.  Moreover, we have indirect evidence, in the folder 
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 attached180 and elsewhere, that  pathologists have continued to remove tissue at 
 post-mortem for extraneous purposes without specific consent.  I do not think that 
 we should go on overlooking this.181  (My emphasis). 
Officials had noted in JC65 that the 1961 Act did not create offences for non-
compliance, and that, in the case of CdM,  the hospital had had ‘no mechanism in 
place for person in lawful possession’ in spite of DHSS memorandum HM (61) 98 
about the responsibility of Hospital Management Committees or Boards of 
Governors in this regard.182  JC65 raised the question about who should be 
responsible for seeking permission from relatives, both in relation to obtaining 
organs for transplantation, and for autopsies.  With regard to removing tissues 
during autopsy for teaching or research, there had been ‘no complaint yet’.183 The 
paper also noted that ‘a strict interpretation of the legal position might require all 
material removed during an autopsy to be put back in the body’.184  JC65 
recommended that the solution was not to amend the law- ‘such provision being 
difficult to draft and possibly contentious to certain minorities- but by phrasing the 
form of consent so as to indicate in appropriate cases that material was sought for 
education and research’.185 
Paper JC65 was pre-circulated for comment.  A covering letter from the CMO, Dr 
George Godber, to the Chairman of the JCC suggested that ‘it has become apparent 
that the provisions of the Human Tissue Act 1961 are not well known at hospital 
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level’.186  The President of the Royal College of Surgeons of England responded to 
the paper:  
 It is possible that [the proposals] might hinder education and research, as well as 
 being difficult of literal observance.  The Dept’s paper rightly notes that an 
 amendment of the law to cover present practice would be difficult to draft... A 
 subcommittee of the College set up to consider the matters raised by the 
 Department are of the opinion that, rather than alter the phrasing of the consent 
 form to include this [consent to the autopsy in the interests of research and 
 teaching], that the matter be left as it is at present, in view of the tacit acceptance 
 of present customs by the general public.187 
The response from the Royal College of Pathologists (RCPath) to the draft paper 
was largely in support of the status quo ante. The response also revealed some 
confusion in the minds of College officials about the law. ‘Strict interpretation of 
the legal position, as suggested in paragraph 5 of JC65, would be utterly 
impracticable, if indeed it were true.  In our view this is not so, for specific approval 
is given by s.1 of the Human Tissue Act 1961.’ 188  It was of course s.2 of the Act 
which was at issue. This stimulated an internal memorandum between two officials 
within the Department: ‘*Like you+ I suspect we are not getting through to the 
Pathologists, and that they aren’t getting the point... the point we were on was that 
consent to an autopsy did not automatically convey consent to the removal of a 
part.’189 
The JCC set up a Special Committee on Organ Transplantation which reported in 
January 1970190, and which subsequently published its conclusions in the British 
Medical Journal.191 The Committee had confined its deliberations to questions left 
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unanswered by MacLennan.  Their conclusions were in favour of ‘contracting in’ 
and unanimously opposed to ‘contracting out’ as ‘premature’.   The Committee 
favoured amending the Human Tissue Act 1961 to define a hierarchy of relatives to 
be consulted. Although there was a view that the plain intention of the 1961 Act 
had been that the wishes of the deceased, where known, should be paramount192, 
the Committee recommended that objection of relatives should explicitly be 
allowed to trump the express wish of the deceased for that his or her organs be 
taken for use.193 
5.2 Any amending legislation should be broadly drawn. 194 
By the end of 1971 the activities of Parliamentarians and other bodies described 
above had prompted a revision and updating by officials of possible amending 
legislation195, building on the work in the Department that had already been 
undertaken during the previous Government.196 Although the stimulus to examining 
the contents of possible legislation had continued to be the problems identified by 
transplant surgeons and their supporters (see recommendations of MacLennan), it 
was the Department’s view that any amending legislation should not be confined to 
transplantation alone (including provisions with regard to live donors) but should 
be as least as broad as the Human Tissue Act 1961 itself.197  Areas identified where 
a revision of legislation should be contemplated included: authorisation for removal 
of tissue; definition of ‘relatives’; definition of ‘enquiries’; procedures to certify 
death; statutory recognition of bequests; live donors; consent of the Director of 
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Public Prosecutions  to prosecution of doctors; offence to sell organs; recovery of 
implanted devices; autopsies; amendments of Anatomy Acts 1832 and 1871.198  
 As matters turned out, there would be no major amendment of the Human Tissue 
Act 1961 until it was replaced by the Human Tissue Act 2004. [The original s.3, 
which related to the Anatomy Act 1832 and Cremation Acts 1902199 and 1952200, 
was repealed by the Anatomy Act 1984.  Section 1(4) was amended, and s.1(4A) 
and (10) added, by the Corneal Tissue Act 1986. 201  The Human Organ Transplants 
Act 1989202 had its origins in a ‘kidneys for sale’ case.  By regulation, a new 
supervisory body, the Unrelated Live Transplant Regulatory Authority (ULTRA) was 
established203. Other minor amendments were made by general health and 
community care legislation.] 
The importance of the work undertaken by officials in the early 1970s was that their 
conclusions and recommendations remained on file and were available to those 
involved in the stages of inspiration, deliberation, and formulation of what became 
the 2004 Act.   This is discussed further in Chapter Four. 
5.2.1 Post mortem examinations (‘post mortems’; ‘PMs’; ‘autopsies’). 
 Of particular note were the issues identified by officials in 1971 in regard to 
autopsies in the following terms: 
 The procedure required in s.2(2) for [non- coronial] autopsies is the same as that 
 for donations under s.1 for therapeutic purposes, medical education or research, 
 namely, express consent or absence of objection by the deceased or his relatives. It 
 is held upon Parliamentary Counsel’s advice that consent to an autopsy does not 
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 ipso facto authorise removal of tissue beyond what is essential for the purposes of 
 the autopsy. 204 
 [This was an interpretation by Departmental officials205 of Counsel’s advice given 
during drafting of the Human Tissue Act 1961 and discussed in Chapter One, against 
the need to include the term ‘retention’ in the 1961 legislation206].  It matters little 
that Counsel’s letter perhaps allowed an alternative interpretation to be put on it 
with regard to consent for retention from that taken by the official when drafting 
advice in1971, in that ‘retention’ *of small portions of tissue+ was seen by Counsel 
as an inevitable consequence of an examination, rather than as an extra procedure.  
More important is that the phrase ‘consent to an autopsy does not ipso facto 
authorise removal of tissue beyond what is essential for the purposes of the 
autopsy’ entered official files. 
The Departmental paper continued: 
 It follows from this that a doctor wishing to carry out both an autopsy and removal 
 of tissue, say for other research, should, in strict law, obtain explicit consent to 
 both purposes.   There is some indication that this is not always sought, and there 
 has been some controversy.  It is possible that pathologists and others carrying out 
 scientific autopsies are motivated by a desire to spare distressed relatives as much 
 as possible, but this is a source  of misunderstanding and possible friction.  Three 
 options are possible.  First, the wording of s2(2) could be amended to bring it into 
 line with what is thought to be medical practice, that is, a relative would agree to a 
 post-mortem and removal of tissue.  Second, the opposite course would be to 
 tighten the wording to make sharper what is understood to be the present effect of 
 the law. Third, the issue could be left, but sooner or later there might be an 
 awkward case weakening public confidence in the profession.  On the other hand, 
 it is not clear that the medical profession would welcome the publicity likely to 
 accompany discussion of a change since this is delicate ground for them.207  
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Events twenty five years later would prove the prescience of these words. 
6. Summary.  
The challenges posed by developments in transplantation had been the driving 
force behind the Human Tissue Act 1961.  It is not surprising therefore that it was 
further questions raised by transplantation practice which challenged the adequacy 
of that legislation.  These questions proved Dr Dickson Mabon MP to have been 
wrong in his predictions about its adequacy in the long term. 
In the absence of any systematic post-legislative scrutiny (a usual state of affairs for 
the time), evidence of problems accumulated gradually and patchily, led by the 
pleas of the transplant surgeons.  In the mid to late 1960s, Government was still 
conditioned to determining ‘what the doctors require’; so that, when questions 
began to be raised about the definition of ‘the person in lawful possession’, and the 
span of relatives who needed to be consulted after such reasonable inquiry as was 
practicable, the Government responded by setting up two broadly based advisory 
conferences, followed by MacLennan.  Both the lead Ministers who were involved 
during this period, Rt Hon Kenneth Robinson MP and Rt Hon Richard Crossman MP, 
clearly expected that new revised legislation would be needed to meet the doctors’ 
wishes. 208  
In the event, what emerged from Robinson’s conferences, and from MacLennan, 
was a need for caution. The voice of the public had begun to be heard, and that 
expressed significant disquiet about the possibility of organs being removed under 
an ‘opt out’ scheme favoured by the more vocal transplant surgeons.  The need for 
explicit consent began to be articulated.  This led Robinson to conclude that public 
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opinion would not support the removal of organs without permission209 - a view 
endorsed by Cabinet. 210   
In 1968 Robinson had said in the House of Commons that, in his view, the Human 
Tissue Act 1961 at the time of its enactment had gone as far as had been 
reasonable at that time to strike a balance between facilitating the possible use of 
organs to save another life and the feelings and religious beliefs of the dead 
person’s family; and that changes which might be desirable to keep pace with 
advances of medical science would not be generally acceptable unless such feelings 
were treated with due respect 211 - a very different tone and balance from the ‘give 
doctors what they require’ debates only seven years previously at the time when 
The Human Tissue Act 1961 was introduced.  It was this dawning awareness of the 
need to carry public opinion that was the major reason why successive 
governments in the late 1960s and early 1970s stopped the initiatives of the MPs 
Nabarro, St John Stevas and Dalyell to introduce amending legislation.  Instead, 
after a period when waiting for the (largely irrelevant) Broderick and Peel reports 
was used as a stalling mechanism by Ministers, a mantra was developed which 
thereafter intoned repeatedly the need for motivation and education of the public, 
with a view to devising an acceptable and effective scheme for voluntary 
donation.212 213 214 
The publicity given to the cases (Ford, Howard, O’Sullivan, McEldowney) in which 
doctors had allegedly transgressed the provisions of the 1961 Act, and the letters of 
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protest which were sent subsequently from the public to Ministers215 216 217 218 219, 
must surely have influenced at least Departmental thinking.  This can be seen in the 
draft legislation which officials prepared in the early 1970s (but which in the event 
was never revealed), in which such matters as authorisation for removal of tissue, 
procedures to certify death, and procedures to allow the prosecution of doctors (all 
of which had been raised by members of the public), were outlined.220  This 
apparent awareness of public concern stood in contrast to the response of officials 
to letters of concern from the public, sent around the time of introduction of the 
1961 Act, which were ignored or politely rebuffed.221 222 223 
Within the evolving transplantation narrative, an ignorance of the relevant law was 
revealed on the part of doctors who were involved.  Dr Couve de Murville had said 
directly that he did not know of the need for consent from the relatives before 
taking corneas.  In the O’Sullivan case, the hospital authorities had been uncertain 
about the extent of their obligation to seek objections.  More worryingly, the 
surgeon in the Ford case had indicated, by the speed with which he had proceeded 
to harvest a kidney after death, a lack of understanding of the purpose of making a 
proper inquiry of the relatives-a purpose set by the Minister of Health in terms that 
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far more harm would be done by a single case in which a strongly held scruple was 
overridden than by a temporary loss of opportunity.224  The doctors in the Ford case 
apparently overrode a clearly stated objection, with the result that, to judge from 
the volume of adverse press and public response, harm was done to the cause of 
transplantation. 
In part mitigation, it is relevant to remember the difficulties that MacLennan had 
had with understanding the implications of the Human Tissue Act 1961 as worded 
with regard to the taking of organs for therapeutic purposes, and which they had 
resolved only into a series of questions. Who was the person in lawful possession?  
In the period between death and the claiming of the body by executors or next of 
kin, did the hospital have possession, or did possession by the executors or next of 
kin start at the moment of death?  Was it permissible under the law to remove 
organs if no enquiry is ‘practicable’ within the very short time after which organs 
become unusable?  Did the right to object subsist literally in ‘any surviving relative’, 
no matter how remote the kinship? 225  These questions would not be resolved in 
statute law until the passing of the Human Tissue Act 2004.226 
Ignorance of the Human Tissue Act 1961 was not confined to transplant surgeons, 
nor to an understanding of the wording of those sections of the Act which were 
relevant to transplantation.  It will be recalled from Chapter One that that Act had 
had sections added which related to post-mortem examinations in order to settle 
previous uncertainty about the legality of non-coronial post mortems. 227 This issue 
was eventually resolved within the 1961 Act at s.2(1): 
 s.2(1) ‘Without prejudice to section fifteen of the Anatomy Act 1832 (which 
 prevents that Act from being construed as applying to post mortem examinations 
 directed to be made by a competent legal authority), that Act shall not be 
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 construed as applying to any post- mortem examination carried out for the 
 purpose of establishing or confirming the causes of death or of investigating the 
 existence or nature of abnormal conditions.228 
The legislation dealt with the fact and the purpose of a post mortem examination 
but said nothing about the procedure or the content of such an examination.  If, as I 
propose, doctors regarded ‘retention’ as an integral part of a post mortem 
examination rather than as an extra procedure, then at least some of the gaps in 
communication between doctors and relatives about PMs, revealed in later ‘organ 
scandals’, might be better understood.  However, there was also an ignorance of 
the law on the part of medical practitioners as revealed by: overlooking the content 
of DHSS circular HC (IS)156 by Regional Medical Officers and their staff; there being 
a difference between removing organs for transplantation and ‘mushing up a little 
gland’ in the mind of a pathologist; uncertainty within the Medical Research Council 
as to the boundaries between the requirements of an autopsy to establish the 
cause of death and those for extending the range of knowledge and understanding 
of disease, as revealed by the Neuberger Inquiry into radiation studies229; and the 
fact that, as late as 1990, the retention of tissues from post-mortem examinations 
continued to generate letters to the Royal College of Pathologists, and led to the 
conclusion by the executive of that College that ‘obviously some pathologists are 
still not clear as to the legal situation.’230  
It must have been of some embarrassment to Government that several of the 
transgressions of the Human Tissue Act 1961 which accumulated in the ‘in-tray’ had 
arisen from government establishments.  The Medical Research Council had been in 
charge of the Human Pituitary Collection, and when it emerged that pituitaries had 
routinely been taken at post mortem without consent, the best that a spokesman 
for the Council could say was that the MRC relied upon pathologists to conform to 
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the law.  As to the MRC’s involvement in radiation studies, where again tissue 
(bone) was taken without consent, IRG concluded that ‘most parents signing *a PM 
consent form] would have had little idea of the assumptions which were made at 
that time by pathologists about what that signature covered or authorised’231.  The 
Neuberger inquiry conceded that the boundaries between the requirements of an 
autopsy to establish the cause of death and those for extending the range of 
knowledge and understanding of disease were blurred.232  Most striking of all 
[albeit in retrospect] was the involvement of government institutions, and 
coroners, in the taking of tissues for research without consent revealed in 
November 2010 by Redfern 2.  Ignorance of the law, and the mores of the time with 
regard to ‘informed’ consent, extended well beyond the medical profession. 
The main purpose of this Chapter was three-fold:  first, to determine what 
accumulated in the ‘in tray’ following the introduction of the Human Tissue Act 
1961 and note what responses, if any, followed (as a prelude to considering the 
possible role of factors other than ‘organ scandals’ in Bristol and Liverpool as 
‘inspiration’ for new legislation- see Chapter Four); second, to assess whether the 
intended policy objectives were met, and if so, how effectively; third, to consider 
narrow questions of a purely legal or technical nature, as relevant.  In overall 
conclusion, the evidence has confirmed that, as was common during the years 
following the introduction of the Human Tissue Act 1961, there was no systematic 
post-legislative scrutiny.  Instead, a series of problems arose, which were met by 
piecemeal responses. The problems had their origins partly in developments in 
transplantation, partly in ignorance of the existing law by practitioners and 
Government research departments, partly in difficulties in interpreting the letter of 
the law (a law that would later be described as be ‘obscure, uncertain and 
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arcane’)233, and, importantly, partly because the voice of the public began to be 
heard in official circles. 
It is to the rising importance of that public voice, and its implications for public 
policy, that the next Chapter turns. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A profession under pressure? Or sailing unconcernedly towards the 
rocks? 
 Preamble. 
In 2000, the Panel in the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (whose findings will be 
considered in detail in Chapter Four) concluded, with regard to their findings 
concerning post mortem tissue retention, that:  
 [t]here was in essence, a professional arrogance, justified when necessary by the 
 recourse to traditional paternalism...[f]undamentally, there was a social and ethical 
 time bomb waiting to go off.  It is no surprise that the explosion of anger, when it 
 came, was huge.  The cause lay in two conflicting attitudes [as between parents 
 and the profession]1. 
Was this an accurate and fair description of the then relations between the public 
and the medical profession, whose standing Parliament had so trusted 40 years 
previously as to legislate for what the medical profession required (my emphasis) 
for the improvement of treatment, education and research2?  If there was such a 
dramatic shift in attitudes, to what might it be ascribed? 
There are three ‘players’ in the following account: ‘society’; patients; and the 
medical profession.  Their interrelations are complex, and each will appear, leave 
the stage, and reappear in a veritable ‘dance to the music of time’3.  The chapter 
begins in the UK with an examination of public attitudes to medicine from two 
perspectives: relationships between medicine and the state; and changing doctor-
patient relationships.  Consideration is then given to what might be expected of a 
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good doctor, including the role of trust.  The importance of professional regulation 
is examined and the performance of the General Medical Council is assessed.  Next, 
comparisons with the USA are made, in an attempt to identify both universal and 
nation-specific factors which might have been operating.  The chapter then moves 
from doctor/patient/medicine/health themes to explore (necessarily briefly) some 
broader societal factors of potential relevance.  The chapter concludes with an 
examination of how the medical profession coped with, and responded to, these 
societal pressures, as the millennium approached. 
1. Attitudes towards the medical profession in the UK. 
Elston noted in 1991‘*t+he paucity of recent detailed empirical studies by medical 
sociologists of the major institutions of British medicine.  Research into the 
professional organisations and the institutions of medical education and collegiate 
control have been conspicuous by their absence in recent years’4. 
With that rather discouraging start, the following paragraphs seek to examine the 
UK position from two perspectives: first, a changing relationship between the state 
and medicine; second, the challenge to medicine from the articulate ‘consumer’. 
1.1 Relations between the state and medicine. 
1.1.1 Influential critiques. 
The concordat between the state and the medical profession was scarcely 
questioned during the first thirty years of the NHS.  However, in the mid 1970s 
concern over continuously escalating costs led to marked financial constraints and 
proposals to ration resource allocation between regions and focus spending on 
national priorities.5   At about the same time, a number of critiques appeared which 
arguably could have combined to dent confidence and optimism about the future.  
Dollery described the end of an ‘era of optimism’ about the contribution that high 
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technology medicine was making to health.  Evidence of diminishing returns in 
terms of reducing adult mortality, the iconoclastic epidemiology of McKeown and 
Cochrane, and the more dramatic claims of epidemic iatrogenesis of Illich may have 
contributed to a climate in which questioning of the efficiency and effectiveness of 
medicine’s use of resources could become a more legitimate activity for politicians.  
In addition, and discussed later, the 1970s saw the beginnings of a rise in concepts 
of patient autonomy/consumerism in health. 
Colin Dollery, one of the foremost clinical scientists of his generation, entitled a 
monograph on clinical science ‘The end of an age of optimism’.6  Writing in 1978, he 
described the mood of the preceding 30 years in these terms: 
 Some of the early achievements in the treatment of infections were so miraculous 
 as almost to surpass belief.  They, literally, changed the world…it was a time of 
 optimism.  Science appeared to have the salvation of the world in its hand and 
 mankind could look forward to an era of healthy ease and modest prosperity…*but  
 now+ the mood has changed…*there are+ doubts about the future of 
 affluence…problems seem larger and solutions to them more elusive.  Crash 
 programmes on cancer and stroke have made only a modest impact on their 
 targets.  The validity of claims made about past successes has been questioned.  
 Both the morality and the cost effectiveness of scientific medicine have been 
 challenged.  Care in the community seems more readily attainable and comfortable 
 than the chance of high technology cure in a modern hospital.  The age of optimism 
 has ended.7  
Dollery identified that, amongst ‘the barrage of criticism’ of medical science, some 
voices stood out.  He drew up a ‘charge list’ and listed the charges against the 
names of the chief ‘witnesses’, as follows: conspiracy against the public (Ivan 
Illich)8; callous lack of concern (Maurice Pappworth)9; irrelevance of medical 
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practice to health (Thomas McKeown)10; credulous acceptance of new procedures 
and drugs (Archie Cochrane)11; technological inhumanity (public and press); lack of 
application to real health problems (Department of Health and Social Security)12.  It 
is beyond the scope of the present account for me to attempt to play the role of 
Counsel for either the prosecution or defence.  Instead, it is appropriate to try to 
assess briefly the wider influence of the charges and the witnesses.  
The sense of immense confidence in the eventual conquest of disease which had 
come from discoveries such as penicillin and streptomycin had not been confined to 
medical scientists.  It had found strong expression in the views of politicians and the 
public.  As Dollery said, this was the age of Beveridge and Bevan as well as Fleming 
and Waksman.13 Unreasonable expectations were fed by uncritical claims and a 
reaction was bound to happen.  Physicians who had been happy to accept the 
credit for ‘cures’ that were the result of the placebo effect and regression upon the 
mean, rather than to specific measures, were faced with the charge that their 
efforts had had little positive effect and might even be counterproductive.  As so 
often occurs in debates, overstatement on one side was met with overstatement on 
the other, and moderating voices were poorly heard. 
For example, the arguments of McKeown, that by far the greater part of the 
improvement in life expectancy over the preceding 150 years had been due to 
improvements in sanitation, housing and nutrition, and that the role of medicine 
and medical science had been minor, received wide and sympathetic hearing from 
reviewers14 who took little notice of rebuttals from authors such as Beeson15, 
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Godber16 and Lever17.  Among those influenced by McKeown’s arguments was Ian 
Kennedy, who would acknowledge this in his Reith Lectures published five years 
later.18  It is of interest that McKeown, in subsequent conversations with Dollery, 
was said to have come to believe that he had presented his arguments leaning too 
far one way to counteract the excessive claims of medical scientists who he had felt 
were leaning much too far in the other direction.19  
Ivan Illich’s book Limits to Medicine opened with the challenging sentence ‘The 
medical establishment has become a major threat to health’.20  He made four main 
charges against the medical care system: much disease is doctor-induced; the social 
organisation of medicine has a health denying effect; there is ‘cultural iatrogenesis’, 
whereby the medical enterprise saps the will of people to ‘suffer their reality’; and, 
in the political dimension, pathogenic medicine is the result of industrial 
overproduction that paralyses autonomous action- but one example of the 
destructive dominance of industry over society.  In a new preface to a reprint of his 
book in 1995, Illich clarified his purpose.  ‘I used medicine as a paradigm for any 
mega-technique that promises to transform the condition humana.  I examined it as 
a model for any enterprise claiming, in effect, to abolish the need for the art of 
suffering by a technically engineered pursuit of happiness’.21  
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It is difficult to assess the long term influence of Illich’s writing.  In the short term, 
we know that one medical student, Richard Smith, later a distinguished editor of 
the British Medical Journal, was so moved by hearing Illich’s lecture in 1974, ‘a 
passionate man surrounded by the fossils of the academic hierarchy in Edinburgh’, 
that he had ‘the closest I ever came to a religious experience’ and dropped out of 
medical school for three days.22  In 2002, Smith found in his re-reading of Limits to 
medicine that ‘*its+ power is undiminished and its prescience remarkable.  What 
was a radical polemic in 1974 is in some sense mainstream in 2002.  Medicine does 
seem to have overreached itself and some reining in will benefit not only patients 
but doctors’.23 
Others were divided on the question of Illich’s long term influence.  To his obituarist 
in The Times, Illich was not a realistic planner towards his goals [‘of freedom, 
equality and fraternity’+.  Instead he gradually retreated into thought rather than 
action, preferring on his rare visits to the UK the company of university professors 
to any investigation of real social conditions.  ‘His attacks on professions, neatly 
paradoxical as they were, often failed to make direct contact with life on the 
ground in mass society’.24  In the view of Bunker, Illich’s attack had been largely 
ignored by the medical profession and there was little if any evidence that it has 
affected the growth of the medical establishment.25  To Scott-Samuel, Illich was 
‘well ahead of his time’ in identifying the health hazards of the medicalisation of 
society, but felt that, in retrospect, his thesis of the disabling of society through the 
direct dominance of professionalism and industrialisation was over-simplistic, and 
certainly gave insufficient credit to the achievements of medicine. ‘But as a 
preacher of revolution in the politics of health, he had few equals’.26  Ian Kennedy, 
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although he would not ‘necessarily’ endorse the views of Illich, was clearly 
influenced by Illich’s conclusion that the whole of medicine was a moral exercise, 
when coming to his own recognition of the ‘medico-moral’ dimension to many 
medical decisions.27  
There is an interesting anecdote about Illich when he was not being ‘charismatic’ 
with ‘compelling rhetoric’.  In 1976, he gave a series of lectures at the University of 
California at Los Angeles (UCLA) on ‘iatrogenesis’ before a sceptical and at times 
resentful medical audience. At the end of his last lecture, a questioner opined that 
his approach to medicine, medical professionals and medical institutions had been 
entirely negative, and asked how medical professionals could improve, rather than 
harm, the health of people and society.  ‘The question prompted Dr Illich to 
formulate, apparently for the first time, a proposal to use the best (most efficient) 
modern medical technology to enrich popular culture so as to improve the ability of 
people to cope on their own with disease and disability, and their ability to help 
maintain their own health’.  This prompted the reporter to hope that, not only had 
UCLA had the benefit of Illich’s thinking, but that UCLA may have helped guide that 
thinking ‘into more constructive channels’. 28  
1.1.2 National policy and medical decisions. 
Although it may be plausible to suggest that the writings of McKeown, Illich, 
Cochrane and others (a form of literature dubbed ‘those antidoctor books’29) 
created a climate in which questioning of the efficiency and effectiveness of 
medicine’s use of resources could become a more legitimate activity for politicians, 
it is difficult to substantiate such a hypothesis directly.  It is certain that the 
economic climate in the late 1970s forced such reappraisal –against a background 
of frustration about the collective inability of the centre to influence activities on 
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the ground.30  Further, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, Rt Hon 
Richard Crossman MP (and his successors) were faced with the effect on the acute 
medical sector of what Klein had termed ‘growing scarcity in an era of growth’31.  
This state of affairs was first recognised by Enoch Powell in 1966 in his immensely 
influential book Medicine and Politics as ‘the infinity of demand’, when he 
described as ‘absurd’ the idea that there was a definable amount of health care 
which was ‘needed’ and which, once met, would result in no more being 
demanded.32 
According to Klein, the way in which central policy makers reacted to the economic 
pressures on the NHS was significant as much for what they did not do as for what 
they actually did.  In the reorganisation of the NHS in 1974, certain policy options 
were ‘automatically’ ruled out.  There was no move towards controlling or even 
investigating the decisions of clinicians, in contrast to the USA where an open 
ended budgetary system had led to a series of attempts to introduce a formalised 
system for reviewing medical decisions.  The doctrine of clinical autonomy 
continued to reign supreme.  Even the Health Service Commissioner, whose office 
was set up in 1974 to deal with patient complaints, was explicitly barred from 
dealing with cases involving questions of clinical judgment.33 
Although the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS, devised with the goal of managerial 
efficiency, was constructed to ensure that the influence of ‘expertise’ continued, 
the ever deepening economic crisis that marked the years after 1973 profoundly 
transformed the situation.  In Klein’s analysis, one casualty of the new politics was 
the faith in technocracy that had marked the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 
the 1970s, so that there was a re-politicisation of issues which had previously been 
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defined as belonging properly to the realm of the expert.  Inevitably politicians had 
to handle the conflicts brought about by competing claims for resources.  
Moreover, the challenge to expertise was reinforced by another powerful emerging 
trend which began in the late 1960s and gained ever increasing prominence 
through the 1970s – namely, the emphasis on the values of ‘participatory 
democracy’ and a revolt against centralised bureaucracy.  This was a development 
whose contributory factors had been well analysed in the USA34 (which will be 
further considered in section 3 of this chapter), and which, in Klein’s view, were 
equally relevant in the UK.35 While successive governments were reorganising the 
civil service, local government and the NHS on criteria based on the values of 
efficiency, simultaneously a groundswell of opposition to these values was making 
itself felt.36 
By the late 1970s, the revolt against expertise and a rising interest in participatory 
democracy, combined with a polarisation of politics and, above all, commitments to 
reducing public expenditure, were to have a major influence in the health care 
policy arena.37  Although the process of change was gradual – a dawning realisation 
that the perceptions and assumptions which had for so long shaped health care 
policy needed to be adapted to the new environment – in my view there were a 
number of discrete episodes which altered in the UK, perhaps forever, the 
relationship between the medical profession and government, and the image of 
doctors in the eyes of the public. 
Against a background of rising trade union militancy in the NHS during the early 
1970s, in October 1975, for the first time in the history of the NHS, doctors took 
industrial action.  Breaking with all precedent, junior doctors in Leicestershire 
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withdrew their labour in a pay dispute, an action which subsequently spread to the 
rest of the country.38   The outcome of the dispute was the introduction of an 
industrial-type contract for junior hospital doctors with overtime payments for 
virtually all hours worked over a basic 40 hour week.  The concept of a doctor as 
someone who took responsibility for his or her patients at all times of the day or 
night was gone.  At the same time, consultants were already embroiled in a battle 
with the Government over their contracts and private practice.  They too adopted 
militant tactics.  Their ‘sanctions’ began as threats only39, but escalated so that for 
sixteen weeks, to a greater or lesser extent around the country, consultants 
‘worked to contract’.  Outpatient sessions were cancelled, and waiting lists grew.  In 
some places casualty departments closed on alternate weekends, and more than 
one patient found themselves anaethetised and then not operated on because the 
surgeon’s time was ‘up’.40  An editorial in the British Medical Journal identified the 
use of sanctions as ‘a regrettable decline in professional self esteem which could 
permanently damage relations between doctors and the public’.41   
As described by Timmins, there was a real clash of personalities in the dispute: the 
burning determination of the Rt Hon Barbara Castle MP, Secretary of State at the 
DHSS, versus the leader of the negotiators for the BMA, the surgeon Anthony 
Grabham.  ‘He brought to the previously gentlemanly conduct of 
government/doctor negotiations all the icy fire of a Tebbit- like shop steward, 
operating to a brief’.42 Assessment of Grabham’s performance over the years has 
varied greatly- from being the best negotiator the BMA ever had to ‘the man who 
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single-handedly did more damage to British medicine than any other’ according to 
the anonymous words of a senior doctor in the DHSS.43 
Eventually the dispute was settled by the intervention of the Prime Minister, Rt Hon 
Harold Wilson MP, and the involvement of Lord Goodman as chief mediator, but 
not without a cost.  The adoption of industrial sanctions seems to me to have 
represented a profoundly important shift in the position of the medical profession, 
from a profession which ‘earned’ its respect and influence through a calling to serve 
the public, with its attendant privileges and restraints, to being just another group 
of workers in the NHS.  This is to echo the words of Sir Theodore Fox, a past editor 
of the Lancet and a much respected medical figure, writing in late 1976 ‘either they 
are industrial workers who strike on any provocation, or they are members of a 
profession who strike on none’.44 
Long term damage was undoubtedly done.  Dr Derek Stevenson, Secretary of the 
BMA, tried to limit the damage done by both junior and senior doctors as best he 
could in frequent appearances on television.  But the violence of the doctors’ 
language, the misogyny with which Barbara Castle had been attacked as ‘the Red 
Queen’, and, most damaging of all, the sanctions which the profession had applied 
to patients, seriously undermined the standing of doctors with both the public and 
politicians.  At the same time the profession was split, many members having had 
no part in the action.45   There were a large number of resignations from the BMA, 
including Sir George Godber, the then recent past Chief Medical Officer, who stated 
that he was no longer willing to be a member of an organisation which was 
prepared to pursue its objectives by methods harmful to patients.46  As expressed 
by Timmins ‘their moral authority to condemn industrial action by others in the 
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NHS had gone, and the Tories, as much as Labour, marked the BMA down as a 
deeply troublesome and offensive trade union, a professional cabal which…seemed 
to have too much power and needed to be cut down to size’.47 
And cut down to size they were. According to Elston ‘doctor bashing’ and calls for 
reform became major sports in the mass media.48  Indeed the BMA felt obliged to 
protest publicly, virtually accusing the Secretary of State for Health of complicity in 
‘what appears to be a deliberate attempt...to denigrate the work of doctors and 
undermine them in the public eye’.49  
 Over the next dozen years, the medical profession was excluded completely from 
consultations on a range of changes in the health services, including, most notably, 
the major reorganisation set out in the White Paper Working for patients50 (whose 
proposals were described by Klein as ‘a turning point in the history of the NHS, a 
deliberate repudiation of the past’51).   The ebullient Secretary of State for Health, 
Rt Hon Kenneth Clarke MP, was clear about his approach to the BMA. ‘We had to 
pull them into the mud with us and make clear this was just another trade union, 
actually one of the nastiest I have dealt with, and battle it out’.52  The underlying, 
vastly increased and ‘incontrovertible’ ambition of the Government, in the view of 
Brazier and colleagues, was to control doctors on behalf of the central state.53 
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It is difficult to assess the overall effect in the eyes of the public of a battle, fought 
in the headlines, between the Government and a profession which challenged 
many of the Government’s proposals54 55.  The BMA mounted an expensive 
campaign that included large posters which asked ‘What do you call a man who 
ignores medical advice?  Mr Clarke’56: to be followed by Clarke’s public rebuttal by 
announcing that his answer to the question was ‘Healthy’.57   This reply conveyed 
concisely the scepticism which characterised Clarke’s term of office towards the 
BMA’s claims to professional disinterestedness and the right to a central place in 
policy making. 
The National Health Service and Community Care Act 199058 which arose from 
Working for patients, marked a double defeat for the medical profession.  Not only 
was it the end of an era in which there was a medical veto in the health policy 
process, but the doctor’s voice in the local administration of health care was also 
weakened.59  The failure to include the Government’s own Chief Medical Officer as 
an ex officio member of the newly created NHS Board symbolised for some the 
displacement of the profession from the centre of health policy making.60  
It has long been recognised that the man or woman in the street may take a very 
different view of ‘doctors’ from ‘my doctor’.61 It is to that personal relationship that 
I now turn. 
                                                     
54
 BMA affairs. BMA launches campaign against White Paper.  BMJ 1989; 298 (6674): 676-9. 
55
 Vallance-Owen AJ.  The BMA after NHS review. BMJ 1989; 298(6689): 1661-1662. 
56
 Timmins N. The five giants: a biography of the welfare state. London.  Fontana Press, 1996, op. 
cit., p741. 
57
 Clarke K.  Speech at Conservative Party conference. October 10, 1989. 
58
 National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 (1990, c. 19.) 
59
 Klein R. The new politics of the National Health Service. Fourth edition.  London. Prentice Hall, 
2001, op. cit., p172. 
60
 The Independent. May 15, 1989. 
61
 Gaffin B and Associates.  What Americans think of the medical profession: report of a public 
opinion survey. Chicago, American Medical Association, 1955. 
145 
 
1.2 Doctor-patient relationships. 
1.2.1 The rise of the articulate consumer. 
The late 1970s witnessed not only the end of an era of optimism about scientific 
medicine, but also, and perhaps not unconnectedly, the ‘end of an era of the 
passive patient’.  Instead, there arose the beginnings of active and increasingly 
sophisticated ‘consumerism’62, a concept neatly summarised by Lupton: 
  In all usages of the notion of the patients qua consumers, regardless of political 
 orientation, the dominant and privileged representation is that of dispassionate, 
 thinking, calculating subjects [who are] rational economic decision makers with 
 complete sovereignty over the  choice of how to use their resources to their best 
 advantage.63 
 It was later argued that factors operating to encourage ‘consumerism’ on both 
sides of the Atlantic included: increased lay knowledge about medicine; declining 
deference to experts in society at large; changing patterns of morbidity, including a 
startling increase in chronic (as compared to acute) diseases as the dominant 
concern in practice; and a rise of psychological explanations for illness, leaving the 
physician dealing with the uncertainties of psychosomatics.64 65  All these changes 
were modifying social expectations about doctor-patient relationships towards 
respect for a patient’s views, and mutual participation in decision-making.66  It is 
clear that the medical profession did not adapt quickly enough. 
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Sir Donald Irvine, a Past President of the General Medical Council, certainly took the 
view that, during the 1980s, a conservative profession became increasingly out of 
step with the expectations of both government and the public. 
  Even though throughout the whole of the 20th century, the profession was 
 vigorously progressive in developing medical science and technology, it remained 
 deeply conservative in matters of attitude and human relationships…*t+he medical 
 profession missed the point- and it was certainly not the only one to do so- that 
 paternalism, even when it was benign, was becoming less acceptable in a consumer 
 society in which patient/customer/client autonomy was emerging as the new 
 order.67 
The outcome was ‘society and patients moving out of respecting a profession and 
its practitioners  simply by historical right and traditional relationships, leaving the 
doctors behind, floundering in surprise’.68   A decline in respect coincided with calls 
for accountability- itself a symptom of the changing structure of ‘exchange 
relations’ in medical care.69  It is of interest that the Social Science Citation Index 
(SSCI), which arranges all papers in the social science literature by the subject area 
of the title, first used the term ‘accountability’ in 1969, when there were two 
articles.  In 1974 there were 89 references.  Between 1969 and 1981 a total of some 
700 books and papers on accountability were indexed.70 
1.2.2 The particular contribution of Ian Kennedy to the debate. 
For his Reith Lectures, broadcast by the BBC in 1980, Ian (later Professor Sir Ian) 
Kennedy chose as the overall title ‘The unmasking of medicine’.  In the preface to 
the lightly edited version of the lectures, published in 198171, he explained why he 
had chosen that title.  His purpose was 
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  [t]o ask some questions about the way medicine is thought of and practised, and 
 to offer some ways of responding to what I perceive as problems...clearly, 
 reference to a mask suggests that a face is being presented which hides the real 
 one.  My aim is to expose and then examine the real face of medicine...my task is 
 to dispel the myths, so as to discover what the truth might be.72 
Also in the preface, Kennedy offered some signposts to his themes: the power of 
the professional, in contrast to the notion of the self determination of the client 
(the patient) and his sense of responsibility for himself; accountability of the doctor, 
and the need to ensure that the decisions of doctors, to the extent that they are 
not technical, conform to principles acceptable to ‘all of us’; the need to recognise 
that medicine was, at bottom, a political enterprise- if such factors as poverty, 
malnutrition, stress, unemployment and lack of job satisfaction were heavily 
implicated in undermining health, it was clear that that these were not matters 
which doctors could affect.73  He acknowledged as his ‘principal sources to whom 
my debt is great’ the writings of Illich74 and McKeown75 (discussed above), Muir 
Gray76 (a specialist in public health), and Lesley Doyal77 (a political economist, 
Marxist and feminist).   
By identifying themes concerning the doctor- patient relationship, professional 
accountability, non-technical issues acceptable to ‘all of us’, and the political 
dimension to health care, Kennedy anticipated, and certainly helped to usher in, the 
subsequent twenty years of public debate, professional soul searching and political 
action. 
1.2.3 ‘A good doctor’. 
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Bound to the consumerist approach is expectation.  What is expected of ‘a good 
doctor’? How does one recognise a good doctor in the UK?  Much appears to be 
based on patients’ beliefs- that doctors are technically proficient, have good 
interpersonal skills, and show signs that they are the patients’ ally.78  
Attempts have been made to tease out the various roles which doctors play in 
society, in order that each might separately be held up to scrutiny and individual 
judgment.  Burnham identified three main roles for physicians: priestly, technical 
and social.79  
The priestly function has been described by different authors in different ways.  To 
Burnham the term related to an ‘old fashioned’ view of doctors as wise, kindly, 
trusted [usually] men, who took a personal interest in his patients and their 
families.  Branson went further, describing the ‘secularisation of medicine’ in which 
the old ways, with their emphasis in faith, were being eroded by a widespread 
demand in society for self determination.80 Veatch described the main ethical 
principle which summarised the priestly tradition as ‘benefit and do no harm to the 
patient’, which led to taking the locus of decision away from the patient and into 
the hands of the professional. 81   
The technical or ‘engineering’ model arose from the biological revolution, and 
made the physician into a scientist and a technician, to be judged by his or her 
knowledge and competence.  At its extreme, this model required the doctor to be 
‘value free’.82 
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Veatch divided possible ‘social’ roles into ‘collegial’ and ‘contractual’.  He dismissed 
the collegial model of doctor and patient, in which the physician is the patient’s 
‘pal’ with each having common interests and with trust and confidence playing a 
crucial role, as ‘a mere pipedream’.  He preferred a more provisional model which 
would permit equality in the realm of moral significance between patient and 
physician without making utopian assumptions of collegiality.  This he termed ‘the 
contractual model’, in which the lay community was given the status of contractor 
so that day-to- day medical decisions could, with trust and confidence, rest with the 
medical community.83 
In 2002 the British Medical Journal set up a web-based debate on what a good 
doctor is and how one is made.  Over 100 people from 24 countries submitted rapid 
responses.84  Everyone had something different to say.  Coulter referred to a 
Europe-wide evaluation of patients views about general practice85 in which the 
most highly rated aspects of care were: ‘humaneness’, followed by 
‘competence/accuracy’, ‘patients’ involvement in decisions’, and ‘time for care’.86  
In Coulter’s view, patients wanted to trust their doctors but trust had to be earned 
by treating people as adults, answering their questions, listening to their views and 
involving them in decisions.  This was not an optional extra- failure to 
accommodate patients’ needs for involvement would diminish doctors’ standing.87 
Hurwitz and Vass asked whether the notion of goodness had anything to add to 
what was wanted from doctors once their competence and performance had been 
specified and verified. They recognised that, with regard to doctoring, ‘good’ 
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increasingly functioned as a descriptive label that denoted having met certain tests 
of competency, ‘poor’ meant good intentions but inadequate knowledge or skills, 
and a ‘bad’ doctor was one who, however skilled, had bad intentions, undesirable 
values or suspect motives.  Varieties of good, poor and bad doctoring may 
sometimes coexist in the same individual.  However, these authors remained 
optimistic that becoming a good doctor was not an unattainable ideal.  They 
believed that, through medical education, the skills of the applied scientist and the 
reflective capabilities of the medical humanist could be married.88 
The political and social commentator, Polly Toynbee, recognised that the above 
prescription was a tall order.  Commenting on the then recently issued guidance to 
medical schools by the General Medical Council89, she opined that ‘if medical 
schools could indeed turn out doctors moulded to this template, then we should 
expect a new generation of scholar saints and gentle scientists- wise, 
knowledgeable, sensitive, collegiate, humble and good beyond imagining’.90  
Toynbee believed that the GMC document reflected the changing expectations that 
the public had of how doctors should work. She was supportive of the hope that 
young doctors of the future could be imbued with the ethos of this new framework 
for their education, even if, between aspiration and reality, ‘human nature 
intervenes’.91 
Ashcroft had the sceptical thought that compliance with a code was merely the 
outward form of medical virtue and not the heart of it.  He drew attention, as 
Hurwitz had, that a search for the moral heart of medicine might be aided by study 
of the medical humanities.  Goodness, in the sense of being a good doctor, may not 
be a matter of degree at all.92  Holmes, taking a psychodynamic approach, 
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concluded that ‘the search for a good doctor is an illusion- our unconscious minds 
will make sure of that’.  Instead he recommended that, if a doctor, without 
complacency, can bring his or her good and bad parts together so as to become a 
‘good enough’ doctor, that should bring contentment- not only to the doctor but, 
more importantly, to patients, ‘despite sometimes feeling let down by us’.93  As 
O’Neill had observed, trust brings with it no guarantees.94 
In a summary of the debate in the British Medical Journal, Tonks observed that for 
some the notion of a good doctor was simple: it was one who satisfied patients or 
whom you would trust yourself.  For others, defining a good doctor appeared to 
have been more difficult.  Like defining a good car or a good play, it all depended on 
the perspective.   An academic librarian had described a good doctor as ‘one who 
reads and reads and reads’.  A professor of bioethics with an interest in history had 
argued that good doctors are also good historians.  Educators had given high 
priority to being a good teacher, coach and mentor.  And a quality improvement 
specialist had proposed that a good doctor was one who critically examined what 
he or she did and tried to improve on it.  Patients had appeared to want little more 
than a doctor who listened to them.95 
One can detect in the replies, and in other surveys of patients’ perception of their 
doctors and of the health care system, the importance of trust, long recognised to 
be crucial in medical settings96, and said in recent reports to be in decline in the 
UK97 and elsewhere in the West98. 
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1.2.4 Has there been a decline in trust? 
The empirical evidence about a decline in trust in health care, and in doctors, is 
limited and inconsistent.  In Europe there has been some evidence of a decline in 
trust, but it appeared to vary according to the values and organisation of each 
country’s health care system.99 100  The studies of Mechanic support the conclusion 
that, in the USA, there had been a gradual decline in public trust in health care over 
the past 25 years.101 102  Although a pattern of decline in satisfaction (not 
necessarily to be equated with trust) with the NHS had been shown over a similar 
period103 104, trust in doctors in the UK appears to have continued to be strong, at 
least as compared with other professions.  A MORI poll of almost two thousand 
adults, commissioned by the BMA in late 2000, showed that 89% of the public 
trusted doctors to tell the truth- more than any other group, including teachers, 
lawyers and clergymen.  The same proportion said they were either very satisfied 
(36%) or fairly satisfied (54%) with the way that doctors did their jobs- only nurses 
scored higher.105 
However, the poll gave a warning to doctors to give regard to patients’ feelings.  
Thirty-five percent of respondents thought that doctors paid too little attention to 
patients’ feelings, but 43% disagreed and 19% were undecided.  Hospitals as 
                                                     
99
 Straten GFM, Friele RD, Groenewegen D.  Public trust in Dutch health care. Soc. Sci. Med. 2002; 55 
(2): 227-234. 
100
 Wendt C.  Trust in health care systems. Berl. J Soziol. 2003;13: 371. 
101
 Mechanic D.  Changing medical organisation and the erosion of trust.  Millbank Quarterly 
1996;74(2): 171-189. 
102
 Mechanic D.  The functions of limitations of trust in the provision of health care. J Health Politics 
Policy and Law 1998;23(4): 661-686. 
103
 Calnan M, Almond S, Smith S. Ageing and public satisfaction with the health service: an analysis of 
recent trends.  Soc. Sci. Med. 2003; 57(4): 757-762. 
104
 Exley S, Jarvis L.  Trends in attitudes to health care: 1983 to 2001. London.  National Centre for 
Society Research, 2003. 
105
 Ferriman A.  Poll shows public still has trust in doctors. BMJ 2001; 322 (7288): 694. 
153 
 
institutions fared worse than doctors, with 59% of respondents believing that 
hospitals paid too little attention to the rights and feelings of patients.106 
Results of surveys by questionnaire depend crucially on sampling, the actual 
questions asked, and on satisfactory prior validation of the questionnaire.  A recent 
well conducted cross-sectional postal survey by Calnan and Sanford, using a 
structured questionnaire, had as its objective an examination of how the public 
assessed trust in health care in England and Wales.107  The data showed that 
despite a then recent series of scandals (some of which will form the basis of 
subsequent chapters in this thesis) ‘confidence and trust in orthodox medical and 
health care practitioners remained relatively high.  This is in marked contrast to the 
low levels of trust and confidence found in health service managers’.108  The most 
important factors which contributed to the respondents’ overall level of confidence 
and trust were at the ‘micro’ or personal level, and were a mixture of technical and 
interactive considerations.  The top 5 of 32 factors were, in order: patients are 
taken seriously; patients get enough attention; patients will always get the best 
treatment; doctors always make the right diagnosis; doctors provide patients with 
good guidance.109  
Nevertheless, the authors concluded that overall levels of trust were relatively low, 
at least when compared with other indicators of public views such as satisfaction 
levels, with at least 30% expressing little or no trust that patients are taken 
seriously and given enough attention, rising to 50% of distrust that patients will 
always get the best treatment.110  The fact that the authors concluded, on 
consecutive pages, that their data indicated ‘relatively high’ and ‘relatively low’ 
levels of trust is itself an indication of some of the shortfalls of questionnaires, 
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however well constructed.  O’Neill pointed out that the questions used by pollsters 
were not easy to answer.  ‘The pollsters ask carefully controlled cross-sections of 
the public whether they trust certain professions or office-holders.  Most of us 
would want to say that we trust some but not other professionals, some but not 
other office-holders, in some matters but not in others’.111 
O’Neill, in her Reith Lectures in 2002, found little evidence of a crisis of public trust 
in institutions or professionals –and no evidence that, on balance, there was more 
untrustworthy behaviour now than in the past.  Since the essential nature of trust 
was that it had to be placed without guarantees, it would inevitably be misplaced 
on occasions.  However, she found ‘massive evidence’ of a culture of suspicion112, 
and a pervading view that the remedy lay in prevention and sanctions- that 
Government, institutions and the professions should be made more accountable.  
‘The new accountability culture aims at ever more perfect administrative control of 
institutional and professional life’.113  Her fear was that the pursuit of ever more 
perfect accountability, while providing citizens and consumers, patients and parents 
with more information, more comparisons and more complaints’ systems, could at 
the same time build a culture of suspicion and low morale, and eventual 
professional cynicism.114 
Mechanic made similar points, noting that, when trust became eroded, public 
authorities often appointed expert commissions and introduced new rules and 
regulations to control substandard and unethical behaviour, for the purpose of 
assuring the public that health services met high standards and doctors could be 
trusted.  Such measures may help, but, according to Mechanic, they usually did not 
have the high credibility that was accorded to trusted doctors in guiding and 
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reassuring patients.115   In the UK the body which plays this standard-setting and 
regulatory role is the General Medical Council.  I turn now to a brief overview of its 
performance in contributing to public confidence in doctors. 
1.2.5 The role and performance of the General Medical Council. 
The General Medical Council of the UK was established as a result of the Medical 
Act 1858116   with the duty to maintain a register of medical practitioners.  It is 
concerned to set standards for the medical profession and control medical 
education, and it has powers to discipline errant doctors, including the power to 
remove from the Medical Register those doctors judged unfit to practise. The GMC 
embodied the principle of self regulation, long seen as a quintessential 
characteristic of a profession117. 
In the last decades of the 20th century, the GMC, with its large majority of medical 
(as compared to lay) members, came under sustained criticism, particularly with 
regard to a perceived inadequacy in the focus and thrust of its disciplinary 
procedures.  Much of this criticism came from patients and relatives, for whom the 
formidable Mrs Jean Robinson, a lay member of the GMC (with wide knowledge of 
patients’ complaints through her work for the Patients’ Association), was long a 
champion.118  There was substance in Mrs Robinson’s complaints- as put in 1989 by 
Richard Smith, later editor of the British Medical Journal: 
 [u]ntil very recently, there was truth in the common charge that the Council was 
 more concerned when doctors slept with their patients rather than killed them 
 through incompetence.  This has now ceased to be true, and in the past ten years 
 the Council has begun to apply its disciplinary machinery to doctors whose 
 standard of practice has become unacceptably low.  It does not, however, yet have 
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 any efficient mechanism for weeding out and educating incompetent 
 practitioners.119 
Professor Ian Kennedy, a lay member of the GMC (‘the Council’) and, as has already 
been indicated, a trenchant critic of medical practices120, cast doubt on the 
adequacy and appropriateness of self regulation of doctors at the end of the 20th 
century.  His views were summarised by Smith.  First, the Council had a primary 
duty to protect the public interest but had no efficient mechanism for asking the 
public what that interest was. The lay members of the Council clearly represented 
the public interest, but they existed in a vacuum.  They were not elected and had 
no constituency: rather they were appointed for undefined reasons by the Privy 
Council.  In contrast, more than half the members of Council were doctors, many of 
them sponsored by the BMA.  Second, in the view of Kennedy, it was of concern 
that the accountability of Council was not to Parliament, but rather to the Privy 
Council.  Furthermore, the media-‘the ultimate court in Britain’- were kept at a 
distance by the GMC.  Third, the Council was not seen to secure the public interest- 
echoing Jean Robinson, too many complaints to the Council were dismissed without 
lay involvement and without open examination and public scrutiny.  Fourthly, and 
in agreement with Rosenthal121, Kennedy worried that the extent of the Council’s 
disciplinary activities was determined, not by need, but by the availability of 
resources.122 
Sir Donald Irvine later wrote of his time at the GMC, including his spell as 
President.123  He endorsed Margaret Stacey’s view of the 1980s as ‘the era of the 
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patients’ revolt’.124   In his version of that revolt125, Irvine identified as the most 
influential figures in the public critique of the GMC (and by extension the 
performance of the medical profession) to be: Ian Kennedy, whose Reith Lectures in 
1981 were a ‘wake up call from the public’; Jean Robinson- ‘applauded in the 
consumer world, and certainly got through to ministers whilst being disregarded by 
doctors’; the political scientist Rudolf Klein, for ‘his focus on issues of doctors’ 
accountability’126; and, especially, Richard Smith, who in 1989 wrote a highly critical 
profile of the GMC in the BMJ in a series of papers.127  The then editor of the BMJ 
had called for an independent inquiry into the issues raised by Smith’s articles.128 
In 1995, the Medical (Professional Performance) Act was passed129, extending the 
powers of the GMC to investigate poor performance by doctors.  It took until 
December 2002, and a series of scandals, for a Medical Act (Amendment) Order130 
to be introduced, enabling the introduction of revalidation, new fitness to practise 
procedures, and a new, smaller, General Medical Council.  At the time of writing 
(August 2010), the operational details of the revalidation process were still being 
discussed. 
1.2.6 Summary and interim conclusions. 
Over the last three decades of the 20th century a number of factors combined to 
change the traditional model in the UK which had left ‘medical’ decisions to 
doctors.   
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Patients and the wider public grew more educated and better informed (partly by 
the mass media which developed a keen interest both in medical advances and 
doctors’ failings), and became perhaps not less trusting, but more questioning.  The 
era of ‘the passive patient’ gave way to a wish for a new set of doctor-patient 
relationships, in which patients could ask questions,  and could treat the answers, 
not as commands, but as advice to be taken or left.  This wish for new doctor-
patient relations went at least partly unfulfilled as a consequence, in Irvine’s view, 
of the deeply conservative  attitudes of doctors in matters of attitude and human 
relationships which had persisted throughout the 20th Century.131  Alongside rising 
patient expectations came more frequent criticisms about the standard of 
performance of some doctors and dissatisfaction with the ability of the medical 
profession to regulate itself.   
Government had several roles.  First, the establishing of the NHS had created the 
promise, or certainly the expectation, of health in its widest form.  The opening 
sentences in the Command Paper of February 1944 which presaged a national 
health service stated: 
 The Government... intend to establish a comprehensive health service for 
 everybody in this country. They want to ensure that in future every man and 
 woman and child can rely on getting all the advice and treatment and care which 
 they may need in matters of personal health; that what they get shall be the best 
 medical and other facilities available; that their getting these shall not depend on 
 whether they can pay for them, or on any other factor irrelevant to the real need-
 the real need being to bring the country's full resources to bear upon reducing ill-
 health and promoting good health in all its citizens.132 
With such lofty goals there were bound to be disappointments.  Second, the failing 
economy in the late 1970s brought a sharper questioning of the worth of high 
technology, and a repoliticisation of matters previously that had previously been 
left to experts.  Third, publicly conducted conflicts between the government and 
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the medical profession grew, and, crucially, the medical profession changed its 
relations with government (and more importantly, its image in the public’s eye), 
perhaps forever, by taking industrial action which affected clinical services.  
Fourthly, the beginning of governmental dissatisfaction with the competence (and 
later questioning the appropriateness) of professional self regulation has often 
been attributed to the Thatcher government, but in fact has a longer history.133  
Last, the ‘consumerist’ approach of the government in the 1980s and 1990s led to 
the pursuit of ever increased accountability of, among many others, doctors - a 
state of affairs which, while providing citizens and consumers, patients and parents 
with more information, more comparisons and more complaints systems, may at 
the same time have built a culture of suspicion and low morale. 
Such was the UK position in the late 1990s.  It is timely to turn to the USA, to 
explore whether the cauldron of relationships (medicine/state and doctor/patient) 
which was simmering in the UK had any counterpart elsewhere. 
 2. Attitudes to medicine and doctors in the USA. 
2.1 ‘A golden age’? 
During the first half of the 20th century, American physicians enjoyed social esteem, 
prestige, and an admiration for their work that was unprecedented in any age. 134  
By the 1970s, morale in the profession had slumped135 in the wake of attacks by 
articulate and knowledgeable critics. In 1981, a survey of the general public 
revealed substantial mistrust of doctors and the medical profession as a whole.136  
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Burnham examined different types and levels of criticism of doctors in an attempt 
to find out what had happened.137 
In the early years of the 20th century, according to Burnham, a ‘golden age’ of 
medicine dawned.  In the wake of medical, and particularly surgical, successes, by 
the early 20th century the public was persuaded to want and expect uniformly well-
trained, well paid physicians who themselves set standards of practice.138  So 
effective was favourable publicity about both science and doctors that the 
American public began to view extensive medical care as a life necessity.  Expansion 
of hospital care at the beginning of the 20th century was an important indication of 
the change.139 
However, all was not completely well.  By the late 1930s the modern campaign for 
‘socialised medicine’ or compulsory health insurance had begun, and for many 
decades organised medical groups opposed any change in the structuring or 
financing of health care delivery.  These ‘socialised medicine’ debates eventually 
undermined public confidence in medicine as a profession.140  The heavily financed 
publicity campaigns in the name of the American Medical Association, and the 
evident social insensitivity of physician groups, tended to tarnish the doctor as a 
public figure, and many people began to associate the physician with another 
familiar stereotype, the small business man who was presumed to be not only 
grasping but slightly dishonest.141 Indeed the actions of physician groups caused the 
US Supreme Court in 1943 to refuse officially to recognise doctors’ professional 
claims, and instead to find physician groups, including the AMA, guilty of restraint 
of ‘trade’.142 
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Even those doctors who were striving for high standards inadvertently contributed 
to an overall lessening of the image of their profession, according to Burnham.  
Beginning in the 1940s, a number of reformers within the medical profession had 
worked to expose inferior medical practice and upgrade medicine to a level 
appropriate for the age of penicillin and high technology.  Some of the self criticism 
revealed through these efforts had been repeated by the general press: the 
resulting combination of internal criticism and external distrust eventually had a 
negative effect.143 
2.2 The end of the golden age in the USA. 
The rare public doubters of the medical profession of the 1940s gradually increased 
in number.  By 1954 it was possible to cite a series of sensational articles in mass 
media magazines attacking not only money making but incompetence in clinical 
practice.144  Psychological studies and systematic research on patients, analogous to 
consumer surveys, had revealed concerns about individual doctor-patient 
relationships.145 146 Throughout the US, grievance committees were set up by local 
medical societies to try to mediate in physician-patient disputes and ‘bring about 
some of the professional self policing so notoriously absent theretofore’.147  In 
addition other factors were at work, to which physicians were apparently slow to 
respond.  As identified by Burnham, these included the marked rise in chronic (as 
opposed to acute) diseases as the dominant concern in practice, the greatly 
increased sophistication of consumers, and the rise of psychological explanations 
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for illness, ‘leaving the physician dealing with the uncertainties of 
psychosomatics’.148  It is relevant, Burnham noted, that these criticisms coincided 
with a more general public scepticism, and with emerging evidence of negative, or 
at least ambivalent, images of many American institutions which in the 1940s had 
been beyond reproach, including the city, the automobile, the large family, and the 
learned professions.149 
As late as the 1950s, the most common criticisms of doctors were ‘a failure to take 
a personal interest in the patient and his family’ and ‘failure to communicate 
adequately with the patient’.  It was only in later decades that the demand for 
competence became conspicuous.  A further concern emerged in the USA about 
the imposition of too much medicine, such that not only might tests, procedures, 
and operations be forced on persons without their understanding the risks150, but, 
in addition, patients might be used for experimental purpose without their 
consent.151 
By the 1960s and 1970s, there were challenges, led by the arch critic Illich, about 
doctors’ setting of increasingly arbitrary boundaries to illness, ignoring ‘positive’ 
health.  With regard to the technical role, the public had become increasingly aware 
of the possibility of incompetence on the part of doctors, resulting in a steady rise 
in malpractice suits.  There were also darker fears of ‘too much medicine’, 
accompanied by widespread accusations of greed. Distrust of the intentions and 
customs of the medical profession had led new, well educated groups to challenge 
the monopoly of doctors, and support the rise of new kinds of ‘alternative 
medicine’.  The professional counter-voice could be heard from Franz Ingelfinger, 
the distinguished US physician and editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, 
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who regretted that, to the physician, the task of inspiring confidence and trust 
became impossible when the patient had been ‘indoctrinated to disrespect medical 
authority’, and cited as an example of the ‘discontent’ of doctors the recent 
publication of a book entitled ‘Talk back to your doctor’.152 153 
Exactly where and when a ‘final shove off the pedestal’ occurred to mark the end of 
Burnham’s golden age, or indeed whether there was an identifiable tipping point, is 
not certain.154 Gross traced the new criticism to the first of no fewer than twenty 
investigations of the New York health system that took place in the third quarter of 
the 20th century.155 In 1965 an anonymous writer in Consumer Reports dated 
modern criticism from the publication of a survey conducted in 1958 in which 
investigators had rated actual physician performance.156  Burnham believed that 
the most important date was 1958, when Richard Carter’s The Doctor Business was 
published157, described as ‘the first of a number of muckraking books’.158  Carter’s 
expose/ and others that followed drew heavily on both public investigations and 
critiques which members of the medical profession had written for internal political 
purposes. Other observers traced the rising level of adverse comment to unrealistic 
hopes -‘in later decades, as Americans came to expect their medical profession to 
furnish comfort, happiness, and well behaved children as well as health, the 
disillusionment grew’.159 Whatever the sources, clearly adverse criticism had 
entered a novel phase by the end of the 1950s and heightened throughout the 
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1960s and 1970s, and with it faded the ideal of a group of dedicated scientists 
producing marvellous cures while at the same time practising as equally dedicated 
clinicians.  
2.3 Summary and interim conclusions. 
Perhaps the most interesting of Burnham’s conclusions were, first, that it had been 
the politics of the socialised medicine debate which first planted the seeds of major 
and pervasive mistrust - or, more accurately, that it was the self-serving attitude of 
doctors (identified by the public as being at the centre of the campaigns of the 
American Medical Association) which had provoked a major change in public 
attitude.  This is an example of a factor which also operated in the UK, namely, 
conflict between the medical profession and government. 
 Of equal importance was Burnham’s second conclusion that those doctors who in 
the decades after 1945 had spoken out to increase the beneficent results of 
medicine and upgrade the profession in the direction of the professional ideal, 
‘unwittingly opened the doors for the latter day critics who attacked not only the 
priestly pretension but technical performance as well’.160  Critics in the UK were 
able to focus on the General Medical Council as the body to attack for failing to 
regulate medical performance.  There was no equivalent body in the US (although 
pressure resulted in local grievance committees being established) but rather a 
steady stream of revelations and ‘anti-doctor’ publications raised similar issues to 
those in the UK. 
The rise of more questioning patients with a wish for more evenly balanced two-
sided doctor-patient relationships was common to both sides of the Atlantic.  The 
factor which was prominent in Burnham’s account, but had no identified equivalent 
in the UK, was the perceived financial greed of American doctors as manifest both 
in the stance that the American Medical Association took in its rejection of 
‘socialised medicine’, and in the fear of the public that doctors were pressing ‘too 
much medicine’ on their patients for personal gain. 
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Perhaps the ‘greed’ that was shown by doctors in both the USA and the UK was to 
try to hold on to their professional autonomy in the face of more general societal 
changes and the challenge to their professionalism.  These factors are considered in 
the next two sections of this chapter. 
3. Societal trends. 
Elston wrote in 1991 that ‘few would dispute the overt questioning of medical 
autonomy and expertise in the past decade in Britain or that this has intensified in 
the last two years as the debate over the future of the NHS has gathered 
momentum’.161 Could this trend have been the outcome, not of specific health 
related questions, but rather of more generic changes among the public’s attitude 
to expertise or authority, or from even broader cultural trends? 
From a vast literature, I have chosen to highlight in necessarily short order three 
important accounts: Inglehart’s empirically based work on transforming cultures of 
advanced industrial societies162 163; Beer’s analysis of the origins of participatory 
democracy from the ‘revolutions’ of the 1960s; and the theoretical work of Giddens 
on the contours and existential parameters of life in ‘late’ modernity’.164 165 [I also 
touch briefly on a fourth study: the eclectic approach of the Kennedy School of 
Government at the University of Harvard when exploring the origins of ‘why people 
don’t trust Government’166]. 
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My justification for using political studies to examine public attitudes to medicine is 
the powerful case made by Kennedy that ‘medicine is, at bottom, a political 
enterprise’.167  I turn first to the empirical studies of Inglehart. 
3.1 Inglehart on post-materialism and cultural shift. 
As a bridge that could relate the more narrowly defined reasons for changes in the 
acceptability of ‘doctor knows best’ to broader trends in societal attitudes, the 
postulates of the political scientist Ronald Inglehart, which arose from his empirical 
studies, are attractive. One of Inglehart’s main hypotheses is that individuals pursue 
various goals in hierarchical order, giving maximum attention to the things they 
sense to be the most important unsatisfied needs at a given time (‘scarcity 
hypothesis’).168  First, material needs like hunger or thirst have to be satisfied.  If 
this is achieved, goals will gradually shift.  
Inglehart’s data (which relied on a modification of Maslow’s hierarchy of human 
goals169 as comparator) have expanded over thirty years to become ‘a vast, 
impressive, unique and well-analysed data set’170, and were based originally on 
responses to a four item, ‘force-choice’, survey of public opinion in eight European 
countries using cross-sectional age cohort data.  He discerned two types of 
response.  The first, which he termed ‘materialist’, was compatible with a value set 
that placed high priority on economic security and domestic order. 171  The second, 
termed ‘post-materialist’ or ‘post-bourgeois’, rated most highly such values as 
individual improvement, personal freedom, citizen input into government 
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decisions, the ideal of a society based on humanism, and the maintenance of a 
clean and healthy environment.172 
Post-materialism assumes an on-going transformation of individuals and society 
which liberates them gradually from the stress of basic acquisitive or materialistic 
needs, and causes  them to evaluate their leaders and their institutions by more 
demanding standards than were applied in the past. While conditions of insecurity 
give rise to the ‘authoritarian reflex’ (the tendency for mass publics to seek and 
idealise strong, authoritarian leaders), in the more prosperous, stable and 
democratic industrial societies the authoritarian reflex becomes latent, and 
confidence in their institutions declines significantly. 
An important conclusion from Inglehart’s analysis of his original data in 1971 was 
the existence of an ‘intergenerational shift’, that is to say, a consistent tendency for 
younger age cohorts to be more ‘post-materialistic’ than their elders, surveyed 
contemporaneously.173   By observing the trends in age-related cohort data with 
regard to materialist/post-materialistic preferences with the economic trends of 
the country in question in his more comprehensive data analysed some twenty 
years later174, Inglehart came to a powerful if controversial conclusion.  The 
relationship between socio-economic preferences and value priorities was not one 
of immediate adjustment.  A substantial time lag was involved, such that one’s 
basic values reflected the conditions that prevailed during one’s formative and early 
adult years. 175 176  He termed this delayed response the ‘socialisation hypothesis’, 
to be laid alongside his previously described ‘scarcity hypothesis’ discussed above. 
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Taken together, these two hypotheses generated a coherent set of predictions 
concerning value change.  First, while the scarcity hypothesis implied that 
prosperity was conducive to the spread of post-materialist values, the socialisation 
hypothesis implied that neither an individual’s values nor those of a society were 
likely to change overnight.  Instead, fundamental change in values took place 
gradually, almost invisibly: in large part it occurred as a younger generation 
replaced an older one in the adult population of a society.177  
Further analysis revealed that, although post-materialists had higher levels of 
income, education and occupational status than materialists, they did not show 
higher levels of subjective well-being.  Post-materialists took prosperity for granted 
and focused on other aspects of life such as politics and the quality of the physical 
and social environment; further, they applied more demanding standards to them.  
In addition, the position of elites became more difficult in advanced industrial 
society.  The mass public was becoming increasingly critical of their political leaders, 
and increasingly likely to engage in ‘elite challenging activities’.178  A major 
component of the postmodern shift was a turning away from all kinds of authority, 
because deference to authority had high costs: the individual’s goals had to be 
subordinated to those of a broader authority.  Instead, a post-materialist emphasis 
on self expression and self realisation became increasingly central.179 
3.2 Beer: in search of a new public philosophy. 
Beer, whose analysis of US politics of the 1960s was believed by Klein to be fully 
relevant to the UK180, described ‘the dual revolution of the sixties’ in an account of 
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the shift in political sensibilities of that time upon which the following paragraphs 
rely.181  
Beer identified the development of two currents of thought, the technocratic and 
the counter-cultural.  In the ‘technocratic takeover’, and in the belief that science 
could transform society, a generation of technically and scientifically trained people 
in government service began to have a growing influence on the initiation and 
formulation of public policy, and in the consequent direction of public 
expenditure.182  But with the growth in influence of ever more ‘professionalism’ 
came, paradoxically, fragmentation of goals, with a greater number of ever more 
competing programmes.  The outcome was that political actors were weakened in 
their ability to function as a national public.183  
In the ‘romantic revolt’ in the 1960s, the romantic impulse was reincarnated, 
dominated by subjectivity: trust the heart not the head; emotion not reason; 
spontaneity not calculation, nature not civilisation.  Moreover, subjectivity not only 
controlled the mode of conduct, but also dictated the ends.  The important thing 
was not the fruit of experience, but experience itself; not utility, but sentiment; not 
wealth or power or any external possession, but feeling.  There were also messages 
for the group, again based on subjectivity.  The basis of group life was to be found 
not in economic need or universal values, but in a common culture, a distinctive 
way of feeling and acting.184 
The literary and artistic movements which arose quickly acquired a strong political 
thrust which included, as a goal for America, ‘participatory democracy’.  The 
essential and initial meaning was to give power at the level of immediate impact 
directly to those people who were most affected by government policy- and called 
for ‘maximum feasible participation’, defined as ‘the participation of the 
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program(sic) beneficiaries in policy development, planning and implementation’.185   
Because participatory democracy was taken to mean a decentralisation of authority 
‘that sometimes appeared to extend down to the lone individual’, in practice the 
results were disorderly, had little cohesion or continuity, rarely followed a 
calculated strategy and fell victim to endless discussion punctuated by outburst of 
direct action.186 Beer concluded that, in that form, participatory democracy could 
not have a future.  Yet in a larger sense, the participatory idea had a profound and 
lasting effect on American politics- such that it would be unthinkable in the years 
that followed to find a programme involving regulation or delivery of services in, for 
example, health, welfare or education, that did not provide for community input.187  
The cases developed by Inglehart and Beer are political analyses which relied in the 
end on the beliefs, feelings and consequent actions of individuals.  A broader, 
Harvard based, study of ‘why people don’t trust government’, which assessed the 
effect of economic, social and political factors, with a scope beyond the confines of 
this Thesis, also acknowledged the importance of long term secular changes in 
socio-cultural attitudes towards authority and traditional social order.188 
  It is therefore appropriate to turn now to examine aspects of life in ‘late’ 
modernity as developed by a master in the field of sociology, Professor Anthony 
Giddens, lately Baron Giddens of Southgate. 
3.3 Giddens on modernity and self identity. 
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The following account of the work of Giddens owes much to the scholarly analysis 
of Michael Calnan and Simon Williams.189 
According to Giddens, modern institutions differ from all preceding forms of social 
order in terms of their dynamism, the degree to which they undercut tradition, and 
their global impact.  In this respect, ‘late’ modernity displays an ever increasing 
degree of ‘reflexivity’, a key concept of Giddens’ which refers to the susceptibility of 
most aspects of social activity and material relations with nature to chronic revision 
in the light of new information and knowledge.  The outcome is that all beliefs and 
practices are subject to systematic examination, critical scrutiny and revision in the 
light of changing social circumstances.  Reflexivity becomes a chronic and defining 
feature of late modernity, with its never ending cycle of reappraisals, 
reassessments and revisions which span all aspects of modern social life.190  The 
overriding emphasis is on individuals (my emphasis), and the emergence of new 
mechanisms of self-identity, which are shaped by- yet also shape- the institutions of 
modernity.  The self is not a passive entity, determined by external influences; in 
forging their self-identities, no matter how local their specific contexts of action, 
individuals contribute to and directly promote social influences that are global in 
their consequences and implications.191 
While modernity is a post-traditional order, it is not one in which ‘the sureties of 
tradition and custom have been replaced by the certitude of rational knowledge’.192 
Rather, doubt becomes a pervasive feature of modern critical reasoning, forming a 
general existential dimension of the contemporary social world.  As Giddens 
argued, in circumstances of increased reflexivity, uncertainty and choice, the 
notions of trust and risk become particularly pertinent.  Trust becomes a crucial 
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‘medium of interaction’ with modern abstract systems and sources of authority and 
expertise, here generating ‘that “leap into faith” which practical engagement 
demands’.193  However, while the nature of modern life is deeply bound up with 
mechanisms of trust in abstract systems, it requires a special form of trust, namely 
an ‘active’ trust which, in contrast to previous eras, has to be continuously ‘won’ 
and ‘retained’ in the face of growing uncertainty.  Moreover, active forms of trust 
presuppose autonomy on the part of the individual, since compliance is freely given 
rather than being anchored in external constraints.194 
 Giddens further noted that there are many different relations between lay 
experience and abstract systems which coexist in the contemporary era: 
  Attitudes of trust, as well as more pragmatic acceptance, scepticism, rejection and 
 withdrawal, uneasily coexist in the social space linking individual activities and 
 expert systems.195 
There is growing awareness of risk within society 196, and this includes a growing 
public concern about the risks of modern medicine, and the limitations of 
expertise.197  These possibilities were expressed by Giddens himself in the following 
terms: ‘Widespread lay knowledge of modern risk environments leads to an 
awareness of the limits of expertise and forms one of the ‘public relations’ 
problems that have to be faced by those who seek to sustain lay trust in expert 
systems’.198 
Living in high modernity becomes, to an ever increasing degree, influenced by the 
media, and systems of mass communication, both printed and electronic, play a key 
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role.  Here Giddens sees the interpenetration of self development and social and 
global systems becoming ever more pronounced- the ‘mediation of experience’.199  
People are continually bombarded with media messages: processes which have a 
crucial bearing upon the knowledge base and reflexivity of the lay populace in 
contemporary Western societies.  Not only do the media contribute to the 
demystification of science and technology, they also contribute to the growth of a 
critically informed lay public, and in doing so act as important ‘cultural 
intermediaries’, arbitrating between the competing claims of social and scientific 
rationality.   
According to Giddens, growth of a critically informed public leads to the gradual 
introduction of a further mechanism of self- identity which he terms ‘reskilling’, 
defined as ‘the reacquisition of knowledge and skills, whether in respect of the 
intimacies of personal life or wider social involvements [arising as] a pervasive 
reaction to the expropriating effects of abstract systems’.200  In simpler terms, 
individuals become used routinely to filter and act upon a variety of information 
relevant to their life situation: ‘*i+nformation produced by specialists (including 
scientific knowledge) can no longer be confined to specific groups, but becomes 
routinely interpreted and acted on by lay individuals in the course of their everyday 
action...[i]ndividuals are likely to reskill themselves in greater depth where 
consequential transitions in their lives are concerned or fateful decisions have to be 
made’.201   
3.4 Summary and interim conclusions. 
It would be foolish to claim that the above, necessarily brief,  sampling of a huge 
literature did more than identify a few signposts towards what might have been 
happening in the second half of the 20th century to some societal attitudes outside 
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the health field.  Nevertheless, I submit that it is possible that the factors identified 
did indeed contribute to changing attitudes towards medicine and doctors. 
The most powerful of Inglehart’s observations for present purposes was his 
identification of time trends, in which ‘the rules have changed’, such that the public 
of the developed world are evaluating their institutions by more exacting standards 
than in the past.  Further, his finding that the most important factor underlying 
change over time was a (relatively) steady ‘intergenerational shift’ in attitudes 
encourages a search for gradualist phenomena, rather than a big bang, to explain 
changing attitudes to medicine.  Add to that his finding that the attitudes of a 
generation were moulded in their formative and young adult years, and one can 
arrive at a plausible explanation for differing attitudes today towards the NHS 
between the elderly and the youthful.  The patients who used the NHS from 1948 
to, say, the mid 1970s, would have been those who grew up and remembered the 
lack of health care before 1948, and would have looked upon the NHS as a desirable 
‘materialistic acquisition’, in Inglehart’s terms.  In contrast, younger people have 
grown up with the NHS, and have taken its material benefit as ‘a given’.  They have 
begun to apply their post-materialist values and attitudes to the NHS and have 
become more demanding and more critical and expect higher standards.  Although 
more able to make political systems respond to their needs by being more 
articulate and politically active, post- materialists in Inglehart’s analysis did not 
register higher levels of satisfaction with politics.  This finding maps well to the 
rising volume of complaints about the NHS and to the social background of the 
sternest critics of the GMC. 
Because Inglehart’s studies are based on survey data, a word of caution is in order.  
Any effort to measure the value priorities of the mass public by means of survey 
research must be approached with modest expectations.  Low correlations between 
items and low stability over time seem inherent in survey research-not necessarily 
because people do not have real attitudes, but partly because survey research must 
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contend with a relatively high component of error in measurement.202  It has been 
known for many years that ordinary citizens are capable of expressing a coherent 
political outlook in a series of leisurely, in depth interviews.203 However the cost is 
prohibitive to take this approach to large populations. 
 The public opinion survey can have certain advantages, even when studying basic 
attitudes and values.  It can provide very large numbers of cases, which for example 
can allow reliable intergenerational comparisons, and control for, say, social 
background.  The mass survey can provide representative national samples - 
extremely useful if one wished to know what was happening to a society as a 
whole.  The random error inherent in survey research tends to be cancelled out in 
large samples, especially if multi-item indicators are used.204 
Unfortunately there are few automatically generated measures of how people 
translate their attitudes into behaviour, and survey research can be looked upon as 
a fall back.205 Different questions produce different answers (for example, asking 
about ‘trust’, compared to ‘confidence’, compared to ‘satisfaction’), and the 
context of a poll can affect even the most scientifically selected samples.  What 
cannot be easily dismissed are consistent and inexorable shifts in answers to the 
same questions.  For example, there was a consistent trend of falling confidence in 
government shown by all polls of public opinion in the US, and this was replicated 
by the results of focus groups.206 
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The dichotomy of the 1960s in the USA allowed both a ‘technocratic takeover’ and 
a ‘countercultural revolution’, in Beer’s account .  Although both were short lived in 
pure form, their influence lived on.  In the UK especially, the rise of medical 
technology brought about a repoliticisation of health priorities, driven by economic 
pressures.   That, and the subsequent loss of blind faith in the promises of 
technology itself were felt in the UK ten years later as Dollery’s ‘end of an era of 
optimism’.  In contrast, the rising post-materialist emphasis on self expression and 
self realisation continued to resonate on both sides of the Atlantic.  The influence of 
‘participatory democracy’, although the name itself was no longer used, lived on, as 
can be seen in the ‘community input’ into US health programmes; and nearer 
home, in areas ranging from the more recent emphasis in the NHS Constitution for 
England on patient and public engagement (PPE)207, the revised composition of the 
General Medical Council with a much increased proportion of lay members, the 
emphasis on communication and interpersonal skills within programmes of medical 
education and training, to the commitment of government itself to consult as part 
of an essential and important aspect of its working methods.208  
In a search for why there has been a shift from ‘doctor knows best’ in recent 
decades, at both a political and a personal level, it seems to me that Giddens’ 
model makes an important contribution.  As put by Lupton, a ‘reflexive’ actor will 
actively calculate, assess, and if necessary counter the knowledge and autonomy of 
experts with the object of (in the present case) maximising the value of services for 
health care.209  One can imagine this process taking place both in the person that is 
the individual patient during a medical consultation, and even in the collective 
minds of officials at the Department of Health.  Giddens’ account of ‘active’ trust 
which needs to be sought and retained by professionals and given by lay persons, in 
the face of uncertainty and risk, rings true in the context of a medical encounter.  
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Further, he has explained well how, at a pragmatic level, attitudes of reverence and 
reserve, approval and disquiet, enthusiasm and antipathy can coexist in ordinary 
persons when considering high science and technology.  As put by Williams and 
Calnan, the consequence of these developments in thinking has been that, in 
contrast to the past when science was invested with a considerable degree of 
mystique, the relationship between medicine and the lay populace has increasingly 
to be seen as being built around a reflexively organised dialectic of trust and 
doubt.210   
The insight about the drive to reskill being especially prominent in the face of 
‘consequential transitions’ resonates with the observations of Elston that in the UK, 
as in the US, patient and public voices have been most critical of medical science 
and practice in specific areas.  These include areas: where ‘consumers’ are not ill, as 
in the management of reproduction; where patients have experiential expertise, or 
curative medical science has little to offer, as in disability, chronic illness and 
terminal care; and where rapid scientific developments arouse fundamental 
societal concerns, for example, transplant surgery or prenatal screening.211  
Last, it is important to note the role of the media as ‘cultural intermediaries’, in 
Giddens’ model, in demystifying science and contributing to the growth of a 
critically informed lay public.  The importance of the ‘information revolution’ and 
the attitude of the press were also judged in the Harvard study to be important 
factors affecting people’s trust in public institutions.  I merely note these points 
now, and will return to a broader account of the role of the media in shaping public 
opinion when considering ‘the scandals’ of Bristol and Alder Hey in the next 
chapter. 
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How are issues of ‘active’ trust, uncertainty, risk, and lay reskilling being handled 
within the doctor- patient relationship?  It was conceded by Williams and Calnan 
that these latter issues were not easy to study, and would require a combination of 
empirical large scale surveys with more detailed qualitative and ethnographic 
approaches to yield richer insights and do justice to the complexity of lay thought as 
illuminated by Giddens.212  In the meantime, we can turn back to the medical 
profession in the UK to examine whether, by the late 1990s, it was a profession 
under pressure, or [still] sailing on unconcernedly.  
4. Professionalism. 
In the light of the evidence in the above sections of changes in society, government 
and public expectations of medicine and doctors, all of which had had a tendency to 
destabilise traditional medical certainties, it was not surprising that debate arose at 
a theoretical level about ‘the deprofessionalisation’ of medicine, and that, at a 
practical level, medical leaders should have asked what was to be done. 
4.1 The response of the medical establishment in the mid 1990s. 
In 1994, the then Chief Medical Officer, Professor Sir Kenneth Calman, wrote in the 
British Medical Journal: 
  [t]here is increasing public and professional interest in medicine, with questioning 
 of professional standards and the quality of care.  Public expectations of the level 
 of service to be delivered are rising.  It is timely, therefore to review the role and 
 purpose of medicine and the concept of a profession.213  
 Sir Kenneth called for a full debate on the purpose of medicine and its basic values, 
a continuing review of medical education in a time of change, an examination of 
standards of quality and care in medical practice, further consideration of the 
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future organisation of medicine beyond the year 2000, and a recognition of the 
responsibility of the profession to take these forward.214 
A conference of leaders of the profession was organised in response (it is 
noteworthy that no ‘patients’ were involved).  As subsequently reported, Sir 
Maurice Shock, former Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford, told the delegates when 
opening the conference that British doctors had failed to notice that the world 
around them had changed utterly.  Doctors seemed to imagine that they were living 
in Gladstone’s world of minimal government, benign self regulation and a self-
effacing state. In fact, Sir Maurice said: 
  [i]nstead of the rights of man, we have the rights of the consumer, the social 
 contract has given way to the sales contract, and, above all, the electorate has 
 been fed with political promises...about rising standards of living and levels of 
 public service.  The appearance of the consumer society, together with medical 
 advances on an unprecedented scale and ‘the rise of geriatrics’, had meant that 
 ‘the doctor is different, the patient is different, and the medicine is different’.215  
 In the face of this warning, Sir Donald Irvine observed that the discussions within 
the conference revealed ‘strongly defensive attitudes and very little insight into the 
profound nature of the changes that had taken place all around us’.216  This view 
was confirmed by Shock who later wrote that the medical profession had been 
sluggish in its willingness to change: an appropriate motto might have been ‘the 
status quo is the way forward’.  He urged that there was no point in attempting to 
swim against the tide.  This was an age of regulated capitalism in which the 
consumer was cosseted and protected, encouraged to be articulate, and persuaded 
of his or her power.   
 Not that any of this should be taken at face value.  We are only too aware that the 
 media, public relations, advertising and politics have made this an age of mirrors.  
 But the basic point is not affected: public support is essential.  That must always 
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 begin with the patient, but doctors will have to pay an entrance fee to the hall of 
 mirrors.217 
Would paying this price represent an erosion of professional status? 
4.2 Has there been an erosion of the professional status of medicine? 
To answer this question requires a prior consideration of what ‘a profession’ is and 
what ‘professionalism’ means. 
Sociologists have discussed the nature of the professions at least since the 1930s.  
Carr-Saunders and Wilson recognised the central role of professions in modern 
society, arguing that professional associations were stabilising elements, 
engendering ‘modes of life, habits of thought, and standards of judgment which 
render them centres of resistance to crude forces which threaten steady and 
peaceful evolution’.218  Professions, as essentially altruistic self-governing 
communities, were seen at that time as the ideological bulwark of liberal 
democracy.219  Talcott Parsons, one of the founding fathers of American sociology, 
recognised that professions were characterised by ‘rationality’, by which was meant 
the setting of standards and the exercise of an authority which was not based on 
superior ‘wisdom’ or higher moral character but on superior technical competence- 
which in turn was limited to a particular field of knowledge and skill (termed 
‘specificity of function’).   Parsons also emphasised that professionals worked 
objectively without emotional involvement, applying standards and criteria that 
arose from the objective features of ‘the case’, regardless of who the client was ( 
termed ‘universalism’ by Parsons).220 
In 1960, Goode analysed the struggle that ‘sociology’ was then having to become 
established as a recognised discipline.  He defined, from a synthesis of the 
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literature, two core characteristics of a profession:  a prolonged specialised training 
in a body of abstract knowledge; and a service orientation.221 As an occupation 
became more professionalised, it acquired several features (Goode listed ten) 
which could be viewed as sociologically derivative from the core.222 Freidson, in his 
seminal sociological study Profession of medicine223 published in 1970, pointed out 
that five of Goode’s ‘derived characteristics’ referred to autonomy, so that it could 
be said that Goode’s core characteristics were critical criteria for professions insofar 
as they were said to be causal in producing professional autonomy.224   Freidson 
himself laid great store on the overriding importance of autonomy as the defining 
cornerstone of a profession- ‘legitimate, organised autonomy, that is, it has been 
given the right to control its own work’.225  This autonomy over the technical aspect 
of his work, he wrote, gave a professional the wherewithal by which to be a 
member of a ‘free’ profession, ‘even though he is dependent on the state for 
establishing and sustaining his autonomy’.226    
However, as to a profession’s exclusivity in applying its knowledge, Freidson had 
grave doubts: 
  It is not justified morally because I believe that human beings, even if laymen, have 
 the right to determine what their own problems are and to have a voice in how 
 they are to be managed.  It is not justified functionally, I have argued, because it 
 leads the profession to be blind to its own shortcomings and unable to regulate its 
 practices adequately.  From these conclusions follows the question of how the 
 application of knowledge to human affairs by professional experts should be 
 organised in the public interest.227 
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Not surprisingly, sociologists have tended to point to Freidson’s Profession of 
medicine as marking the point when the image of the medical profession began to 
tarnish.228   
4.3 Deprofessionalisation. 
The concept of medical professionalisation, which appeared mainly in American 
sociological literature229, was centred on accounts of the historical development of 
the power of the medical profession.  Elston pointed out that, in discussions about 
medical power, the concepts of autonomy and dominance were often used 
interchangeably, whereas an analytical distinction could be made.  ‘Medical 
dominance’ referred to medicine’s authority over others (which according to Starr 
could be subdivided into social authority, that is, doctors’ control over the actions 
of others through the giving of commands, and cultural authority, that is, the 
probability that medical definitions of reality and medical judgments will be 
accepted as valid and true230), while professional autonomy  (following Freidson231) 
was the legitimated control that an occupation exercised over the organisation and 
control of its work.232  In Elston’s view, a failure to define clear bench marks and 
specification of the dimensions of medical power had made assessments of change 
in that power, as published, a matter of continuing controversy.233  ‘Loss of power’ 
had been the starting point for alternative accounts termed ‘proletarianisation’234  
                                                     
228
 Armstrong D.  Medicine as a profession: times of change. BMJ 1990; 301(6754): 691-693, op. cit., 
p691. 
229
 Larson MS.  The rise of professionalism.  Berkeley.  University of California, 1977. 
230
 Starr P. The social transformation of American medicine.  New York.  Basic Books, 1982, p13. 
231
 Freidson E.  Profession of medicine: a study of the sociology of applied knowledge. New York.  
Dodd Mead & Company, 1975, op. cit. 
232
 Elston MA.  The politics of professional power: medicine in a changing health service.  In: Gabe J, 
Calnan M, Bury M (eds.)The sociology of the health service.  London.  Routledge, 1991,op.cit., p61. 
233
 Ibid. 
234
 Oppenheim M.  The proletarianization of the professional. Sociological Review Monograph 1973; 
20: 213-237. 
183 
 
235  and ‘deprofessionalisation’236, respectively. With regard to medicine, the 
proletarianisation thesis placed most emphasis on the changing work conditions of 
doctors (in an American context), especially in the growth of salaried practice and 
alleged subordination to managerial control.  The deprofessionalisation thesis was 
built upon the changing doctor- patient relationship, in which an increasingly well-
informed laity had brought about a decline in the cultural authority of medicine and 
in the extent of its monopoly over health- related knowledge237 and were seeking a 
collegial model for their relationship238. 
However, Elston opined that, as then formulated, neither of the alternative 
accounts of diminishing medical power in the USA, although of value in stimulating 
debate, was amenable to rigorous testing.239As examples of questions that could be 
raised within the models in an NHS context were whether medical managers would 
become loyal to their ‘corporate sponsors’ and not to clinical colleagues (as argued 
by McKinlay and Archer240), that is, proletarianism writ large; or whether 
Freidson241 was right when he said that the widespread adoption of new techniques 
for monitoring the efficiency of performance and resource allocation did not of 
itself constitute diminished professional autonomy, because it all depended on 
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what criteria for monitoring and appraisal were used and who controlled any action 
that ensued.242 
It is arguable that these theoretical models of deprofessionalisation arose after the 
de facto pressures for new doctor-patient relationships.  I have already noted the 
rear guard action of a distinguished American physician who equated 
‘deprofessionalising the profession’ with the difficulties encountered by a doctor in 
trying to inspire confidence and trust in a patient who had been ‘indoctrinated to 
disrespect medical authority’.243  This attitude was reflected in 1994 in Shock’s 
charge that the medical profession in the UK had been sluggish in its willingness to 
change: living up to a motto that ‘the status quo is the way forward’.244  
Writing in a UK context in 1990, Armstrong found that the medical profession 
‘faced the very real threat of deprofessionalisation’.  His suggested response to this 
threat required a recognition that in the new climate [of increasing government 
intervention into the way that health care was provided], there were certain limits 
to clinical freedom: taking seriously the responsibilities of being self-governing; 
endorsing voluntarily cost-effective procedures; being willing to allow some kind of 
external review of its decision making; recognising that the NHS was changing from 
a paternalistic organisation in which professional and administrative interests 
decided what ‘the consumer’ needed to a service that was more responsive to the 
higher expectations and wishes of patients; respecting the role that other emerging 
health care professions must play within the service.245  Similar points were made 
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seven years later in an editorial in the British Medical Journal entitled ‘Do 
professions have a future? Perhaps, if they are not defensive or complacent’.246 
5. Overall conclusion. 
It was all too little, too late.  The rocks loomed ahead. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
‘Five tumultuous years’1: which culminated in the Human Tissue Act 
2004. 
Preamble. 
This Chapter (concerning England, Wales and Northern Ireland) and the next 
(concerning Scotland) return to the story of human tissue legislation, with the 
additional evidence from Chapter Three that by the late 1990s the medical 
profession had lost the unqualified confidence of the public and government, and 
to an extent had lost confidence in itself. 
This and the following Chapter need to be taken together.  From the apparently 
common trigger of ‘organ retention scandal’, and on a background of shared 
legislation (the Human Tissue Act 1961), the outcome was two pieces of legislation 
with distinctly different provisions.  It is my central hypothesis that the legal 
provisions which resulted in England and Scotland will be better explained, both in 
their similarities and their differences, within an understanding of the processes by 
which new legislation had occurred, the climate of the time and the institutions and 
persons involved. 
In England, there were three major inquiries which individually and collectively 
made headlines, regarding: children’s cardiac services in Bristol; organ retention at 
post-mortem in the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital; and events which followed 
the death of Mr Cyril Isaacs in Manchester. 
1 ‘Inspiration’. 
1.1 Inquiries 
1.1.1 Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (‘Bristol’).2 
                                                     
1
 Editorial.  Effective implementation of the Human Tissue Act.  Lancet 2006; 368 (9539):891. 
2
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On June 18, 1998, following years of adverse publicity, and pressure from a parents’ 
group (the Bristol Heart Children Action Group (BHCAG)), the Secretary of State for 
Health, the Rt. Hon. Frank Dobson MP, announced in Parliament his decision to set 
up a Public Inquiry into children’s heart surgery at Bristol, to be chaired by (then) 
Professor Ian Kennedy.3   
During the course of the Bristol Inquiry, unexpected information came to light from 
coincidental parental inquiries regarding organ retention after post-mortem 
examination.4 Initially treated by the Inquiry in a local, Bristol context, the picture 
changed dramatically when Professor Robert Anderson, a distinguished cardiac 
morphologist, revealed the scale of the retention of congenitally malformed hearts 
nationally.  He estimated that the largest collection was at Alder Hey Children’s 
Hospital with approximately 2,500 hearts; he himself had built up a collection at the 
Royal Brompton Hospital of some 2,000; and there were collections at Great 
Ormond Street Hospital of 2,000, at Birmingham Children’s Hospital of about 1,500, 
and other, smaller collections in Leeds, Bristol, Southampton, Newcastle and 
Manchester.5  Within a week of Professor Anderson’s appearance at Bristol, the 
local 6 7 8 and national 9 press became engaged and parental groups formed (for 
example, Young at Heart in Birmingham; PITY II in Liverpool) primarily to offer 
mutual support, but also to exert pressure on the authorities.  A particularly 
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searching spotlight was to fall on the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital (‘Alder 
Hey’). 
The Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Professor Liam Donaldson, at the request of the 
Secretary of State, instituted a census of all retained tissues throughout the 
country.10  He asked the Bristol Inquiry to prepare an Interim Report on organ and 
tissue retention to help him in his nation-wide investigation.  The Interim Report 
was published in May 2000. 
1.1.1.1 Bristol Interim Report: Removal and retention of human material. (‘BIR’; ‘the 
Report’).11 
BIR found that, with regard to Coroners’ post-mortems (CPM), pathologists had 
considered that they were entitled to retain, long term, human material such as 
organs, including hearts, for teaching, research and storage in archives.  Human 
material had also been removed and kept after hospital post- mortems (HPM).  
Even though, in the past, parents had often agreed to these PMs, they had had no 
real understanding of what was involved.12 
BIR also found that the law regulating the removal, retention, use and disposal of 
human material to be ‘obscure, uncertain and arcane’.  Two ways forward were 
identified.  Either, as a minimum essential step, a new Code of Practice with 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms should be introduced; or, desirable but not 
essential, there should be changes in the law, together with incorporation into law 
of the proposed Code of Practice.13 
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Within the body of BIR and its Annexes14, there were trenchant criticisms of the 
attitudes and behaviour of doctors towards post-mortem procedures15 16, as well as 
detailed analysis of the shortcomings and opacity of the existing law. The result, BIR 
concluded, was that a social and ethical time bomb had been waiting to explode.17  
1.1.2 The Royal Liverpool Children’s *Hospital+ Inquiry (‘Alder Hey’; ‘Redfern’).18 
 September 7 1999, the day of the Anderson revelation about heart collections in 
Bristol, was a date which would affect the lives of many who lived or worked in 
Liverpool and would introduce the name ‘Alder Hey’ to the nation. 
The existence of retained hearts generated local media interest.   In the first month 
of enquiries Alder Hey received 618 calls from parents. At the same time, a frantic 
exercise was begun in the hospital to try to catalogue the specimens satisfactorily, 
but was greatly hampered by inadequate records and unsatisfactory storage 
conditions.  At a meeting of parents on November 1 1999 they discussed their 
difficulties in obtaining information from the hospital, with calls not being returned 
and long delays incurred in securing the return of organs.  The Community Health 
Council told the Chief Executive that she had a disaster on her hands, described as a 
‘juggernaut rolling down a hill out of control’.19 
Alder Hey was by now overwhelmed at the extent of the crisis. 
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On December 3 1999 the new HM Coroner for Liverpool, Mr Andre Rebello, told 
BBC Radio 5 Live that the organ retention at the hospital might have been 
unlawful.20  On the same day, Lord Hunt, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State 
(House of Lords), established an Independent Confidential Inquiry under the 
provisions of the National Health Service Act (Section 2) 197721, to be chaired by Mr 
Michael Redfern QC.22  
1.1.2.1 Findings of the Redfern Inquiry. 23 
The Inquiry dealt with several matters which to an extent would have benefited 
from individual consideration, but which came to be seen as a whole, with 
escalating consequences. 
It was found that the actions of the pathologist Professor Dick Van Velzen, between 
1988 and 1995, were not only unacceptable within established pathology practice 
of the time, but were in some aspects illegal as well.  His method of performing 
PMs of infants and children had been to remove virtually all internal organs, whole, 
from each case, and to retain them ‘for later examination’. 24  Perhaps most serious 
was the fact that the examination of these organs had never taken place25 , or had 
been delayed26 , or had been incomplete27, or still worse, had been fabricated 28, so 
that no useful clinical or research information had resulted – and there had been no 
feedback of worthwhile information to the parents or the medical attendants.  
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These facts alone justified his immediate suspension and subsequent erasure from 
the Medical Register.29 
With the exception of the ‘rogue’ practices of Professor Van Velzen, Redfern 
identified a similar range of problems and uncertainties regarding PM practice as 
had been identified in BIR including:  an absence of explicit consent to, or 
understanding of, PM examination, and in particular, to a lack of information that 
organs might be retained (as part of ‘normal’ practice)30; doctors had been 
genuinely of a mind to spare grieving parents the further upset which they judged 
an explicit description of the PM process would produce31;‘on the evidence, the 
medical profession did not properly consider the Human Tissue Act [1961] in the 
first place’32; and ‘a clouded view of what the Coroner’s jurisdiction requires of 
clinicians’.33  The latter had not been helped by a revealed ‘slackness’ in the 
procedures of the Liverpool Coroner.34   
With regard to organ ‘collections’, it was found that, during the forty pre-Van 
Velzen years, large collections of hearts, foetuses, body parts, cerebella, and eyes 
had been established within Alder Hey and the University of Liverpool Institute of 
Child Health.  Each collection had its own history, and all had had their beginnings 
as resources for research. The overall evidence of prior consent having been given 
was patchy and scanty. 
Both Bristol and Redfern concerned children and their parents.  However, the 
revelations caused anxieties which extended to the relatives of adults who had 
died.  The case of Cyril Isaacs (deceased) subsequently made headlines. 
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1.1.3 The `Isaacs’ Report.35 36 
Although this Report was not published until May 2003, the complaint which was 
its starting point had been known to the Secretary of State for Health and the Chief 
Medical Officer in January 2001.  The case was a significant occupant of the `in-
tray’: it revealed that the shortcomings of post-mortem procedures extended to 
adults. 
1.1.3.1 Background. 
This report was instigated by the chance discovery by Mrs Elaine Isaacs in April 
2000 that the brain of her late husband, Mr Cyril Isaacs, had been removed during 
the PM examination carried out at Prestwich Hospital mortuary on 27 February 
1987.  Mr Isaacs’ brain had been removed without the knowledge or consent of 
Mrs Isaacs and in clear breach of the requirements of the Human Tissue Act 1961. 
The Secretary of State for Health, Rt Hon Alan Milburn MP, having learned of the 
case during the debate in the House of Commons on the Redfern Report37, asked 
HM Inspector of Anatomy, Dr Jeremy Metters, to undertaken an investigation. 
1.1.3.2 Findings. 
Mr Isaacs’ brain and many others had been retained as part of an arrangement that 
had started in 1985 when the Coroner for the North Manchester district had agreed 
to a proposal that his office staff should identify, from among the deaths reported 
to the Coroner, those where the brain might be suitable for a ‘joint programme’ of 
research of several Departments within the University of Manchester.  Dr Metters 
found that Mr Isaacs’ brain had been disposed of after it was decided that it could 
not be used in the research programme.  
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The wider national picture with regard to brain retention was revealed within 
Isaacs. Three types of collection were identified. First, there were a few holdings of 
brains specifically collected for research.   Second, there were brains initially 
retained for diagnostic purposes, but later used for research. Third, there were 
‘accumulations’ of brains, without any research or other use being intended.  Some 
accumulations had occurred simply because neither the Coroner nor the 
pathologists had given instructions regarding disposal of these brains.  
Dr Metters attempted to understand events from the point of view of the practising 
pathologist.  
  First, before the Human Tissue Act in 1961, pathologists had been used to 
 removing organs at post-mortems that appeared to be of interest for research or 
 teaching purposes.  This practice had continued during the 1960s, little influenced 
 by the Human Tissue Act.  Second, pathologists carrying out post-mortems were 
 trained by their seniors and followed their example and practices. Third, some 
 pathologists were reportedly asked by Coroners not to distress relatives by 
 referring in their post-mortem reports specifically to the retention of organs.  There 
 is nothing in writing to confirm that such instructions were given... [H]owever, [the 
 author of the Report] is satisfied that some Coroners did ask pathologists to refrain 
 from mentioning organ and tissue retention in their post-mortem reports.  Fourth, 
 it is noteworthy that Schedule 10 of the Coroners Rules, which sets out the format 
 for the post-mortem examination report, refers obliquely to organ or tissue 
 retention.  The schedule does not require a list of organs and tissues that have 
 been retained.  
1.1.4 Commonality of features in Bristol, Redfern and Isaacs. 
Although each of the three Inquiries arose because of a particular circumstance, or 
set of circumstances, the findings were strikingly similar.  [Professor Van Velzen 
stood apart in Redfern by virtue of his wilful and criminal falsification of data.] 
All three Inquiries found serious inadequacies in communication with relatives 
about PM examinations. Withholding the details was recognised in Redfern to have 
its origins, at least in part, in well meaning paternalism.  With regard to HPMs, 81% 
had not been told that they could have objected.38  In Isaacs, the examination had 
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been carried out in the face of objection from Mrs Isaacs, and was thereby illegal.  
In Bristol parents were found to have been asked to sign papers very soon after the 
death of their child, and after, at best, brief discussion, when many had been clearly 
and understandably unable to comprehend what was being put to them.39 
It was common to Bristol and Redfern, and central to Isaacs, that relatives were 
unaware that organs might have been, and usually had been, retained.  That the 
discovery provoked shock was understandable.  What at first sight may be less clear 
is why the collective response escalated to the point where multiple funerals were 
felt by the families to be necessary – even to the extent of interring glass 
microscope slides of tissue.  These matters are considered in more detail below.   
The PM examinations which gave rise to most concern were those in the coroners’ 
jurisdictions. Pathologists had believed, erroneously, that they were entitled to 
retain, long term, organs and tissues for teaching, research or archiving.  Redfern 
berated the medical profession because ‘*they+ did not properly consider the 
Human Tissue Act 1961 in the first place’.40  Isaacs found ‘a major 
misunderstanding of the Human Tissue Act and the Coroners’ Rules.’  The Interim 
Report of Bristol (BIR) found the law regulating the removal, retention, use and 
disposal of human materials to be `obscure, uncertain and arcane’41. The coroners 
themselves had a case to answer in each centre.  In Redfern, ‘slackness’ of coronial 
procedures was found to be a contributory factor.  In Isaacs, the Coroner’s Office in 
one district was actually responsible for identifying to the clinicians cases which 
might be suitable for brain research.  Dr Metters in Isaacs ‘*found+ it hard to believe 
that *the coroner+ did not know’.  BIR concentrated on an analysis of law relating to 
the activities of coroners and said little about the conduct of the Bristol Coroner 
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within the context of the Inquiry. [In Bristol, two medical witnesses gave evidence 
which was at variance with the account of the then coroner42.] 
Taken together, the common factors revealed by the three Inquiries would of 
themselves have called for stronger guidelines to the medical and coronial 
professions, perhaps coupled to new proportionate legislation.  In addition, there 
were further factors which, I argue, may have influenced the climate in which new 
legislation was sought. 
1.2 Further ‘inspiration’ factors which influenced the climate in which new human 
tissue legislation was brought forward. 
1.2.1 Bristol Interim Report, Annex B.43 
Professor Kennedy and colleagues examined in detail the then existing law and 
guidelines and identified many of the shortcomings and uncertainties already 
discussed in Chapter One.   The Report stated that the ruling principle regarding the 
removal, retention, use and disposal of human material must be respect for the 
dead child and for the concerns and, to the extent allowed by law, the wishes of the 
parents.44  Two options were offered: either to produce an enforceable (and 
enforced) Code of Practice45, or ‘Option 2’: 
 If it were decided that new law is necessary and if parliamentary time could be 
 found, a twofold approach could be adopted. Specific concerns could be met 
 through amending or clarifying the existing law. In addition, the scheme of 
 consents proposed above as a code of practice could be given statutory form by 
 being incorporated into the new law as a schedule, or by stipulating in the law that 
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 the code of practice issued from time to time by the appropriate government 
 department must be observed.46 
 
 The ensuing paragraphs in Annex B identified specific matters which a new law 
should address.  These included: the importance of the Coroners Act 1988 and 
Coroners Rules 1984; communication between Coroner and parents; responsibility 
for retained tissues after Coroner is functus; tissue blocks and slides; DNA; parents’ 
rights; the need for explicit consent in hospital PMs, with a Code of Practice as a 
schedule to the putative new legislation; breach of provisions of law should attract 
legal sanctions; the right to possession and control of tissue after parental consent 
should vest in the pathologist [with consequent legal issues of title, commerce, 
intellectual property rights to be resolved]. 47  
The recommendation of ‘Option 2’, and the specific issues listed above, bore a 
striking congruence with the provisions of the later Human Tissue Bill 2003-4, the 
content of the subsequent Parliamentary debates, the issues which attracted 
forceful lobbying, and the ‘omissions’ from the Human Tissue Act 2004 identified 
later by legal scholars.  All these matters will be discussed later in this Chapter.  At 
this stage, I submit that the evidence for the Bristol Interim Report having been an 
important ‘inspiration’ (and source of later ‘formulation’) is considerable. 
1.2.2 A commitment to parents: the CMO’s ‘Summit’ meeting on organ retention.48 
This meeting was held in London on January 11 2001.  Its purpose, according to the 
CMO, was to draw on experiences from the past so as to ‘come up with ideas and 
solutions for the future and look forward’.49  Whatever was the desired purpose of 
the meeting, it was characterised throughout by angry contributions and 
                                                     
46
 Ibid., p47, paras 176. 
47
 Ibid., pp47-50, paras 177-193. 
48
 Department of Health.  Transcript of Chief Medical Officer’s Summit.  Thursday January 11, 2001. 
CMO Transcrip2t*1+.pdf.  Obtained on February 11, 2010 from CMO’s Private Office. 
49
 Ibid., p2. 
197 
 
interjections from some parents, and (mainly) defensive and apologetic speeches 
from the medical profession.  
There was [in retrospect] a remarkable contribution from Mrs Michaela Willis, chair 
of the National Committee concerned with Organ Retention (NACOR), speaking of 
the need to change future practice.  As noted (verbatim) in the transcript of the 
Summit: 
 There must be an immediate change in the law. The rules governing hospital and 
 coroners' post mortems must be the same. Doctors must be obliged to seek fully 
 informed consent from families for the examination of the relative's body and the 
 retention of every item of material. Contravention must lead to disciplinary action 
 and rights to damages.  A new criminal offence of selling human material or 
 profiting from its use [is required].  There should be a national inspectorate which 
 should be set up to monitor practices in all hospitals and to administer a national 
 register of all human material.50 
This described with some accuracy the structure and content of the Human Tissue 
Bill 2003-4 introduced some three years later. 
 Almost the last word was given to a lay participant, Mr Fergus Walsh, the BBC’s 
health and science correspondent, who said, to repeated bursts of applause:  
  The mistakes that have happened in the past are appalling… The way the 
 Government and the medical profession respond to this scandal is crucial...[These 
 are] the final views that Liam Donaldson will hear before he goes back to see Alan 
 Milburn. We should listen to the families more than anyone else.51  
 The CMO responded ‘We do have to change the law. We do have to put in 
measures that bite and work.  We must, whatever we put in place, pass one simple 
test and that test is two words, "never again"’(Applause).52 The CMO gave an 
assurance to the meeting that its proceedings would help to shape his advice to 
ministers on future regulations for organ retention.  
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I believe it is not fanciful to conjecture that the emotion of the Summit, exemplified 
in Walsh’s summary, was communicated to the Secretary of State, and in turn fed 
into his presentation of Redfern to Parliament two weeks later.  Evidence later in 
this chapter will indicate that a ‘commitment to parents and relatives’ by the 
Government reappeared at all subsequent stages of the legislative process. [The 
content of Ms Willis’ presentation from NACOR suggested that the process had 
already begun]. 
1.2.3 Public opinion and the Press. 
The scale of the early response to the events in Bristol and later Alder Hey can be 
gauged from the volume of newsprint that was produced.  A computer search in 
‘Nexis’ in April 2008 of ‘organ retention’ revealed that between November 1999 
and November 2000 there were 258 articles on the subject in the national press 
and 774 in regional newspapers.  The tone of the articles can be summarised in 
three headlines of the time. ‘Parent’s heartache at being told child may have been 
cremated without her heart’ 53; ‘Hospital that set up ‘library’ of tragic babies may 
be sued: parents act as the agony of losing a child returns’54; ‘An 18 year wait to lay 
a cot-death baby to rest’.55  [Although the timing of publication of the Isaacs Report 
on May 13 2003 placed its contents firmly in the ‘in-tray’ of draft legislators, it 
made fewer headlines than Bristol and Redfern.  It may have been that retention of 
(elderly) adult brains was less newsworthy than comparable practices which 
involved infants and children.  In addition, the Report may have been partly driven 
from the front pages by the fact that it appeared on the very day the Clare Short 
MP, the International Development Secretary, resigned from the Government 
because of her opposition to the Iraq War.56] 
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The media response during the months leading up to the publication of Redfern was 
as nothing compared with the storm which erupted in the Press on January 31 
2001, hours after the Secretary of State, Rt Hon Alan Milburn MP, had released its 
contents to a hushed House of Commons57.  According to a ‘Nexis’ search in 
December 2009 (of ‘organ’, ‘tissue’, ‘retention’, ‘children’, ‘infants’, ‘scandal’), 
supplemented by on site searches in the British Library newspaper collections, 
there were at least 117 separate articles in the national newspapers on that day.  
The majority of the newsprint was, understandably, devoted to the findings in 
Liverpool itself, and concentrated on the reaction of parents (‘unforgivable pain of 
organ scandal parents’58), and the verdict on Professor Van Velsen (‘a catastrophic 
betrayal of trust; organ horror doc; Dr Liar; Frankenstein’59).  In addition, however, 
there was extensive coverage of the CMO’s Census60 [discussed below at 1.2.5] 
(‘child organ scandal: illegal body parts held all over the country’61).  The sum was ‘a 
disgrace beyond imagining’62, and represented ‘truly the darkest day in the proud 
history of the National Health Service’63. 
Commendably, there were a few articles in a few newspapers which, even on the 
day following the revelations of Alder Hey, sought to look forward.  Particularly 
impressive to me was the contribution of David Robson in The Express who 
anticipated many of the debates to come (as well as the content of several 
subsequent sections of this Thesis) when he wrote:  
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 Our first thought about Alder Hey will be with the parents, who feel themselves 
 brutalised, but our second thought should be that several valuable things will 
 emerge: there may be a change in the culture of medicine, the sort of change that 
 comes through policy often precipitated by disaster.  Equally important is an 
 increased recognition by us that our attitude to corpses should be examined.  
 Organs are essential to science: their removal with consent is not an offence 
 against the dead or the living.  Quite the contrary, it should be seen as a 
 contribution.64 
1.2.4 The response of the Secretary of State, Rt Hon Alan Milburn MP to Redfern. 
It is more than likely that the Secretary of State held the view that the relationships 
between the content of the Report, his views, and their handling by the press might 
be important in shaping public opinion, and this may have influenced his approach. 
There were comments in the press about his choice of words and oratorical style as 
he presented Redfern in the House of Commons.   As described by Simon Hoggart in 
the Guardian: 
  [w]e do not often hear demotic English in Parliament, so the words made the 
 goose pimples almost painful, and the chill in the pit of the stomach even worse.65 
 An anonymous features writer in the Times took a different view of Mr Milburn’s 
performance. 
 It was essential to shed light on what happened at Alder Hey.  But the hysterical 
 and overwrought language used by Mr Milburn is the reverse of helpful [and] 
 ensured that the ...atmosphere was as highly charged as possible. This lurid touch 
 was the last thing needed by either doctors or parents.  He should have been 
 trying, in the interests of everyone involved, to calm the various parties so that the 
 vital work of rebuilding trust could have as easy a beginning as possible.66 
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 A similar view was later expressed by the President of the Royal College of 
Physicians (RCP) about what he perceived as the ‘hyperbolic’ language of the 
Secretary of State.67 
Two further documents were published alongside Redfern, both from the Chief 
Medical Officer, as follows.  
1.2.5 The Chief Medical Officer’s Report of the census of retained organs and 
tissues conducted throughout England during 2000. (‘CMO’s Census’). 68 
This Report revealed that a total of approximately 54,300 organs, body parts, still-
births or fetuses were held by pathology services at the end of 1999 which had 
been retained from PMs between 1970 to 1999; nearly half the total organs 
retained were brains and a sixth were hearts.69  Not surprisingly, these findings 
added to the press furore. 
1.2.6 The Chief Medical Officer’s Advice on the removal, retention and use of 
human organs and tissue from post-mortem examination( ‘CMO’s Advice’).70 
 The Government chose to accept the CMO’s recommendation that: 
 [a]s soon as possible, there should be a more fundamental and broader revision of 
 the law, encompassing the taking, storage and use of human tissue from the living 
 and the dead, and introducing an independent system of regulatory control.  To be 
 comprehensive, this should encompass aspects of coroners’ practice.  It should 
 shift the emphasis from ‘retention’ to ‘donation’ to signal a new relationship with 
 the public and bereaved families.71  
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The principles underlying the CMO’s advice included respect, informed consent, 
and adequate information, and certainly chimed with public opinion, BIR, the 
CMO’s Summit, the language of Redfern, and a need to be ‘true’ to the bereaved 
parents. Indeed the Secretary of State paid tribute to a parent, Mrs Michaela Willis 
(Chair of the National Committee on Organ Retention), and others who ‘have 
helped to contribute to the CMO’s recommendations’.72  The emphasis on ‘consent’ 
was derived from these sources, and in addition, was congruent with a more widely 
expressed concern by the Government of the day, and articulated by the Secretary 
of State in October 2001, that ‘for public services to command public confidence 
today, they have to give greater control and more [informed] choice to the people 
who use them’.73  One month later the Department of Health had reinforced the 
importance of ‘patient-centred consent practice’ in a circular to be acted on by all 
Health Authorities and Trusts in the NHS.74 
If more evidence were needed of the influence of bereaved parents in ‘inspiration’, 
it came from the Secretary of State:  
 I think there is consensus on what the parents really want.  They want an apology 
 and an explanation and to know that those who are responsible for what happened 
 to them and their families will be brought to book.  Above all, they want to know it 
 will not happen again and that action will be taken quickly to prevent it from 
 happening again.  We are committed to taking that action.75 
With the Government’s decision to change the law the end of the ‘inspiration’ 
phase had been reached.  Sadly, I have not found it possible to identify a positive 
contribution from the medical profession to this phase, unless it could be said that 
errant behaviour revealed in (in particular) Redfern and Isaacs was a positive 
stimulus to the inclusion of sanctions in the new legislation!  Because I believe, and 
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will try to argue later, that an absence of positive medical/scientific input at the 
early stages of the legislative process (perhaps it was positively not welcomed) led 
to otherwise avoidable conflicts, it is appropriate to add a note at this point in the 
narrative about the state of the profession in the months before and after the 
publication of Redfern. 
1.2.7  A postscript about the medical profession at the end of the ‘inspiration’ 
phase. 
Chapter Three has already suggested that by the millennium the medical profession 
had lost the unqualified confidence of the public and government, and to an extent 
had lost confidence in itself.  Bristol, Alder Hey and Isaacs did not improve matters. 
1.2.7.1 Royal Colleges and individual doctors. 
 The Royal College of Pathologists (RCPath), the body at the professional centre of 
the storm, had earlier given a Statement to the Bristol Inquiry which, to my reading, 
had contained a mixture of fact, explanation, discomfort, and, in places challenge.76  
RCPath had also emphasised the existence a Working Party of their College which 
had been set up in 1995, four years before the Inquiry (RCPath’s emphasis) to 
produce authoritative advice to the profession by way of guidelines for the 
retention of tissues and organs at PM examination. 77  The RCPath Guidelines were 
published in March 200078, by which time the revelations in Bristol and Liverpool 
were well underway.  The Guidelines were described in the Bristol Interim Report as 
‘long awaited’79, but were dismissed as inadequate, stating:  
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 [The College] could have proposed that their changes be put into statutory form, 
 on the ground that professional guidelines were not sufficiently binding.  After all, 
 previous guidelines have not been conspicuously well-observed.  The College chose 
 not to do so.  It is a matter of considerable concern whether guidelines, on their 
 own, issued by the very professional body seen by some as having lost trust, will 
 suffice to recapture this trust.  We doubt it.80 
RCP indicated to the CMO their view that the response by the public, press and 
politicians to Bristol and Alder Hey had failed to recognise properly the importance 
of the study of PM tissue for good clinical practice, education and research.81 RCP 
conceded that specific consent for the retention of organs and tissues had not 
usually been sought.  This had not been because of an intention to deceive or 
conceal the purpose, but because it had been assumed that acceptance of such 
actions was implicit in the consent given to the process of autopsy.  Further, ‘we do 
not believe that most people giving consent to autopsy believed that every piece of 
tissue was returned to the cadaver prior to burial or cremation.’ 82 
While many of the official medical responses were positive or in places feisty in 
tone, there is no doubt that, at the level of individual practitioners (especially 
histopathologists), the immediate outcome was a severe loss of morale, with 
feelings that were a mixture of defensiveness and bewilderment, and accompanied 
in some cases by (doomed) attempts to explain to a hostile audience the benefits of 
post-mortem examinations.83   Paediatric pathologists, in particular, suffered 
abuses: some received threatening phone calls to their homes, while others found 
their children being bullied at school because of their parents’ profession.84 
A few were more robust in their responses. John Bennett, a distinguished senior 
physician, wrote: ‘The study of whole organs (fresh, or preserved in jars) and 
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histological slides has been an integral part of medical education for centuries, and 
every undergraduate medical school had a pathology museum of which it was often 
justifiably proud’.85  The President of the Pathology Society sought to distance the 
practice of the ‘overwhelming majority of pathologists’ from those exposed in Alder 
Hey, stating that ‘pathologists generally are scrupulous about ensuring that full 
permission for autopsy is given and that the permission form mentions that tissue 
may be retained’.86  
1.2.7.2 The response of the medical press to the Inquiries.  
The British Medical Journal accepted the charge of medical paternalism, and asked 
‘what have we learned from the Alder Hey affair?’ The answers were that all 
doctors needed to be educated about how to obtain appropriate consent, and must 
understand that patients wanted to be partners in decision making.  Further, 
doctors’ behaviours which were deemed important needed to be ‘continuously (sic) 
monitored to ensure adherence with standards’.87 Not surprisingly, this editorial 
provoked a flurry of emailed ‘Rapid Responses’ to bmj.com with a wide range of 
content, from support, through specific counter points, to ‘unfair criticism’.88   
Perhaps the most balanced of the early medical commentaries came in a leader in 
the Archives of Disease in Childhood by Professor (later Sir) David Hall, President of 
the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health.  Although many doctors, including 
himself, had initially thought that this was just another ‘doctor bashing’ story, he 
had come to realise that Alder Hey was probably as cataclysmic an event in British 
medicine as Bristol, and ‘the culmination and, perhaps, the final demise of what we 
have thought of as benign medical paternalism’.  The lessons to be learned would 
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require modifying consent procedures, embracing the concept of patients as 
partners, developing techniques for limited postmortem examinations, clarifying 
the law- but above all, finding a method for the profession to say a collective 
‘sorry’.89 
2. ‘Deliberation and formulation’. 
2.1 Retained Organs Commission (ROC; ‘the Commission’).90   
The publication of Redfern exacerbated public indignation and, crucially, parental 
anger and distress which required urgent attention.  In response the Government 
established the Retained Organs Commission, through which, by its very existence, 
the Government further confirmed a commitment to parents. The ROC was 
established by the Secretary of State for Health as a Special Health Authority on 
January 30 2001, and came into being formally on April 1 of that year.  It was 
chaired by the legal academic, Professor Margaret Brazier, and functioned until 
March 31, 2004. The Commission contributed to the deliberative and formulating 
phase, but also did much more. 
 A drily worded catalogue of the important tasks given to ROC- to manage the 
process of organ return in the NHS, provide advocacy and information for families, 
consult on and propose a regulatory framework for ‘collections’, advise Ministers 
about the changes needed in the law- fails to capture the scale of the emotional 
burden that would fall on the Commission acting perhaps as a ‘lightning conductor’.   
Its weight can be sensed in the words of Professor Brazier in her final report:  
 Three challenging years...the Commission came into being because of the hurt 
 done to so many families...the pain caused by organ retention was graphically 
 demonstrated to us in all our meetings with relatives...however painful some 
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 meetings may have been, the opportunity to exchange views and engage in frank 
 discussion enhanced the work of the Commission.91 
My view that this aspect of the Commission’s activities was among its most 
important is given credence by a paper written by Brazier wearing her academic 
hat, in response to a provocative argument by Harris that, inter alia, ‘the role of 
consent in posthumous organ retention is highly problematic’ and, even if valid, 
needed to be weighed against the usefulness to which body parts could be put in 
the public interest.92  Brazier, having declared an interest as Chair of the ROC, 
‘fundamentally’ disagreed with Harris, and suggested that his analysis of the ethical 
issues arising from the controversies surrounding organ retention was incomplete: 
 [Harris] overlooks the context in which revelations about organ retention came 
 about.   Deeply held religious and cultural beliefs are not accorded the weight they 
 deserve. The value accorded to respect for the dead, acknowledged throughout the 
 world and through history, is virtually ignored.  He does not fully address…the 
 claims of bereaved relatives to  respect for their loss and protection from 
 emotional distress and psychiatric harm…*N+early two years of meeting families 
 whose  relatives’ organs were taken without any genuine consent on their part has 
 offered me insight into the impact of organ retention which has  radically affected 
 [the views I hold].93 
The views of the ROC were much influenced by the fervent wish of parents from 
Bristol and Alder Hey that the experiences they had suffered must never happen 
again, and in due course  must have fed directly into the process of new legislation, 
perhaps particularly in the need for informed consent and for sanctions for 
transgression.94 The ROC’s formal advice to Government about regulation and legal 
reform was issued in June 2003, and was concentrated on three specific areas: the 
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legal status of tissue blocks and slides95; the use and disposal of unclaimed and 
unidentifiable human remains96; and a regulatory framework for museums, 
archives and collections of bodies and their parts.97[Note of December 2010. I have 
been unable to obtain these ROC documents despite enquiries to the Department 
of Health, the National Archives, and, indirectly, to two members of ROC]. 
2.2 A ‘fundamental and broad review’ of the law (Recommendation 6, CMO’s 
Advice). 
Between 2001 and mid 2002, the Department of Health undertook a review of the 
law on human organs and tissues taken from both adults and children, as had been 
recommended.98  The starting point must have begun earlier, since the CMO’s 
Advice to Government on January 31, 2001 had already recommended a review of 
the law: 
  [e]ncompassing the taking, storage and use of human tissue from the living and 
 the dead, and introducing an independent system of regulatory control.  To be 
 comprehensive, this should encompass aspects of coroners’ practice.’ 99 
2.2.1 The primacy of consent. 
I have already identified (at 1.2.1 above) the influence of the Bristol Interim Report 
(BIR) on review of the law, and which, inter alia, established the ‘ruling principle’ of 
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consent100.  The CMO’s advice subsequently regarding respect and informed 
consent was compatible not only with the Inquiry reports but also with a general 
commitment of the Department of Health to ‘patient-centred consent practice’101- 
which in turn reflected a deeper trend within society in favour of personal 
autonomy and informed choice, discussed in Chapter Three.  However, as I try to 
show in the ‘legitimation’ section below and in Chapter Five, other factors could, 
and did, play a significant role in modifying the ‘ruling principle’. 
2.2.2 The origins of the decision to include ‘tissues from the living’ within new 
legislation. 
It remains something of a puzzle as to why the CMO took the decision to 
recommend to Ministers that tissue from the living should be included in the 
proposed legislation- a decision described as ‘surprising’ in a later academic 
analysis102, and questioned by Lord Turnberg in the House of Lords as to whether it 
was needed103.  
We know from BIR that control of tissue banks ‘and the like’ had been on the 
CMO’s mind.   By July 2002 there would also have been early proposals for EU 
legislation on Departmental desks, concerning the quality and safety of cells and 
tissue from the living used for therapeutic purposes104 and which eventually led to 
Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in March 
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2004105.  The Directive, binding on the UK Government, contained concepts and 
requirements which could be seen as also relevant to legislation regarding tissues 
from dead people (and which, incidentally, mapped well to the recommendations 
of BIR), including : tissue and cell [use] should be founded on the philosophy of 
voluntary and unpaid donation106, taking into account the Convention for the 
protection of human rights and dignity of the human being107; mandatory consent 
or authorisation requirements [of each Member State], including giving all 
appropriate information to donors and relatives, should have been met108. The 
Directive required: ‘penalties for infringements’ which had to be ‘effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive’109; a  ‘designated competent authority’, to be 
responsible for implementation, a system of accreditation, authorisation and 
licensing, inspections and control measures.110 
Third, some of the recommendations in 1995 of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(on ethical and legal questions concerning medical and scientific uses of human 
tissue) 111 would have resonated in the minds of officials faced with the problems 
raised in Bristol and Alder Hey.  For example it was recommended that, where 
tissue was removed in the course of medical treatment, consent to treatment 
should be taken to include consent to disposal, storage and ‘any other ethically 
acceptable’ use of removed tissue.112 
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It is just possible that the inclusion of tissues from the living in the ‘fundamental 
and broad review’ was (merely) an attempt at a complex tidying operation.  A 
senior civil servant, Hugh Whittall, who was intimately involved in all stages of the 
legislation, gave a fascinating glimpse of Departmental thinking during that review 
in a meeting of the Human Genetics Commission - information which I obtained 
through the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)113:  
 We were faced with the current legislative position which is quite a patchwork.  We 
 have several different pieces of legislation which are operative, we have areas that 
 are not covered by legislation at all.  These have different regulatory approaches as 
 well…what we have found is sometimes anomalous, sometimes inconsistent, but 
 certainly rather patchy.114 
 A ‘tidying up’ which incorporated a wide range of legislation might also be 
congruent with the description by the late Sir Harold Kent QC, Parliamentary 
Counsel, of the differing interests of a minister, in comparison to a draftsman, as to 
the content of a Bill: 
 The draftsman seeks to confine the Bill strictly to matters requiring an alteration of 
 the law.  The department is conscious that the Minister would like to make a 
 Parliamentary splash; it also knows that administration is sometimes helped by 
 being able to refer to an Act of Parliament; so it wants to put as much as possible 
 into the Bill.115 
2.2.3 Possible influence of the ‘in tray’ (see Chapter Two). 
Although the relevant files in the National Archives that relate to the Departmental 
review will remain closed until at least 2031, it is possible to make an informed 
guess as to their likely contents. Lying in wait for officials and ministers would have 
been the contents of what I have termed the ‘in-tray’ prior to 2000.  Chapter Two 
described a series of problems which arose and which had been met by piecemeal 
responses. Recalling Drewry’s five stages of the legislative process116,  these events 
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represented recurring, albeit largely unplanned, ‘post legislative scrutiny’ which had 
identified shortcomings in the law, and which had resulted in several attempts by 
officials to produce draft amending legislation.117   The influence ascribed by 
Drewry of ‘the public’s response to legislation- particularly their complaints and bad 
experiences’- in this case from Bristol, Alder Hey and Isaacs- would have supplied 
overwhelming further ‘feedback’ to Government and  taken the legislative process 
full circle- returning  to ‘inspiration’ and ‘formulation’118-  with an added sense of 
urgency. 
In addition, there would have been more recent Departmental activity which 
would, separately, have brought ‘errant doctors’ and, separately ‘human tissue’ and 
‘coroners’ to the forefront, and may just have added still more to the ‘in-tray’: the 
erasure by the GMC in 1998 of Rodney Ledward, a consultant gynaecologist and a 
man with a ‘god like attitude’ who had ignored previous disciplinary hearings and a 
formal warning. 119 120 ; specific recommendations in the Shipman Inquiry (on death 
certification, and the investigation of death by coroners) of direct relevance to 
officials and ministers as they determined a course of action following Redfern.121 
122  The removal of hands on the coroner’s instructions for identification purposes 
after the 1989 Marchioness disaster, revealed by, and criticised in, the report of 
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Lord Justice Clarke in March 2001123, would also have been of then current concern.  
It is of course impossible to say whether or not these extreme cases contributed to 
the Department’s ‘inspiration’ phase of new human tissue legislation, but they 
cannot have helped the medical (or coronial) cause. Last, the opening of Gunther 
von Hagens’ ‘Body Worlds’ exhibition had provoked much debate.124 125 However 
remote this exhibition was from the day to day work of the Department of Health, 
one may conjecture that a new file had been opened. 
2.2.4 Litigation on behalf of parents. 
The information in this section was obtained from the NHS Litigation Authority.126 
These proceedings, of great importance to the affected families, are mentioned 
only briefly in this Thesis because they took place during the phase of deliberation 
and formulation, but with the plausible hypothesis that the litigation kept the needs 
of parents at the forefront.   
For the record, there were two separate legal actions.  First, the Royal Liverpool 
Children’s Litigation (RLCL), which was settled after confidential mediation on 
September 25-27, 2002.  98% of the RLCL Claimants accepted the settlement terms 
of a global compensation figure (i.e. a figure for the whole group, to be split as the 
group decided) plus a number of non-financial remedies.  Second, a separate 
‘Nationwide’ Group Litigation Order (NOGL) was created following service of a 
second set of proceedings on Leeds Health Authority, with four test cases from four 
centres.  The trial commenced on 26 January 2004, in London before Mr Justice 
Gage. It concluded on 18 February 2004 [by which time the Human Tissue Bill had 
passed Committee Stage in the Commons].  The Claimants failed in their attempt to 
establish a new tort of ‘wrongful interference’ as a result of which, the Coroners’ 
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Post Mortem (CPM) cases failed (approximately 40% of the total cohort). They 
succeeded in establishing that there was a duty of care owed to parents which was 
breached in the Hospital Post Mortem (HPM) cases; however, only one of the HPM 
claimants succeeded in establishing that they had sustained foreseeable psychiatric 
injury.  Damages were awarded127.  Separately, at mediation on September 27-28, 
2004, a confidential lump sum settlement to the Group was agreed in principle.  In 
addition, the NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) agreed ‘best endeavours’ on certain 
non-financial outcomes including apologies where these had not already been 
provided.  98% of the claimants accepted the damages settlement.128 
In total, 1089 claims were settled under the RLCL. 2060 claims had issued on the 
NOGL group register of which 860 CPM claims were dismissed. All cases were 
indemnified by the NHS Litigation Authority on behalf of the NHS trust members of 
its schemes.129 
2.3 Consultation: ‘Human Bodies, Human Choices’ (‘HBHC’).130  
The outcome of the Departmental review was a document, ‘Human bodies, human 
choices’, which was launched in July 2002.  It had the unusual subtitle of ‘a 
consultation report’. Although the format of the document was consultative, much 
of the content was declarative, and many of its 142 questions sought refinements 
to issues apparently already decided. The document was explicitly built around the 
Government’s prior acceptance of the CMO’s Advice such that the fundamental 
principles and regulatory regime of the Anatomy Act 1984 would be applied to all 
retention of human tissue, and that new legislation would provide a statutory 
process for regulating all aspects of obtaining, storage, use and disposal of all 
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tissues and organs, including the establishment of a single, regulatory body.131 The 
issues in HBHC were grouped into five broad headings: the scope of the definition 
of ‘organs and tissue’, consent, uses of organs and tissue, oversight and compliance, 
and specialized uses (transplantation, fetal tissue, gametes, cell lines and stem 
cells).    
The outcome of the HBHC process was a summary document in April 2003 from the 
Department of Health (‘the Summary’)132 with the analysis of each broad topic 
given under three heads: aspects generally agreed; aspects where there were 
‘differences’ or ‘reservations’ among respondents; and key messages for the 
development of new legislation.  It must have been difficult to summarise 
accurately a process where 231 written replies had been received and over 200 
individuals had attended the associated workshops and conference.  It would be 
understandable if certain opinions or advice were outweighed by contrary views, or 
even became lost in the ‘noise’.  In the next four paragraphs I have tried to follow 
the passage through the consultative process of certain views expressed by the 
Wellcome Trust (‘WT’, ‘the Trust’), not only because it is a major research body 
(and whose voice might have been expected to be heard within a consultation 
which was concerned that, inter alia ‘the legitimate needs of...medical science are 
safeguarded in all our interests’133), but because it happened that some of the 
matters raised by the Trust within HBHC came eventually to occupy a great deal of 
parliamentary time during the legitimation phase proper. 
In the months preceding the HBHC consultation there had been two consultations 
to which WT had already responded, one from the Retained Organs Commission on 
unclaimed organs and tissue134 and the other on a draft interim statement on organ 
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and tissue use from the Department of Health itself.135  WT opined rather tetchily 
that it would have seemed appropriate to provide feedback on these previous 
inquiries, in order to try and achieve a common opinion and to avoid numerous 
repetitions of the same points.136 In direct response to HBHC, WT confined itself to 
‘add*ing+ further comment’137- perhaps an error of judgment.  For present purposes 
I have shared WT’s assumption that responses to previous consultations were 
considered as part a greater consultation process.  In the next paragraph each 
proposal by the Trust is followed in italicised brackets by the Departmental 
response in the Summary. 
With regard to ‘definitions’, WT proposed that ‘human tissue’ as a term should be 
defined in the legislation and that this definition should exclude body fluids, 
standard tissue blocks and slides, certain ‘replicable tissues’ such as blood, small 
amounts of skin, teeth, hair, and non-cellular material.  ‘Surgically discarded tissue’ 
should also be excluded from the legislation, as should cell lines and stem 
cells.138[Departmental response in Summary: ‘Although there was a general view 
that discarded material should form a separate category, views differed as to 
whether it should therefore be excluded from legislation.  Key message: ‘Discarded’ 
human material should form a separate category, but with any new law still taking 
into account the uses to which it could be put, for example, through genetic testing 
139]. 
 With regard to ‘consent’, the Trust, within a stated ‘strong support for an open and 
transparent system based on informed consent’, considered that it would be 
ethical, with safeguards, to perform an autopsy without consent where there was a 
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pressing clinical/scientific need such as when an individual may have died from a 
notifiable disease with implications for public health.140  [Views were divided on 
what should happen if no consent could be obtained for a proposed hospital post 
mortem. Some felt that a hospital post mortem should be carried out if it would 
serve a greater public good and there was no reason to believe the deceased person 
would have objected. Others were against proceeding without consent. Key 
message: Consent should be the basis for new legislation and any regulatory system 
established141].  
With regard to ‘use’, WT argued for the continuing importance of tissue archives: ‘It 
cannot be overemphasised that medical diagnoses are not made once and for all 
with complete accuracy. They must be subject to continuing review, often over 
periods of many years, as knowledge advances’.142[There were divided views on 
whether... tissue blocks and slides should be distinguished for the purposes of 
disposal after a post mortem. Many people felt that... tissue blocks and slides should 
be retained as a matter of course, perhaps indefinitely. Consent for this retention 
should be included in consent to the post mortem. Other respondents, however, 
were anxious that...tissues should be returned after a post mortem and that the 
wishes of the ‘next-of-kin’ be respected in disposal. Key message: Any new 
legislation should allow for different levels of consent for different uses of human 
organs and tissue, for example, for quality assurance, retention of tissue blocks and 
slides,and use of human tissue in research.143]. 
In addition, WT, while ‘fully supporting the establishing of a regulatory authority 
supported by an Inspectorate and an effective regulatory framework’144, proposed 
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that ‘the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) should have the facilitation of research for 
the benefit of the public as one of its core objectives’; and that the membership of 
the HTA should include ‘appropriate scientific representation’.145 [The Summary of 
responses regarding the HTA contained no mention of research or of the 
composition of its membership].146 
One recognises that the Department must have been faced by competing views, on 
a background of a commitment to the families of ‘never again’.  The above evidence 
supports a conclusion that in a number of areas of importance to the research 
community, the advice of that community was, at best, diluted. 
2.4 An absence of pre-legislative scrutiny. 
What should have been the next stage?  A range of MPs of all parties had hoped 
that there would have been an opportunity for ‘pre-legislative scrutiny’ of a draft 
Bill.147   This would have allowed all parties concerned with the practicalities of a 
piece of legislation and its future interpretation to determine whether a Bill would 
be likely to serve its purpose.148  Instead, in September 2003 the Department of 
Health published, with an introduction from the Chief Medical Officers for England 
and for Wales, an eight page document titled ‘Proposals for new legislation on 
human organs and tissue’ (‘the Proposals’)149 which set out ‘*what+ we would 
expect to be incorporated in the legislation’.  In passing one may note the [by now] 
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rejection of the WT views on tissue blocks and slides.  The Proposals expected that, 
in the new legislation: 
 Consent would be required before organs, tissue or cells could be taken from living 
 patients or from deceased persons, and subsequently stored and used for specified 
 purposes. Tissue blocks and slides made from tissue samples for microscopic 
 examination would be subject to the same rules as any other tissue.150 
 
There were further meetings with professional organisations, but only in the spirit 
of explanation and foretaste.  The Human Tissue Bill was introduced in the House of 
Commons on December 3, 2003151, to be followed, as it turned out, by many 
further months of lobbying and negotiation between scientists and politicians 
before the Human Tissue Act 2004 reached the Statute Book. 
3 ‘Legitimation’: passage of the Human Tissue Bill 2003-4(‘the 2003-4 Bill’; ‘the 
Bill’).152 
3.1 Purpose of the Bill. 
The contrast between the language used to introduce the Human Tissue Bill in 1960 
with that used to introduce its successor could not have been starker. In 1960, Miss 
Edith Pitt MP, when presenting the1960 Bill, had emphasised the importance of 
disseminating knowledge and encouraging research153, and of putting beyond 
doubt the lawfulness of what the medical profession required (my emphasis) for the 
improvement of treatment, education and research.154  On January 15, 2004, Ms 
Rosie Winterton MP, Minister of State for Health, said at Second Reading of the 
2003-4 Bill: 
  The origins of the legislation lie in the distress, grief and anger felt by families in 
 Bristol and Liverpool when they discovered that the organs of their deceased loved 
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 ones had been retained without consent. The Bristol, Alder Hey and Isaacs 
 inquiries demonstrated that that had taken place on a large scale. It was a tragedy 
 for the families affected and it was unacceptable. The aim of the legislation is to 
 ensure that it will not happen again.155  
As described in the Explanatory Notes which accompanied the Bill, its purpose was 
to provide a consistent legislative framework for issues relating to whole body 
donation and the storage and use (and, for deceased persons, the removal) of 
human organs and tissue, all activities to be underpinned by the fundamental 
principle of consent.156  The Bill would repeal and replace the Human Tissue Act 
1961, the Anatomy Act 1984 and the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 as they 
related to England and Wales. It would also repeal and replace the Human Tissue 
Act (Northern Ireland) 1962, the Human Organ Transplants (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1989 and the Anatomy (Northern Ireland) Order 1992.157 
3.2 Support from the National Committee relating to Organ Retention (NACOR). 
NACOR was given early sight of the proposed Bill.  Reportedly, it was ‘broadly 
speaking, delighted with the helpful, proposed legislation, ensuring that families 
whose loved one has to undergo a post-mortem in the future, can be assured that 
proper consent, backed with comprehensive information- will allow them choice 
and the opportunity to donate organs and/or tissues as a ‘gift’, incorporated within 
what will be mandatory practice.’158 This response was perhaps not surprising, since 
the chair of NACOR, as early as the CMO’s summit, had spoken of changes needed 
in future practice which bore a close resemblance to those now on the face of the 
Bill (see 1.2.2, this Chapter).  The chair of NACOR added to an official: ‘*With regard 
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to consent] we need black and white, and no chance of grey, so that the words 
‘never again’ as stated by the CMO really do apply’.159 
3.3 Support at Second Reading House of Commons (HC): with three areas of 
concern identified. 
At Second Reading, there was broad cross-party support for the proposed 
measures.  Criticisms by MPs were largely concentrated in three areas. 
3.3.1 Complex and unclear drafting. 
 There was (in my view) justified criticism of the way the Bill had been drafted, as 
exemplified by ‘the Bill is remarkably difficult to navigate, given that it is meant to 
lend clarity to the obscurities relating to the removal, storage and use of body 
parts.’160;  and ‘complexity is not an excuse for opacity’161. 
3.3.2 Lack of pre-legislative scrutiny. 
 There were repeatedly expressed regrets (or stronger) that there had been no pre-
legislative scrutiny- this theme reappeared at all stages of the passage of the Bill.  
The origin of this discontent lay in an adjournment debate in the House of 
Commons on April 29, 2003, when in response to pressure from Andrew Lansley 
MP that there should be early publication of a draft Bill that would allow pre-
legislative scrutiny which would include public and professional input162, the then 
Parliamentary Under Secretary for Health, Hazel Blears MP, responded ‘I can give 
the Hon. Gentleman the undertaking that we hope to publish the draft Bill for 
Parliamentary scrutiny before the summer recess.’163  The later recanting by Dr 
Stephen Ladyman MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary for Health, explaining that 
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drafting resources had been unavailable, rang rather hollow.164  Revealingly, 
Ladyman continued ‘we therefore had to make a judgment call- do we balance the 
need for scrutiny against the needs of the families who are demanding that we 
make progress? We decided that making progress was more important than 
publishing the Bill in draft’.165 
3.3.3 An adverse effect on research and education? 
The third, and major, area of concern was the possibility that the Bill as drafted 
would adversely affect research and education.  Some also warned of the dangers 
of ‘overreaction’.166 167 168  At the same time, an atmosphere of suspicion of medical 
researchers was voiced or implied by some, and exemplified by Ms Liz Blackman 
MP, who, having listened to an interview on Radio 4 between the Minister and ‘a 
member of the scientific fraternity’ *the Chief Executive of the Wellcome Trust], 
sought and received an assurance from the Minister that during the passage of the 
Bill she would resist any attempt to soften the guidance and protocols in relation to 
the removal of tissue as well as organs, and that consent would also remain the 
watchword in that regard.169 
3.4 Subsequent passage of the Bill: themes and chronology. 
3.4.1 Introduction to a ‘tug of war’. 
Although it was the stated intention of the Government that the Bill was intended 
to achieve a balance between the rights and expectations of individuals and 
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families, and broader considerations170, opinion was expressed both within 
Parliament171 and by outside bodies172 and commentators173 that the Human Tissue 
Bill, as originally drafted, leaned too far towards the protection of individuals and 
families, and away from requirements that would ensure that important research 
could continue to be carried out.  A virtual tug of war ensued, the analysis and 
outcome of which forms the majority of the remainder of this Chapter. 
[Although subsequent sections of this Chapter will concentrate on the clinical, 
science, teaching and research debates, it is also relevant to note the overall scale 
of the changes from the original Bill which were sought by the opposition and by 
lobbyists.  At the Committee stage in the House of Commons, 46 groups of 
amendments were proposed.174  When the Bill returned on Report, and as a result 
of debate during eight sessions in Standing Committee G, the government tabled 99 
new clauses and amendments, all of which were passed.175  The House of Lords, 
after Second Reading, two days of further debate in Grand Committee, Report and 
Third Reading, approved a further 71 amendments.176  These were passed at the 
final debate in the House of Commons on November 10 2004, some eleven months 
after the Human Tissue Bill had been first read.177] 
3.4.2 Structure of the Bill (as introduced). 
The structure of the Bill was complex, with three parts and eight schedules. 
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Part 1 was titled ‘The removal, storage and use of human organs and other tissue 
for scheduled purposes’.  Part 2 sought to regulate activities involving human tissue 
through the ‘The Human Tissue Authority’(HTA), a body with powers to license, 
inspect, regulate transplants, prohibit [commercial dealings], and issue Codes of 
Practice.  Part 3, titled ‘Miscellaneous and general’, contained, inter alia, clauses of 
central importance to practitioners which dealt with: preservation for 
transplantation, surplus tissue, offences relating to non-consensual analysis of DNA, 
and purposes for which DNA may be analysed without consent.   
3.4.2.1 Why was the Bill so drafted? 
 Knowledge of the structure and a reading of the accompanying Explanatory 
Notes178, together with the Departmental document published in September 2003 
and discussed above, give insight into the emphases that were likely to have been 
given to drafting Counsel.  
I believe it plausible to suggest that the instructions to Parliamentary Counsel 
contained as the first priority the requirement to address directly the concerns and 
wishes of the aggrieved parents and relatives which had arisen from the detail of 
their experiences (as a blunt paraphrase: ‘they took and kept my *daughter’s 
heart/husband’s brain] for research without asking my permission.  That should be 
illegal and they should be punished.  It must never be allowed to happen again’). 
This could explain the content of Part 1, which was as follows: 
 Clause 1. The following activities shall be lawful if done with appropriate consent: 
storing and subsequently using a body for ‘scheduled purposes’; removing, storing 
and subsequently using for scheduled purposes ‘relevant material’ which came 
from the body... Clause 2. ‘Appropriate consent’: children. Clause 3. ‘Appropriate 
consent’: adults. Clause 4. Nominated representatives.  Clause 5. Prohibition[and 
defined as a punishable offence] of activities without consent. Clause 6. Restriction 
of activities in relation to donated activities. Clause 7. Existing holdings.  [Their use 
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to be allowed for Schedule 1 purposes without consent. Note in passing: this is a 
clause, as with others in this section, significantly influenced by the work of the 
Retained Organs Commission]. 
The fact that the early clauses in the Bill were so formulated virtually dictated that 
the structure of the rest of the Bill would appear somewhat disjointed to, say, a 
medical reader (who might have expected that [as in the later Human Tissue 
(Scotland) Bill-see Chapter Five], the clauses would have been headed 
‘Transplantation’, ‘Autopsies’, ‘Anatomy’ etc). 
3.4.3 ‘The foundation of the Bill’. 
Part 1, clause 1, was described in the Explanatory Notes as ‘the foundation of the 
Bill’179.  It linked the requirements on consent, summarised above, to the activities 
covered by the Act (‘scheduled purposes’) at Schedule 1.  Schedule 1(1) set out 
eight ‘purposes normally requiring consent’, and Schedule 1(2) listed four ‘purposes 
not normally requiring consent’.  Because the ‘purposes’ on these two lists, and 
their relation to the need for consent, became such a focus for debate as the Bill 
passed through its various stages, it is timely to set them out in detail. 
 Schedule 1.180 
 Scheduled purposes. 
 Part 1: Purposes normally requiring consent. 
 1. Anatomical examination 
 2. Determining the cause of death 
 3. Education or training relating to human health, or research in connection with 
 disorders or the functioning of the human body, (other than education or training 
 which is incidental to medical diagnosis or treatment). 
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 4. Establishing after a person’s death the efficacy of any drug or other treatment 
 administered to him. 
 5. Obtaining scientific or medical information about a living or deceased person 
 which may be relevant to any other person (including a future person). 
 6. Public display. 
 7. Research in connection with disorders or the functioning of the human body. 
 8.Transplantation. 
 Part 2: Purposes not normally requiring consent. 
 9. Clinical audit. 
 10. Education or training which is incidental to medical diagnosis or treatment. 
 11. Public health monitoring. 
 12. Quality assurance. 
3.4.4 Committee Stage (HC). 
3.4.4.1 Concerns of the biomedical community.  
The first one and a half sessions in Standing Committee G were spent in debate on 
Part 1 and Schedule 1. 
First, Andrew Lansley MP explained why the opposition had felt it necessary to 
table no fewer than 46 groups of amendments.  
 The range of amendments…indicate the uncertainty and lack of clarity felt about 
 the Bill, particularly in the medical research community,… the pharmaceutical 
 industry, clinicians and pathologists, who are concerned about the practical 
 implications of the legislation…*A+lthough the intentions and purposes are 
 supported, as far as I can see, their implementation is not attracting the same 
 support across the medical and research community, so we have a job to do.181  
[The weeks following publication of the Bill in December 2003 had seen a flurry of 
activity in a number of prominent medical and research bodies, as they struggled to 
produce their critiques and express their reservations in time to try to influence the 
                                                     
181
Parl. Deb.(HC). Standing Committee G. Official Report, 2003-4, vol. VI. Human Tissue Bill, January 
27, 2004, col. 4. 
227 
 
passage of the Bill.  At first the responses were piecemeal. The BMA182, Royal 
College of Pathologists (RCPath)183, Royal College of Physicians(RCP)184, Academy of 
Medical Sciences185, Wellcome Trust186  and other bodies had each submitted a 
brief and commentary on the Bill.  The major concerns to emerge included: scope 
of the requirement for consent (including requirements in research, and in mentally 
incapacitated adults); possibility of presumed consent in transplantation; use of 
‘residual’ tissue; education and training in research; the nature of ‘DNA offences’; 
sanctions for non compliance; restriction on the commercial use of tissues; duties 
of coroners; composition and responsibilities of the proposed Human Tissue 
Authority.  There was not complete agreement among the bodies, at least initially, 
on all points]. 
3.4.4.2 Unsuccessful attempts to modify Part 1, Schedule 1. 
Opposition members tried to probe the meaning of ‘appropriate’ consent187, and to 
insert the concept of ‘generic’ consent in research and education188.    Most 
important, it was proposed that Schedule 1(3): ‘*purposes of+ education and 
training relating to research…’ should be moved to Schedule 2, and thus not require 
consent.189  All these proposals were rejected by Government.  Dr Stephen 
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Ladyman MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary for Health reiterated Government 
policy in what came to be a memorable phrase: 
 If we are to have a Bill based on the firm principle that people must have 
 consented or understood why the material was collected and what it would be 
 used for, that principle must run through the entire legislation-as a golden thread 
 (my italics) that is not broken at any point...[The] amendments would break 
 that thread.190 
There was an unsuccessful attempt by the opposition to have ‘epidemiological 
research’ explicitly recognised as part of ‘public health monitoring’, and thus placed 
in Schedule 2.191  Dr Evan Harris made the first of several attempts to have the 
concept of ‘presumed consent’ accepted in relation to potential transplant 
donors.192  During a later debate about Government amendments intended to 
simplify issues relating to DNA analysis, Harris raised, but did not pursue, his 
observation that ‘the ethics and law surrounding the analysis of a person's DNA for 
the clinical benefit of someone else have not been raised’.193  This important area 
would be returned to later. 
3.4.4.3 The proposed Human Tissue Authority (HTA). 
The intention was clear from the CMO’s Advice, and confirmed in HBHC, that there 
should be overarching regulatory machinery, modelled on the fundamental 
principles and regulatory regime of the Anatomy Act 1984 and Anatomy Act 
Regulations 1988.194 The medical and research community accepted throughout the 
need for such a body.  Their concerns about the HTA related to the composition of 
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the membership, the scope of its activities and the potential scope and burden of 
the licensing regime. Schedule 2 of the Bill provided that: 
  The Secretary of State shall exercise his power to appoint members of the 
 Authority to secure that at all times not less than half of the members are 
 persons who do not have, and have not had, a professional interest in any of 
 the kinds of activity within the remit of the Authority.195 
The medical and research bodies pressed that membership of the HTA should 
explicitly include persons with ‘appropriate experience in the use of human 
material for research’196.  Amendments in this vein regarding membership were 
proposed in Committee197 (and later in House of Lords198) but were resisted by the 
Government.  As to HTA’s scope, amendments in Committee to allow limitation, 
restriction or exclusion of named activities from time to time199 again were 
resisted.200  Probing amendments in regard to the complexity, burden, and cost of 
licensing, revealed government’s commitment to ‘lightness of touch’201, 
‘flexibility’202 and ‘cost recovery only’203. 
3.4.5 Activities during the gap between Committee stage and Report/Third Reading 
(HC). 
The Committee stage concluded on February 5, 2004.  An almost unprecedented 
gap of nearly five months followed before the Bill was returned to the House of 
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Commons for Report and Third Reading.204 During these months, further rounds of 
discussion and lobbying took place, and the Government shifted its position in 
several aspects, such that, a few days before the Report stage, the Wellcome Trust 
felt able to issue a press release headed ‘Sensible balance in Human Tissue Bill’ 
which described ‘a *now+ sensible balance between protecting the rights and 
confidentiality of patients and their families and the need to safeguard research 
that will provide benefits for health in the future’.205 
Perhaps the most important confidential meeting was that held on March 9, 2004 
between the Minister, her officials, and representatives of the medical and research 
organisations including the BMA, GMC, Wellcome Trust, MRC, and RCPath, details 
of which I obtained from the Department of Health through the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). The BMA206 and the GMC207 had originally supported the 
blanket requirement for consent as set out in the draft Bill, but by March 2004, they 
had come to lend their support to the modifications sought by the research 
community.  These related to the proportionality and practicality of the proposals 
for the use of residual tissue.   A memorandum to Ministers issued after the 
meeting recommended modification to the, until then, requirement without 
exception for consent for research use of tissue from living patients.208  The 
memorandum stated that ‘Ministers have already agreed that an amendment 
should be brought to the Bill allowing the use without consent of remnant tissue 
samples for the purpose of all medical-related education and training.  This will 
satisfy the stakeholders on the first point’209.  [This decision was not public 
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knowledge in March 2004 but must have been taken after the considerations in 
Standing Committee had been further digested by Ministers].  With regard to 
research, the meeting had considered a number of options for alternative 
protective mechanisms so that in the case of residual tissue consent would not 
always be needed.  The recommendation which emerged was explained to the 
House on June 28 2004, during Report. 
3.4.6 Report/Third Reading (HC). 
 3.4.6.1 Agreement to research on residual tissue without consent, with safeguards. 
The Minister referred to many direct representations and a media campaign to the 
effect that obtaining consent to use so-called residual or remnant tissue would be 
onerous and costly, and thereby stifle research:  
 We therefore propose to amend the Bill to allow research using material from 
 living patients to go ahead without consent, but with [two] safeguards [ethical 
 approval in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State; and 
 conditions such that the researcher must not possess information as to the identity 
 of the person from whom the tissue came].  We believe that these safeguards will 
 maintain the essential principles of the Bill and provide appropriate controls, while 
 allowing medical researchers the access to human tissue that they need.210  
3.4.6.2 Concerns about non consensual analysis of DNA resolved. 
Geneticists had expressed two groups of concerns about non-consensual analysis of 
DNA211, which were responded to by Government in two stages. In Committee the 
Government introduced amendments which would allow appropriate DNA analysis 
of existing holdings of human material without committing an offence within the 
Act.212 Second, at Report, Government introduced a new clause 7 titled ‘Powers of 
Court to dispense with need for consent’213  to meet the concerns of geneticists 
                                                     
210
 (2004) 423 (Parl. Deb., Hansard 6
th
 series), HC 96.  
211
 Cambridge Genetics Knowledge Park and King’s College Bioethics Research Centre. Report of 
human tissue workshop. King’s College, Cambridge, January 20/21 2004. 
212
Parl. Deb.,(HC). Standing Committee G.Official Report, 2003-4, vol. VI. Human Tissue Bill, February 
5, 2004, col. 248. 
213
 (2004) 423 (Parl. Deb., Hansard 6
th
 series), HC 26. 
232 
 
about situations- albeit infrequent ones- in which individuals were untraceable, but 
the analysis of their tissue samples was necessary to predict the likelihood of a 
relative having a genetic condition or to help to diagnose and treat a relative.  
Clause 46, as it then stood, would have made it an offence to analyse DNA without 
qualifying consent.  The new clause 7 would also meet the exceptional case where 
the potential benefit to the health of the public of undertaking some research 
without consent outweighed the risk of harm to the rights of the individuals 
concerned.214 *In the final stage of the Bill’s passage, ‘untraceable’ was extended to 
include ‘non-responding’; and instead of the need for a court order to dispense 
with the need for consent, a direction from the Human Tissue Authority was 
substituted.]215 
3.4.6.3 Education and training in research remained problematic. 
Other significant modifications to the Bill were introduced at Report, following 
cases made in Committee.  References to education and training were moved from 
Part 1 to Part 2 of Schedule 1 (with consequential amendments to clause 8 and 
schedule 5).216  However, use of residual human tissue for education and training in 
research techniques, ‘which is a more easily distinguished topic’, would remain 
subject to consent.217  Although the Minister went on to say that members of the 
academic, teaching and research communities had indicated that they were 
satisfied that this approach would allow them access to the tissue that they needed 
for research and education218, this turned out not to be the case, and the issue was 
later debated at length in the House of Lords219 (see below).  
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3.4.6.4 Two further amendments (a) DNA and mental incapacity b) payments by the 
pharmaceutical industry). 
Government introduced amendments to correct the surprising omission from the 
draft Bill of any mention of mentally incapacitated adults.  These amendments 
‘bridged the gap’ between the likely date of enactment of the Human Tissue Act 
and the later enactment of the Mental Capacity Act220.  By a new clause 8, the use 
of tissue and DNA taken from mentally incapacitated adults would be lawful, 
subject to safeguards.221 An amended clause 29 was also introduced to deal with a 
number of concerns from the pharmaceutical industry about what could be seen as 
legitimate payments.222 
3.4.6.5 Progress made, but unfinished business remained. 
Andrew Lansley MP paid tribute to ‘outside bodies’, which included medical, 
research and family support groups, who had used opposition MPs to make points 
in Committee. ‘*A+lthough we put their proposals on the table before Ministers we 
got limited shrift.  However, our persistence seems to have paid off’.223  Lansley 
finished with a caution. ‘Ministers may be tempted to assume that, given the 
positive reception that all the amendments considered today were given, it is the 
end of the story.’224  As the paragraphs below will show, the House of Lords did 
indeed have something more to say. 
3.4.7 Second Reading, House of Lords (HL). 
3.4.7.1 Further briefing from the research community. 
To try to inform the Second Reading debate in the House of Lords on July 22 2004, a 
briefing note was prepared by the Wellcome Trust and issued in the joint names of 
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the Academy of Medical Sciences, the Association of Medical Research Charities, 
Cancer Research UK, MRC and the Wellcome Trust- collectively the might of the 
medical research establishment.225  These bodies, while welcoming the 
amendments introduced at Report Stage in the House of Commons ‘which 
addressed the majority of our concerns that the Bill was unduly restrictive in 
relation to medical research’, nevertheless opined that there was still more to be 
done to ensure that the Bill was workable, effective, proportionate and clear, and 
so gain the confidence of the public (sic).226 It was a measure of the persuasiveness 
of the views expressed in the briefing paper, and the influence of the institutions 
that lay behind these views, that each point was addressed by Their Lordships in 
the several stages of the Bill’s passage through the Upper House. 
3.4.7.2 Identification of issues requiring further resolution. 
At Second Reading, Lord Turnberg, having acknowledged that the Bill had already 
been much improved by the efforts of Ministers and officials to listen to the 
scientific and medical community, asked first whether it was necessary to include 
tissues from living patients in the Bill.  ‘After all, if one wants to do research now on 
such tissues, one must always have ethics committee approval, and that will be 
given only where consent has been, or will be, obtained from patients, or where the 
tissues have been anonymised’.227 His Lordship expressed [residual] fears for 
research and teaching, related to how ‘consent’ and ‘anonymity’ were interpreted; 
and questioned the wisdom of seeking to separate education and training for 
research from education more generally when those are treated separately and 
differently under Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1.  He identified that more discussion 
would be needed on several aspects of DNA research; and questioned the 
appropriateness of the High Court as the body to be asked to make a judgment on 
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whether public interest is of such overwhelming importance as to outweigh the 
interests of an individual who cannot give consent.228  Concluding Second Reading, 
Lord Howe endorsed the need for further debate on the issues identified by Lord 
Turnberg.  In addition, His Lordship found as very unsatisfactory the fact that the 
proposed new coroners’ rules were not available, especially those related to organ 
retention, to ensure congruence with the Bill.229 
In the weeks between Second Reading and Grand Committee in the House of Lords, 
the Wellcome Trust and its partner organisations (see above) had prepared yet 
another briefing paper.230 This paper suggested that the most important (to their 
organisations) of several issues still outstanding was the need to remove the 
requirement for consent from ‘education and training relating to research’, 
activities which in practice, the paper averred, would be difficult to distinguish from 
education and training relating to health (which by that stage in the Bill had 
become exempt from the need for consent). 
3.4.8 Grand Committee (HL). 
3.4.8.1 Continuing Government ‘caution’. 
In Grand Committee the issues raised at Second Reading and in the latest briefing 
from the Wellcome Trust were explored in detail in erudite debate231, against a 
background in which continuing Ministerial caution was perceived.  Lord Clement-
Jones, early in the discussions, had ‘this awful feeling that, as we go through the 
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Bill, ministerial caution…will be a real problem and a barrier to common sense and 
practical solutions’.232  Lord Jenkin of Roding was very disturbed by: 
  [t]he reluctance of the Minister to concede anything on any of the arguments that 
 have been advanced, notwithstanding the huge distinction of a number of 
 Members of the Committee who really do know what they are talking about…and 
 the virtual unanimity of the support which has existed for a number of the 
 amendments.233  
His Lordship warned that the Minister could find himself with amendments carried 
against Government on Report.  That indeed turned out to be the case. 
3.4.9 Report (HL). 
3.4.9.1 Use of tissue for education in research techniques. 
Baroness Neuberger proposed an amendment to permit the use of tissue without 
consent for the purposes of education in research techniques, if the tissue had 
come from a living person and had been anonymised.234 Seven of Their Lordships 
made speeches in support.  As Lord Turnberg put it ‘the distinction between 
research and training for research is much clearer than that between training for 
research and training for professional purposes’. 235 In a lengthy reply for the 
Government, Lord Warner forcibly restated the ‘golden thread’ argument about the 
importance of consent throughout the clauses of the Bill, and concluded by saying 
‘the Government are unable to accept the amendments, would not be able to 
accept them in future and would need to seek to reverse them at a later stage if 
they were passed today’236.  Notwithstanding this powerful rebuff, Baroness 
Neuberger pressed her amendment to a vote, and it was carried by 148 to 112.237 
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Nine days later, at Third Reading in the House of Lords on November 3, 2004, Lord 
Warner proposed Government amendments to replace Baroness Neuberger’s at 
the Report stage.  This represented a considerable Government volte face. 
 I am therefore now introducing amendments to remove those passed on 25 
 October and replace them with government amendments to achieve a similar but, I 
 hope, more consistent and clear effect… we propose to include all education and 
 training in Part 2 of the schedule…research training is simply re-absorbed into the 
 general category of education or training relating to human health.238 
In welcoming these amendments, Earl Howe was delighted that ‘perhaps the single 
largest point of contention that we were faced with when the Bill arrived in this 
House’ had been so satisfactorily resolved.239 Lord Jenkin of Roding added that ‘this 
is a justification for the very long processes that we use in Parliament to put new 
legislation on to the statute book.’240 And so it was that, by subsuming education 
and training in research within education and training in human health, the 
concerns of academe were met without Government having to juxtapose the word 
‘research’ with ‘no consent needed’.  
3.4.10 Third Reading (HL)  
3.4.10.1 Further amendments resisted. 
Further groups of amendments were resisted by government which could be 
thought of as ‘unfinished business’ from a list of academically voiced concerns.  Of 
particular interest within the context of this Thesis was an amendment which would 
have made it permissible in certain identified cases for small pieces of tissue to be 
retained without consent after a coroner’s post-mortem, to allow for possible 
forensic re-examination in the future.241 Lord Warner, for the Government, put the 
objection as follows: 
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  [The amendment] wholly undermines the fundamental principle on which the Bill is 
 based…individuals, or those who were close to a person who has died, should have 
 the right to determine the uses to which bodily material is put….We cannot risk 
 recreating [the circumstances that gave rise to the need for the legislation in the 
 first place.242  
That decision would turn out to be at variance with the provisions of the Human 
Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006.  I shall return to this issue in Chapter Five. 
3.4.11 The last lap. 
On November 10 2004 the Bill, accompanied by 71 amendments from the House of 
Lords, returned to the House of Commons for the last time.243  All were accepted- 
the last amendments in a lengthy and hard fought process which had sought to find 
‘an acceptable balance between the rights and expectations of individuals and 
families and broader considerations, such as the importance of research, education, 
training, pathology and public health surveillance of the population as a whole’ 244. 
Five days later, on November 15 2004 the Human Tissue Act 2004 received Royal 
Assent245 and came fully into force on September 1 2006, drawing to a close ‘five 
tumultuous years of negotiation’246. 
3.5 Commentaries on the 2004 Act. 
The immediate response in the medical press was in general one of relief, but with 
riders attached.  The headline in the Lancet editorial was ‘Effective implementation 
of the Human Tissue Act’247 while the BMJ, in a signed editorial by Furness, (a 
distinguished pathologist and later to be President of RCPath), carried the sub-title 
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‘reassurance for relatives, at a price’248.   The Lancet described what had emerged 
after a difficult negotiation process as a piece of legislation that grappled with 
fundamental questions about the ethical use of human samples in biological 
research- issues which would grow with the increasing popularity of large scale, 
long-term genetic epidemiology studies , including a proliferating number of 
biobanks.  It was to be hoped that more light would be shed on wider debates as 
the specifics of the Act were ‘hammered out’ by Research Ethics 
Committees(RECs).249 Furness also pointed to the crucial role of RECs, which, he 
said, now had a statutory duty to decide ‘not just whether research without 
consent was unethical, but whether or not it was illegal’. The ‘price’ of the new 
legislation included controls on tissue from the living which ‘had not been 
demanded by any public outcry’ and which were absent from Scottish legislation.250 
Furness described fears among professionals of the risk of criminal sanctions, which 
had already induced defensive practices that were not in the best interests of 
patients. 251 
Other commentators had their own views. 
Price did not approve of the ‘substantial concessions’ made to the Bill at Report 
stage which ‘unnecessarily’ diluted the ‘philosophical coherence’ of the 
legislation.252  According to his account, the medical and scientific community had 
‘alleged’ that vital research would be compromised (he cited in support three 
newspaper headlines253 and made no reference to any briefing papers having been 
produced by the clinical scientists to support their concerns).  Price made an 
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allegation of his own, that Government had undoubtedly been very exercised by 
the prospect of researchers being tempted abroad if human tissue use was ‘over-
regulated’ in the UK.254  As a result, he opined, the interests of the living became 
subjugated in the debate, with matters of principle being partially (and ‘needlessly’) 
compromised for utilitarian ends.  ‘These dilutions of the requirement for consent 
beg fundamental questions as to robustness of the central principle of consent in 
the Act’.255 
Bell also expressed concern that the ‘fundamental principle’ of informed consent 
had been surrendered in the 2004 Act, but his arguments centred on 
transplantation and on an absence of successful amendments to the Bill.256  Bell’s 
concerns related to s.43 of the 2004 Act which made it lawful for hospital 
authorities to take steps ‘for the purpose of preserving the part for use for 
transplantation and to retain the body for that purpose’.257  The practical technique 
in question was ‘cold perfusion’, whereby an organ, say a kidney, could be perfused 
with cooling fluid through a cannula inserted immediately after death in an attempt 
to maintain the organ as ‘viable’ for transplantation while efforts were made to 
obtain consent to the organ being removed.  Bell argued that acceptance of cold 
perfusion was but a step towards ‘presumed consent’. His points had been explored 
through probing amendments at Committee stage in the House of Commons which 
were resisted by Government.258  
Bell viewed the entire legislation as ‘inevitably’ a complex balance between respect 
for the individual and broader societal benefit.  Liddell and Hall considered the 
matter in depth within their scholarly assessment of the policy which underpinned 
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the 2004 Act.259 These authors’ starting point was a belief that, on legally 
controversial issues, legal policy should be based on ‘norms which represent an 
intersection amongst competing ethical positions [‘an overlapping consensus’+’260.  
They examined the amendments that were made during the Bill’s passage, 
described earlier in this Chapter, as a struggle for an ‘appropriate’ balance which 
had led to some striking shifts in the government’s legislative goals as well as some 
entrenched limits.261 Their conclusions were that, because an overlapping 
consensus emerges only ‘through sustained deliberation with a heightened sense of 
moral reciprocity’, the outcome (the 2004 Act) could be considered as a significant 
but incomplete success towards achieving such a consensus.  
In more detail, Liddell and Hall found that the government, by tending to 
proselytize a strict view that to use tissue without consent fundamentally 
disrespected a person and, by fiercely justifying its proposal on these grounds, 
failed to offer reasons which would reasonably persuade those who argued that the 
opinion of the immediate physical donor should not be privileged substantially 
beyond third persons in need or the public system of health and welfare.262 
However, in these authors’ view, the new legislation could be considered as a 
thorough attempt to tailor a law that all citizens could concede was reasonable, 
even though it did not wholly comport with their particular moral beliefs.263 
A similar position was reached by Lord Jenkin of Roding, perhaps through a less 
academic route.  During the Grand Committee stage, His Lordship had been 
disturbed by ‘the reluctance of the Minister to concede anything on any of the 
arguments that have been advanced, notwithstanding the huge distinction of a 
number of Members of the Committee who really do know what they are talking 
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about’264.   Later, at Third Reading, and after Government had made a major 
concession following defeat on an important amendment that ‘education on 
research techniques need not require prior consent’ *discussed earlier+, the same 
Lord Jenkin of Roding added that ‘this is a justification for the very long processes 
that we use in Parliament to put new legislation on to the statute book.’265 By my 
reading, the Government had held out, almost to the last, to ‘the golden thread’ 
argument (‘fierce justification’ in Liddell and Hall’s terms) and were defeated (not 
‘persuaded’) by a powerful lobby led by the Wellcome Trust and championed by 
Baroness Neuberger, as part of Lord Jenkin’s ‘very long processes’. 
Other commentators commented on the scope of the Act.   Brazier and Fovargue 
considered whether the Act might have sought to do too much.  By incorporating 
the storage, use and removal of the body and its parts from the living and the dead, 
and addressing transplantation in one Act, it was possible that insufficient attention 
had been paid to the particular issues raised by these individual practices and 
procedures.266 At the same time, these authors opined that an addition to the 
legislation, namely a presumed consent system for organ donation, could [with 
advantage] have been considered.267 
McHale joined Price and Bell in seeing danger in that the amendments made during 
the legitimation process may have swung too far from respect for individual 
autonomy and towards respect for the researcher.268  Further, McHale regretted 
the ‘lost opportunity’ to have considered a regulatory system for ‘the 
commercialization of tissue, intellectual property rights, genetic testing, 
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confidentiality and privacy'269, citing a recommendation of Kennedy and colleagues 
in the Bristol Interim Report270. 
3.6 Conclusion. 
I have tried to show that the 2004 Act was the result of a complex legislative 
process in which, during the phases of ‘inspiration’, ‘deliberation’, ‘formulation’ and 
‘legitimation’, the effects of past history, the climate of the time, and the 
differential influence of certain institutions and individuals could be seen in 
complex interplay.  The outcome, in respect of clinical science, education and 
research, was less of ‘an overlapping consensus’ reached through ‘sustained 
deliberation with a heightened sense of moral reciprocity’, than a ‘score-draw’ after 
a fiercely fought contest. It is understandable that the Minister wished to conclude 
with multiple handshakes: 
 We wanted the Bill to be based on consent, not least because of the very 
 tragic events at the Alder Hey and Bristol hospitals…We also wanted to  convince 
 the research and medical community that we were not trying to stifle some of the 
 excellent work being done.  I believe that the Bill achieves all that now… it will give 
 the medical and research community confidence that it is operating in an 
 environment that they understand, and one that they know that others understand 
 as well.  Our task has been to get the balance right between those two very 
 important principles. I think that the Bill achieves that.271  
Could matters have been handled better?  That question will be considered in 
Chapter Six.  Could matters have been handled differently?  The answer lies in 
Scotland. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
Tissue legislation in Scotland: ‘a more proportionate response’1? 
On March 16 2006, the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (‘2006 Act’) received 
Royal Assent.2  The purpose of this chapter is to explore why, with factors operative 
in the ‘inspiration’ phase of the 2006 Act apparently similar to those which 
preceded the Human Tissue Act 2004 (‘2004 Act’), the deliberation, formulation 
and legitimation phases were so different in tone and content. 
1. Background. 
News of Professor Anderson’s revelations in September 1999 about widespread 
‘holdings’ of hearts retained at PM in England and Wales, and the trenchant 
criticisms in the Bristol Interim Report which followed, of course reached Scotland. 
The press became engaged3, and public concern grew in relation to six hospitals in 
particular: The Royal Hospital for Sick Children, Glasgow (‘Yorkhill’); Royal Hospital 
for Sick Children, Edinburgh; Southern General Hospital, Glasgow; Aberdeen Royal 
Infirmary; Stirling Royal Infirmary; Crosshouse Hospital, Kilmarnock.4  By early 
December 1999, Yorkhill Hospital’s medical director admitted that the hospital may 
have failed to explain fully that individual organs might have been removed during 
PM examinations.5  
2 Response of Scottish Executive. 
2.1 Independent Review Group on Organ Retention (‘IRG’; ‘the Group’). 
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By August 2000 parents at Yorkhill began to press the Scottish Executive to hold a 
public inquiry into organ retention.6  On September 22, 2000, the Minister for 
Health and Community Care, Ms Susan Deacon MSP, announced the setting up of 
an independent review group, to be chaired by the legal academic, Professor Sheila 
McLean.7 
The Independent Review Group on Organ Retention had as its formal remit: 
[t]o review previous post-mortem practice in Scotland, in particular in relation to organ 
retention, and current documentation on consent and guidance, taking account of 
developments across the UK; to develop a Code of Practice for Scotland with particular 
emphasis on issues of informed consent and the most effective mechanism for keeping 
that Code of Practice under review; and to clarify current legal issues with a view to making 
recommendations.8 
The membership of the Review Group was designed to reflect a range of expertise 
and incorporated medical professionals, experts in legal and ethical issues, and 
parents. The independence of the Group ‘was maintained through its 
predominantly non-NHS membership’.9 
2.1.1 The work of IRG: crucial to ‘inspiration’, ‘deliberation’ and ‘formulation’. 
 Understanding IRG’s work in some detail may help to explain why its Reports were 
formally acknowledged to have been influential in determining the eventual form 
and content of the 2006 Act.10  
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 IRG’s worked in two main phases, together with a later Phase 3 which audited 
progress in implementing certain of the recommendations made in the Preliminary 
Report11.  Phase 1 was essentially an inquiry into past practices, and led to a 
‘Preliminary Report’, with recommendations, on February 6, 2001.12  The ‘Final 
Report’, the culmination of Phase 2, reviewed the existing law and made 
recommendations, and was published in November 2001.  IRG adopted a 
methodology that, it was pledged, would be characterised by ‘complete openness 
and transparency’.  In keeping with this commitment, the IRG website was 
constructed in a user-friendly manner which allowed ready access to the public, and 
the present researcher, of all proceedings, discussions and background papers.13 
2.1.1.1 Phase 1: methodology and findings. 
 IRG gathered information concerning past PM procedures using four main 
mechanisms.  First, written evidence was sought from around 150 organisations 
and individuals-the latter because of particular expertise in aspects of medicine, law 
and ethics.  In addition, all primary care and acute NHS trusts in Scotland were 
contacted and asked to provide detailed information relating to numbers of organs 
retained, and past and present consent procedures.  Second, advertisements were 
placed in the press (believed on advice to ensure coverage of approximately 75% of 
the population) inviting members of the public to share their views and experiences 
with the Group. In order to facilitate responses, a ‘relatives’ questionnaire’ was also 
drawn up for those who wished to use it.  Where the express permission of the 
individuals concerned was granted, letters, emails and completed questionnaires 
were made available on the IRG website and from the Secretariat.   Third, oral 
evidence was heard during 23 oral sessions from a total of 59 individuals 
representing  bereaved individuals and parent support groups, hospital trusts, 
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representatives of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, the British 
Medical Association, the Royal College of Nursing, Strathclyde Police, pathologists, 
paediatricians, neuropathologists, autopsy technicians, funeral service providers, 
and those involved in considering or carrying out research which involved use of 
retained organs. Transcriptions were made available to the public.  Fourth, visits 
were made to a number of hospitals where it was known that organs had been 
retained.14   
The findings of IRG in respect of organ and tissue retention at post-mortem and of a 
relative absence of ‘informed’ consent were, not surprisingly, similar in kind if not in 
scale to the position in England and Wales already described in Chapter Four: 
considerable distress had been caused to relatives, aggravated by the difficulties 
associated with trying to find out whether any organs continued to be retained and 
the fate of those organs; there had been  mistakes in recording of information in 
hospitals, and  a lack of effective communication.15  [The inquiry of Trusts 
throughout Scotland ‘in the short time available’ had revealed that a total of 5960 
organs were being retained at that time.  Most were hearts or brains, and there 
was ‘absolutely no evidence’ of any cases of retention of a body’s entire set of 
organs.16  An independent audit, recommended by IRG and later undertaken on the 
instructions of the Auditor General for Scotland, revealed that the accurate figure 
was 10862- the discrepancies being explained mainly by more accurate counting 
and the addition of museum specimens.17] 
Although IRG found no evidence of the ‘shocking practices’ discovered at Alder Hey, 
there was no doubt in its collective mind that past practice in Scotland had led to a 
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significant breakdown in trust between relatives and the medical profession.18  It 
had been clear from early in IRG’s inquiries that ‘the fundamental issue of concern’ 
about hospital post-mortems (HPMs) related to consent.19 There was a related 
need for relatives to be properly informed as to whether a post mortem was being 
instructed by the Procurator Fiscal or being requested by the hospital itself.20  
Although consent of relatives was not required for Fiscal post-mortems (FPMs), IRG 
found that past practice in relation to those PMs had been ‘seriously deficient’ in a 
number of respects. The majority of representations to the Group had related to 
alleged failures of the Fiscal service in the past to provide information and listen to 
concerns from parents.21 
2.1.1.2 Phase 1: recommendations. 
IRG came to a shared view that PM examination should properly be regarded as an 
integral part of patient care which continued after death.  It followed that the 
conduct of PMs was an issue of clinical governance with ultimate responsibility for 
the process resting with the chief executive of the relevant NHS Trust.22 This 
conclusion, which may have been influenced by those in the Review Group with 
practical involvement with organ transplantation, would come to have far reaching 
consequences within the subsequent legislative process. 
The Preliminary Report made 18 recommendations, mainly about HPMs, which 
were intended to ensure that the role of relatives, particularly parents, in the PM 
process was recognised and respected.23  The emphasis throughout was on specific 
consent (which could be withdrawn) for each stage or procedure.  Full information 
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should be provided by a senior member of the medical staff or another appropriate 
person at every stage for those who wanted it, but those who did not want 
information should not have it forced on them.  
A time limit of 5 years was recommended on retention of organs then currently 
retained, to ensure that families had sufficient time to consider their choices.  
During that period, relatives should have every opportunity to reclaim organs or 
tissue blocks/slides, if they so wished, and their entitlement to do so should be 
made clear by a wide variety of methods including sensitive advertising, public 
information notices on television, use of GP surgeries, libraries and other means. 
Under no circumstances should relatives be approached by the hospital regarding 
the current retention or disposal of organs about which they will have no 
knowledge. Relatives should be given every opportunity to inquire, but the wishes 
of those who do not wish to know must be respected.  
Remarkably, in May 2001 IRG received a communication from representatives of 
the major parent support groups, expressing their concern that the recommended 
5 year moratorium on the use of unclaimed organs and tissue might result in 
valuable research being unable to proceed during that time, with potentially 
harmful consequences for families and individuals.24 As a consequence, IRG 
modified their recommendation, such that, as part of the continuing campaign to 
inform relatives of their rights in this respect, it should be made clear that research 
which was non-destructive (defined as observational, or through taking only minute 
pieces of tissue) and important (defined as likely to contribute to understanding of 
diagnosis or therapy) may be carried out on currently retained tissue after a period 
of one year (later revised, after consultation, to six months25) from the start of the 
5-year period.26 
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In accordance with its remit, IRG produced a Code of Practice for Hospital Post-
Mortems, accompanied by template consent forms and information leaflets for use 
throughout Scotland.27  Of crucial importance, IRG recommended that the Clinical 
Standards Board for Scotland should be encouraged to incorporate a standard 
relating to the PM process in their generic standards as the most effective way of 
monitoring implementation of the Code of Practice for HPMs.28 
IRG’s recommendations concerning HPMs were addressed to the Minister of Health 
and Community Care.  In addition, the Group made recommendations regarding 
FPMs for the Lord Advocate to consider29 which arose from their firm view that 
FPMs must be dealt with in as sensitive a manner as were HPMs.30  Issues identified 
included the need for relatives to be informed (as fully as the Fiscal’s justiciary role 
would allow) about the nature and purpose of a FPM by staff trained to undertake 
sensitive discussions.  Steps should be taken to close the then present 
communication gap between the Fiscal, pathologist and relatives at the point 
where the Fiscal had decided that organs retained were no longer required for his 
purposes.31  
2.1.1.3 The early response of the Scottish Executive. 
Shortly before the Preliminary Report was published, IRG held a public meeting in 
Glasgow on January 25, 2001.  The Minister for Health and Community Care was 
not present, which provoked adverse criticism from the audience.   The next day 
the Minister gave public assurances that the removal of organs without consent 
was a practice that had no place in any hospital in Scotland or elsewhere, and that 
new procedures were already in place which required a family’s permission if any 
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organs were to be retained.  ‘I want everyone- families and clinicians- to be in no 
doubt that this process must be followed’.32 On publication of the Preliminary 
Report, the Scottish Executive gave a commitment to implement all its 
recommendations.33 34  In the Scottish Parliament two days later, the Minister of 
Health and Community Care said, in response to a question, ‘we are now taking 
forward a significant programme of measures to improve communication and 
consent procedures and to change the culture’.  The Minister added, perhaps 
somewhat prematurely, ‘we are backing that with major changes to the law’.35 
2.1.1.4 Phase 2: method of working. 
Phase 2 entailed considering current legal provisions and making detailed 
recommendations for change.  IRG’s method of working was to identify the issues 
that needed to be addressed, picking up on the concerns expressed by families and 
health professionals about the current legal framework.  Each of these topics 
formed the subject of a position paper written by the member or members of the 
Group with the greatest expertise in that subject. Each paper reviewed the state of 
the law in relation to that issue and outlined any ambiguities or deficiencies, as well 
as offering proposals for legislative change where appropriate.  Once IRG’s 
recommendations had been clarified, a meeting was held on October 15, 2001 with 
parents’ support groups to explain to them the way in which its thinking had been 
evolving and to test the degree to which it satisfied the need to be sure that there 
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could be no recurrence of past practice.  Those who attended the meeting 
appeared to be satisfied with the thinking outlined.36 
2.1.1.5 Recommendations in ‘Final Report’ of Phase 2. 
2.1.1.5.1 New legislation needed for Scotland. 
Because the Human Tissue Act 1961 had not been listed in Schedule 5 to the 
Scotland Act37, and therefore was not reserved to the Westminster Parliament, the 
Scottish Parliament had the competence to amend the Act as it applied to Scotland.  
Taking advantage of that situation IRG made as its first recommendation: 
Given the problems both of style and of content in the Human Tissue Act 1961, the 
Review Group strongly recommends that it should be replaced by new legislation 
taking full account of our recommendations.38 
[It was noted that some issues, such as regulation of the health professions, data 
protection and genetics, were reserved to Westminster; and that the Review Group 
had taken this into account in shaping its recommendations.39] 
2.1.1.5.2 Authorisation. 
The major recommendations concentrated on the law as it related to hospital post-
mortem examinations, and centred on the need for ‘authorisation’, coupled to the 
imposition of a legal penalty for failure to obtain authorisation or to depart 
subsequently from the terms of any authorisation given40.  The concept of 
‘authorisation’ had been developed and strongly preferred by IRG to ‘consent’ 
during its discussions, and the Final Report emphasised that ‘*w+e are firmly 
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committed to its use’.41  The reasoning of IRG proceeded in several stages, and 
began with consideration of the position of the infant or young child.  First, it was 
noted that the authority granted to parents by the common law of consent was 
confined to decisions which were in the ‘best interests’ of their child.42  IRG found it 
‘understandably difficult’ to use the notion of ‘best interests’ in the context of the 
deceased.   IRG recognised but ultimately rejected the argument  that, since the 
post-mortem examination of a child may be in the best interests of surviving or 
future family members, and since the interests of many others may be enhanced by 
accurate diagnosis, sound medical research and the proper education and training 
of doctors, the deceased child as a member of the family concerned, or simply of 
the ‘human family’, had a continuing interest (albeit not an experienced one) in 
these benefits of his or her brief life and untimely death accruing to others. 43 But 
this interpretation of interests, while possible, was also contestable.  In the view of 
IRG, it expanded the concept too broadly to be safely used in the context of any 
attempt to develop the common law understanding of parental consent, which 
interpreted ‘best interests’ in terms of benefit accruing to the child himself or 
herself.44 
IRG explored other possible routes to explain the legitimacy of the role of parents 
‘clearly and unequivocally’.  It rejected a property-based model, holding the view 
that- irrespective of whether or not a deceased person remained a person for legal 
purposes- it would be ‘inappropriate’ to use the language of property about what 
had once been a person.45  IRG next explored ‘possession’.  Although this was a 
term familiar in law (and could be found in the Human Tissue Act 1961(in which a 
person could be ‘in lawful possession of the body’), IRG believed the concept of 
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possession to be ‘inadequate to clarify and reinforce the very real interests’ that 
parents had in their children, even after their death.46 
IRG was in much greater accord with an analysis of the family unit which drew in 
particular on the obligations and powers which flowed from the concept of 
parenting itself, quoting Page: 
parenthood is seen as having a special value in itself and not simply as a means to 
the care and protection of children and the continuation of the human race.  This 
special value attaching to parenthood constitutes the ultimate foundation of 
parental rights47;  
and Schoeman: 
[t]he relationship between parent and infant involves an awareness of a kind of 
union between people which is perhaps more suitably described in poetic-spiritual 
language than in analytical terminology.  We share ourselves with those with whom 
we are intimate...this makes for non-abstract moral relationships in which talk 
about rights of others, respect for others, or even welfare of others, is to a certain 
extent irrelevant.48 
IRG opined that if parental decision making in respect of a deceased child could be 
thought of as deriving from the value of parenting, then it could be logically 
distanced from the constraints which arose from the legal concept of parental 
consent, most notably the requirement to act in the best interests of the child.  By 
viewing the relationship between parent and child in this way, rather than simply as 
an amalgam of legal rights, obligations and interests, the parental role was placed 
in the right context.49 Further, recognition of the intimate bond between parent 
and child, and the privacy of the family unit (as espoused within Article 8 of the 
Human Rights Act 199850 reinforced the priority of parental decision- making even 
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after death.51  IRG concluded that the use of the word ‘authorisation’ rather than 
‘consent’ strengthened the role of parents in decision-making and clarified the 
scope of their (legally valid) decision-making powers. ‘Authorisation’ also met the 
concerns of parents who did not wish to receive information about post- mortem 
examinations and/or the subsequent removal and retention of organs and tissue, 
but who did not object to these practices, because ‘authorisation’ was not 
constrained by the requirement to have prior provision of, in this case unwanted, 
information.52   
IRG further recommended that amendments to the law were needed to make clear 
that parents should have ultimate authority to authorise or refuse retention and 
use of organs and tissues, the underlying principles being identical to those of 
authorisation for a post-mortem examination itself.  Information about the 
examination given at the stage of seeking authorisation must give clear 
understanding that a properly conducted post-mortem will require (IRG’s emphasis) 
removal and retention of certain parts for 4 to 6 weeks.  This should lead to 
discussion about a range of possible funeral arrangements.53 If parents did not wish 
to be given information, and refused to authorise a past- mortem, this must be 
respected.  If they did not wish to be given information, but nevertheless did 
authorise retention and use, IRG recommended that such organs and tissue may be 
retained and used for legitimate education and research.54 
With regard to post-mortem examination, including retention and use, of a ‘mature 
child’ (recognised in Scots law to be legally competent to enter any transaction 
when aged 16y55 and to have certain specific legal capacities from the age of 12y56 ) 
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or an adult, IRG recommended that prior written instructions should be respected, 
irrespective of the views of relatives  The proposed new legislation should also 
recognise the validity of verbally expressed wishes in the presence of two witnesses 
at any stage in life (provided this had not been subsequently retracted).  Where 
there had been no prior express wish, authorisation should be sought from the 
most senior available in a hierarchy (to be developed) of relatives and ‘those with 
the closest relationship to the deceased person’.57 
2.1.1.5.3 Tissue blocks and slides. 
IRG dealt separately with issues concerning tissue blocks and slides.  The Group had 
previously opined that tissue blocks and slides may induce a different ‘personal’ 
response as compared with organs.58  In addition, it was emphasised that the 
revised information leaflet and forms for authorisation which were already being 
introduced throughout Scotland, as recommended in the Preliminary Report59, had 
made it no longer possible to retain blocks and slides without authorisation.60  This 
view led IRG to an important recommendation: that provision of authorisation to 
conduct a post-mortem would, unless expressly refused by those with the authority 
to provide it, necessarily include agreement to the preparation of blocks and slides; 
and that interest in these prepared blocks and slides should pass to the hospital 
authority who may retain and use them as part of the hospital record, or for 
legitimate education and research.61  [This recommendation was in accord with the 
conclusions elsewhere of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.62] 
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2.1.1.5.4 Medical education and research. 
IRG made several important recommendations about medical education and 
research (the value of which had been supported by all parent groups in their 
evidence63). First, the form authorising a hospital post-mortem should state clearly 
that any authorisation for research use may be either specific or general, and that a 
later change of mind would be respected.  Information about research uses should 
be freely and publically available.  Second, the Group noted that in some 
circumstances non- invasive research may be conducted on retained slides in order 
to improve diagnosis, and cited with approval a specific example of then recent 
research on retained slides of lung tissue from ‘cot death’ infants.64  ‘Such non-
structured research does not require ethics committee approval, and we do not 
recommend that it should.’65  This advice would lead later to significant differences 
between the law in England and Wales, and Scotland, with regard to Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome (SIDS), and is discussed further below.  Next, IRG recognised in 
principle that financial issues could arise regarding the use of retained organs and 
tissues for research use.   The Group was against the use of concepts such as 
‘ownership’, while recognising that it was no longer appropriate to suggest that the 
human body had no value in financial terms.  Clarification of the law in this area 
was recommended.66  Last, IRG was critical of the adequacy of scrutiny of research, 
and proposed a range of measures to improve the competence and performance of 
Research Ethics Committees.67 
2.1.1.5.5 Organ donation.  
IRG strayed from its brief by noting that some of the issues dealt with in the Final 
Report, particularly the weight to be given to the wishes of the deceased as 
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opposed to their surviving relatives, were central to the process of seeking 
agreement to organ donation, even though attitudes to organ transplantation and 
post- mortem examination may be very different.68  It was recommended that the 
Scottish Executive, in implementing any changes to existing legislation as a result of 
the Final Report, would need to give careful consideration to reformulating the 
legislative basis for organ donation, either by way of a clarified combined Act or by 
a stand-alone statute dealing with transplantation.  IRG indicated that it was aware 
that the Scottish Parliament’s Health & Community Care Committee had, by 
chance, already begun to consider the law in respect of organ transplantation.69  
2.2 Response of Scottish Executive to the Final Report. 
2.2.1 Consultations. 
The Final report was published on November 23, 2001.  On that day the Minister for 
Health and Community Care underlined the Executive’s commitment to change the 
legislation, with formal consultation on the Report as the next stage.70  
Consultations closed on March 31 2002, and revealed broad support for the 
approach which had been taken by the Review Group.71  Over the next two years, 
the Scottish Executive kept in close touch with the steps being taken in England and 
Wales towards revised human tissue legislation, principally through a senior 
Scottish official’s presence as an observer during all stages of the Department of 
Health’s planning and implementation process for the 2004 Act.72 
 At the same time, the Executive pursued a path towards separate Scottish 
legislation by consulting further, and separately, on: legislation relating to post-
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mortem examinations73; legislation relating to retention of organs74; existing 
provisions and licensing arrangements of the Anatomy Act 198475; legislation 
relating to organ and tissue donation and transplantation76.  [With regard to organ 
transplantation, it should be noted that both IRG in its Final Report77, and the 
[coincidental] report of the Scottish Transplant Group in 200278, had preferred that 
any new legislation regarding transplantation should be separate from any 
legislation concerning post-mortem examinations.  As will be seen below, the 
Executive decided to separate these issues within a single Bill79].  The Executive also 
began a process of consultation with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
which would lead eventually to improvements in communication between 
Procurator Fiscals, doctors and relatives80, and to agreed standards for Fiscal post-
mortems.81 
2.2.2 Compensation made to parents. 
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Although compensation is unlikely to have been a significant influence on the 
development of new legislation, the following details, made available by the Central 
Legal Office of NHS National Services Scotland, are included for the purposes of 
comparison with agreements reached in England (see Chapter Four, 2.2.4). 
 A scheme for compensation was agreed by the Scottish Executive on what seems 
to have been a ‘formally informal’ basis. There was no primary or subordinate 
legislation involved.  The parents were not required to prove any actual loss or 
damage, but were eligible to participate if it was confirmed that they had a child 
who had undergone post mortem and whose body parts had been retained. The 
money came from the Executive and not the Health Boards, but the Central Legal 
Office administered the scheme during 2003-4.82 
A single litigant pursued a separate case.  The case did not proceed to a final 
hearing on the evidence, but there was a Procedural Roll Debate in the Court of 
Session on the competency of the action.83 
3. ‘Legitimation’: the Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill (‘The Bill’). 
3.1 Scottish legislative process: passage of a Public Bill. 
Inserted below is a diagrammatic summary of the stages in the passage of a Public 
Bill through the Scottish legislative process.84  
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 Of relevance is the definition of an Executive Bill, which is ‘a public Bill introduced 
by a Cabinet Secretary or Minister of the Scottish Government to give effect to 
262 
 
Executive policy’.1  Much informed by IRG’s Reports, supplemented by the 
extensive and multilayered consultative process outlined above, a draft Executive 
Bill, titled the Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill [SP Bill 42], was prepared and introduced 
in the Parliament on June 3, 2005 by Andy Kerr MSP.  Stage 1 commenced on 
September 8, 2005 with the Health Committee as the lead committee.  The Stage 1 
(general principles) debate took place on November 30 2005, Stage 2 comprised 
further meetings of the Health Committee to consider amendments during 
December 2005 and January 2006, and the Bill was passed following the Stage 3 
parliamentary debate on February 2, 2006.  Royal Assent was given on March 16, 
2006.2 
3.2 Policy Memorandum regarding the Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill.3 
The development of policy by the Scottish Executive to which the Bill was intended 
to bring effect was set out (as was required by Rules4 under the Scotland Act 1998) 
in a Policy Memorandum which accompanied the Bill as introduced.  
3.2.1 Overall policy intentions. 
The policy intention was to repeal for Scotland the Human Tissue Act 1961 and 
replace it with legislation containing ‘distinct provisions appropriate to Scotland’ 
relating to organ donation and transplantation from deceased donors, and to 
hospital post mortem examinations; to amend and incorporate in the new 
legislation the provisions in the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 relating to living 
donors; and to amend the Anatomy Act 1984 to broaden the definition of 
‘anatomical examination’; to address public concerns about use of bodies and body 
parts in public displays, and to allow the post of HM Inspector of Anatomy for 
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Scotland to continue following changes made by the Human Tissue Act 2004.5  The 
legislation would make provision to allow the Scottish Ministers to arrange with a 
public authority anywhere in the UK to assist them with certain of their functions 
under the Bill, and, by regulations, power to amend the Act in order to give effect 
to Community obligations relating to material consisting of human cells. 
3.2.2 Transplantation. 
It is striking, in a Bill whose origins lay in considerable part in the distress caused by 
organ and tissue retention at post-mortem, that the first section should be 
concerned with transplantation.  Further, the first clauses in this first section set out 
the duties of Ministers (my emphasis) in this regard: 
s.1(1) It is the duty of the Scottish Ministers to (a) promote, support and develop 
programmes of transplantation; (b) ) promote information and awareness about 
the donation for transplantation of parts of a human body.6 
The Executive’s intention was that ‘the new legislation for Scotland should be firmly 
rooted in the positive attitudes towards organ and tissue donation and 
transplantation held by 90% of the population’.7  At the same time, the aim was to 
ensure that the position in Scotland remained consistent with that of the rest of the 
UK.8   The intention was to apply the concept of ‘authorisation’, as developed by 
IRG, ‘in order to recognise that this is an active decision taken by someone in a 
position of control’.9  Arguments in favour of ‘presumed consent’ had been 
considered by the Executive but were rejected, first because it was important that 
the fundamental principle on which organ donation rested should be consistent 
throughout the UK, but equally from the Executive’s belief that offering organs as a 
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‘gift’ was an important concept to help maintain public confidence and support for 
transplantation at its (then) 90% level.10 
3.2.3 PM examinations. 
The Policy Memorandum confirmed that the provisions in the Bill were intended to 
give expression to the principles set out by IRG11, and thereby fulfilled a 
commitment to change the law which had first been given in the autumn of 200012. 
The approach of including the minimum in primary legislation, as recommended by 
IRG, had been assisted by the acceptance by the Executive that a HPM should 
properly be regarded as part of the continuum of care provided by NHS Scotland; as 
a consequence of which NHS Quality Improvement Scotland had already 
implemented the recommendation in IRG’s Preliminary Report by developing 
clinical standards for the HPM process, made mandatory in all NHS hospitals.13 
With regard to HPMs, the examination itself and the purposes for which retained 
material may be used must be ‘authorised’ by an adult with capacity, a mature 
child, a nominee, the deceased’s ‘nearest relative’ *from a hierarchy+. In the case of 
children under 12, or between the ages of 12 and 16 who had left no wishes, 
authorisation must be given by the person or persons having parental rights or 
responsibilities in respect of the child.14 The framework of authorisation would be 
underpinned by standard authorisation forms and information leaflets which had 
already been developed for use throughout Scotland (and whose content would be 
specified in Regulations to be made under the Bill).15 The forms would make a clear 
distinction between: retention of tissue blocks and slides, the creation of which 
was, as a fact (emphasis in Memorandum), an integral part of the post-mortem 
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examination and which would form part of the deceased person’s medical record; 
and organs, which should only be retained in exceptional circumstances, and which 
therefore would require separate and specific authorisation.  This distinction, the 
Memorandum stated, also reflected ‘the much greater emotional significance of 
organs’.16 
3.2.4 An absence of provision regarding tissue from the living. 
A striking feature of the Bill was that, in contrast with the Human Tissue Act 2004, it 
contained no provisions in respect of surplus or residual tissue from the living.  This 
was not an oversight.  The Policy Memorandum explained: 
Tissue donation from the living is a different matter from living organ donation. 
Bone and other tissue are usually regarded as waste products, in that they would 
normally be discarded from an operation or a diagnostic investigation such as a 
biopsy.  Provisions relating to surplus or residual tissue appear in the Human Tissue 
Act 2004. The Executive’s policy, however, is that the arrangements for the 
authorisation of the use of surplus tissue can be dealt with satisfactorily by 
guidance and an appropriate authorisation form. It sees no need to introduce 
measures in this area more stringent than those which apply to the consent a living 
person gives to the carrying out of an operation. These proposals were included in 
the consultation and no representations have been received objecting to this 
approach. The guidance will, however, be consistent with that issued by the Human 
Tissue Authority under the 2004 Act, since obtaining and using human tissue for 
research purposes should be neither easier nor more difficult in Scotland than 
other parts of the UK. There is the further safeguard that all research involving 
human tissue will always require the approval of a Research Ethics Committee.17 
 
3.2.5 Penalties. 
One of the main criticisms of the 1961 Act was that it contained no penalties for 
non-compliance with the regime it set out for HPMs. The Bill addressed that 
criticism directly by including penalty provisions. The level of penalties equated to 
those set out in the 2004 Act.18  
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3.2.6 Inspection and regulation. 
The Executive had decided that it was unnecessary to provide for a system of 
inspection and regulation of HPMs such as was provided in the Human Tissue Act 
2004, in part in recognition of the deterrent effect of the penalty provisions, but 
largely because of the role of NHS Quality Improvement Scotland had been 
undertaking, since 2003, in reviewing performance against its HPM standards.19  
The standards had been developed with strong input from family support groups, 
and were mandatory on those in the NHS providing this service. In addition, the on-
going reviews against standards included strong representation from those who 
were not health professionals. 
 The Bill nevertheless secured that the Scottish Ministers could ask the Human 
Tissue Authority to exercise any of its functions in Scotland on their behalf, 
including those of inspection and regulation, if it were thought necessary to do so.20 
3.2.7 Examinations instructed by the Procurator Fiscal. 
With regard to FPMs, the Bill provided that tissue samples retained should become 
part of the deceased person’s medical record once the Fiscal had indicated that 
they were no longer required for his or her purposes, and could be retained and 
used for diagnostic purposes and audit without the need for authorisation from the 
nearest relative.  Tissue samples or whole organs no longer needed for the Fiscal’s 
purposes could be used for research, education or training, provided proper 
authorisation had been given for these uses.21  The Memorandum emphasised that 
the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service were aware of the importance of 
good communication with the family, especially of the need to inform them 
whether any organs had been retained as a result of the post-mortem examination. 
The new arrangements for the authorisation of educational or research use of 
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organs or tissue samples no longer needed for the Fiscal’s purposes would require a 
process of clear notification by the Fiscal that his or her purposes were complete, 
and this was provided for in the Bill.22  
3.2.8 Anatomical examination. 
The policy intentions in the Bill with regard to anatomical examination reflected the 
outcome of the prior consultation on the Anatomy Act 1984. 23   The definition of 
‘anatomical examination’ in the 1984 Act should be amended so that it would not 
be restricted to dissection but to any act that is done for [surgical] teaching, 
training, studying or research purpose on a body. The Bill also addressed public 
concerns over the use of bodies and body parts in public exhibitions under the guise 
of education or art.  An attempt had been made to display bodies as part of the 
2003 Edinburgh Festival Fringe, and considerable controversy had been raised 
elsewhere in the UK [as discussed in Chapter Two] by the “Bodyworks” exhibition. 
However, the 1984 Act as then framed did not allow any action to be taken to 
prevent such displays so long as the bodies had been acquired and dissected 
outside the UK. The policy intention was therefore to take on sole power for 
Scottish Ministers to licence the public exhibitions of anatomical specimens, or 
public dissections, for the purpose of education, training and research into 
morphology.24 The third principal intention was to establish structures to enable 
the post of HM Inspector of Anatomy for Scotland to be continued following 
legislative changes in England and Wales.25  
3.2.9 Miscellaneous provisions. 
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In addition, the Bill made provision to regulate the importation of dead bodies or 
body parts and to prohibit the use of such bodies for financial gain, in line with 
changes in the rest of the UK.26 
3.2.10 Arrangements by Scottish Ministers for assistance. 
The 2005-6 Bill and subsequent 2006 Act were helped to remain relatively slim and 
focused by a policy intention27, and later provision28, that Scottish Ministers may 
make arrangements with other UK public authorities to undertake any of their 
functions.  In practice, the Scottish Government arranged for the HTA, on its behalf, 
to: approve transplants from living donors; license organisations that use human 
tissue to treat patients; and sanction analysis of DNA without consent in specified 
circumstances.29 
3.3 The Health Committee (see also 3.5.2). 
A noteworthy feature of the legislative process in Scotland is the importance of the 
committees within Stage 1 of the legitimation process itself.   Extensive scrutiny is 
given to a Bill by the ‘lead’ committee before it comes before Parliament for 
debate.   Following the introduction of the Bill on June 9 2005, it was referred to the 
Health Committee (‘the Committee’) which, a few days later, decided to obtain 
written views over the summer months from a wide range of bodies about the 
draft.  Beginning on September 8, the Committee began Stage 1 formally, and held 
a total of nine meetings over the next two months at which written and oral 
evidence was considered.  The Deputy Minister for Health and Community Care and 
his officials, Professor Sheila McLean (chair of IRG), John Forsythe (chair of the 
Scottish Transplant Group), HM Inspector for Anatomy, and the Solicitor General 
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for Scotland were followed by a stream of witnesses which included representatives 
of two parents’ associations, a diversity of health bodies, the Procurator Fiscal 
Society, the Law Society of Scotland, the Medical and Dental Defence Union, four 
Royal Colleges, BMA,  MRC, Wellcome Trust and other research bodies, the Scottish 
Commission on Bioethics, the Mental Welfare Foundation, Scottish Museums, and a 
number of expert witnesses ad personam.   
The discussions of the Committee with witnesses were extensive and discursive.   
All proceedings and submitted papers were published in the Official Report of the 
Health Committee.30  The outcome of the Committee’s work in Stage 1 was the 
publication on November 22, 2005 of its detailed, 9500 word, Stage 1 Report on the 
Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill.31  
  The Committee reported in the following terms: 
The Committee acknowledges that the Bill deals with important issues which require to 
be handled sensitively. While the Committee supports the Bill, it has throughout this 
report made a series of recommendations about how it might be improved and about 
action to be taken to support effective implementation. The Committee asks that the 
Deputy Minister notes the contents of this report and responds positively to its 
recommendations. 
With this caveat, the Committee recommends to the Parliament that the 
general principles of the Bill be approved.32 
3.4 Parliamentary stages of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill. 
The Stage 1 Report, accompanied by Explanatory Notes33 and a Policy 
Memorandum34 from the Executive, and further briefing papers from the Scottish 
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Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) on each of the three main sections of the 
Bill35 36 37, were used to prepare MSPs in advance of the Stage 1 (general principles) 
debate on November 30, 2005.  The principles of the proposed legislation were 
introduced by the Deputy Minister for Health and Community Care, Lewis 
Macdonald MSP, who affirmed that: 
 The bill is rooted in a strong process of consultation and seeks to respond to the 
 views that we have elicited both from health care professionals and from the 
 general public, while recognising that views sometimes conflict and that there is 
 then a need for a balanced judgment...38 
The Minister emphasised that the legislation was based on the ‘fundamental 
principle’ of authorisation39, and highlighted two objectives in particular: restoring 
confidence in the post-mortem examination process (a procedure which ‘positively 
benefits the living’); and boosting organ donation rates.40  In the debate which 
followed, a total of fifteen MEPs spoke, all in support.  The tenor was captured by 
the Minister who, in closing the debate, said that he had a strong sense of a 
consensus in the chamber, both on the general principles of the Bill and on the 
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sensitivities which would require to be acknowledged and respected during later 
stages of the Bill’s progress.41 
The Stage 2 process, which has analogies with ‘Committee Stage’ scrutiny in 
Westminster, began with a formal, point by point written response from the 
Minister to the issues raised by the Health Committee in its Stage 1 Report.  This 
was followed by papers which listed amendments to the Bill42  brought forward by 
the Executive as a result of three strands of argument which had arisen from: the 
Stage 1 Report, written and oral evidence given to the Health Committee by 
institutions or individuals, and points raised in the Stage 1 debate in Parliament.  
The Health Committee itself sat twice, with the Minister and officials in 
attendance.43  The major Executive amendments concerned disability and 
incapacity, in particular: to make provision for authorisation or withdrawal of 
authorisation by a person who was blind or unable to write; and provisions to 
ensure that adults with incapacity would be given the same degree of protection as 
children in relation to organ donation for transplantation.44 In addition to Executive 
amendments, all of which were accepted by the Committee, ten groups of 
amendments were brought forward by members of the Committee, acting in some 
instances as spokesperson for Parliamentary colleagues or an outside body. All 
were withdrawn or defeated in a vote.  In addition, the Minister, having heard 
further discussion, agreed to bring forward further amendments at Stage 3. 
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The Stage 3 debate in Parliament on the Bill, as amended at Stage 245, took place on 
February 2, 2006, and included consideration of a further, largely technical, list of 
amendments brought forward by the Executive, and, separately, of three proposals 
by MSPs46.   As had occurred in the late stages of the debates in Westminster on the 
Human Tissue Bill, the major issue moved from the backbenches took the form of a 
last ditch attempt to introduce provisions for ‘presumed consent’ for organ 
transplantation.  As in Westminster, the motion was defeated (18 /87)47.  The 
Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill was passed electronically and unanimously at 
17.02h.48 
 Six weeks later, on March 16, 2006, the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 received 
Royal Assent.49 
3.5. Further scrutiny of aspects of the 2006 Act. 
3.5.1 Why separate legislation for Scotland? 
Why did Scotland decide to legislate separately from England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland?  The reasoning was set out during the second meeting of the Health 
Committee at Stage 1.50  First, and probably most important, was the fact that ‘we 
could’, in that legislation in these matters had been devolved [and that the Minister 
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had made a very early public commitment to changing the law51].  Second, there 
had already been important background work undertaken by Professor McLean’s 
IRG and the Scottish Transplant Group.  By 2003, as a result of a recommendation in 
the Preliminary Report of IRG, standards for hospital post mortem examinations 
had already been developed and published by NHS Quality Improvement Scotland52 
and had become mandatory throughout the NHS in Scotland.  Further, both IRG and 
STG had recommended legislation for transplantation separate from post mortem 
examinations.  A senior Health Department official told the Health Committee that 
‘I would like to think that the approach that we have taken has enabled us to focus 
and fine-tune the provisions *for Scotland+’. He continued: 
 It is terribly important, however, that there should be a broadly consistent 
 approach across the United Kingdom, and all the health departments have been 
 working closely together on the primary legislation and, even more so, on the 
 regulations and codes of practice that underpin them. That is important in relation 
 to living transplantation, where we want the Human Tissue Authority, set up under 
 the 2004 Act, to discharge that function for Scotland. It did not make sense to set 
 up a separate body in Scotland, given the numbers involved.53 [see also 3.2.10, 
 above]. 
Professor McLean added three further reasons for having specific Scottish 
legislation: IRG, in comparison to Bristol and Alder Hey, had been asked to consider 
post-mortems in adults [she did not mention Isaacs]; the law in Scotland, compared 
to England and Wales, differed in respect of older children; and ‘finally, there was 
an opportunity to modify the basis on which people opted into the system’.54 
As a senior official had indicated, the Executive was aware of the need to seek to 
ensure that legislation in Scotland was congruent with that elsewhere in the UK.  As 
put by the Deputy Minister during the stage 1 debate: 
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 There is equivalent legislation in the Human Tissue Act 2004, which applies south of 
 the border. Although the bill reflects Scottish circumstances, we have also worked 
 hard at  official level with colleagues in the Department of Health to ensure that the 
 principles in both sets of legislation are the same and that there is, as far as 
 possible, a consistent approach. We recognise that that is important both for 
 members of the public and for health care professionals who will have to work with 
 both pieces of legislation.55 
3.5.2 The role of Committees within the Scottish Parliament. 
The Scottish Parliament’s Guidance on Public Bills sets out an invariable procedure, 
under Rules within the Scotland Act 199856 (see also diagram at 3.1, above).  In 
Stage 1, once a bill has been introduced, the Parliamentary Bureau refers it to 
whichever committee has the bill within its remit.  The lead committee’s role is to 
report to the Parliament on the general principles of the bill, to inform the Stage 1 
debate on the principles.  Provided there is Parliamentary acceptance of the 
principles, the bill is referred back to the lead committee for detailed ‘line by line’ 
consideration.  It is at this stage that the Committee will consider amending the bill. 
During the first and second stages, committees may take evidence and request 
information from ministers (who may respond in writing or in person).  Finally, the 
amended bill, if passed out of the committee, is then referred to the whole 
chamber.  At this third stage, the chamber may pass the bill or refer it back to the 
committee for further ‘stage two consideration’. 57 58 
According to the analysis of Johnston, the Scottish Parliament had been ‘bold and 
innovative in facilitating access and participation’ during its first decade of 
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existence.59  Committees had firmly established themselves as ‘the engine room of 
the parliament’.60  The scrutiny role of a committee, ostensibly to look at the 
‘general principles’, had tended to look much more closely at bills and might include 
suggestions for amendments to the Executive.  This, Johnston opined, had allowed 
for much greater public involvement in the legislative process than existed at 
Westminster.61 The details of the consultations undertaken by the Health 
Committee (see 3.3 above) give support to Johnston’s view, in so far as tissue 
legislation is concerned. 
3.5.3 The wider consultative process. 
The openness and thoroughness of the consultation process, the ready public 
availability of background, briefing and evidentiary documents and transcripts of all 
proceedings, were impressive.  It has transpired that this was not because the issue 
of post-mortems and human organs was especially sensitive (although it was) but 
because of the general approach to consultation adopted by the Scottish 
Government and promulgated on their web site ‘About Scottish Government 
Consultations’.62 Three abstracts give a flavour: 
 Consultation is an essential and important aspect of Scottish Government working 
 methods; 
 Copies of all the responses received to consultation exercises (except those where 
the individual or organisation requested confidentiality) are placed in the Scottish 
Government library at Saughton House, Edinburgh; 
 Within the consultation section of the Scottish Government website there is a full 
 list of all closed consultations and a listing of forthcoming consultations. The 
 ‘closed’ section will, in future, provide details about the outcome of consultations 
 and have links to any reports produced from the consultation exercise. 
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Further, it is evident that steps were taken in the case of tissue legislation to keep 
witnesses, once involved, ‘in the picture’.  Several experts who gave evidence to the 
Health Committee were subsequently informed of evidence given by later 
witnesses and were asked to produce further papers as a result.  In addition, a 
senior Health Department official attended several consecutive meetings of the 
Scottish Council of the Royal College of Pathologists during 2004 and early 2005, 
both to give information and hear comments about the evolving legislative 
content.63 
It is of course easier to proceed in the manner described above in an electorate of 
5million as compared to 55 million.  The origins of the approach can be found in the 
third of four key principles upon which operations of the Scottish Parliament were 
based:  
 The Scottish Parliament should... develop procedures which make possible a 
 participative approach to the development, consideration and scrutiny of policy 
 and legislation.64 
3.5.4 Authorisation. 
A major feature of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 is its reliance on 
‘authorisation’ rather than ‘consent’. As ‘consent’ was ‘the golden thread’ within 
the Human Tissue Act 2004, so ‘authorisation’ became the central theme in the 
Scottish legislation.  As discussed above, the concept of authorisation had its origins 
in the work of the IRG where consideration of ‘best interests’ had seemed to be an 
inappropriate approach to the parental responsibilities towards their dead child, 
and IRG had become ‘committed’ to an authorisation process.65  Because the remit 
of IRG extended to consideration of post-mortems in adults as well, it appeared 
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logical to the Group to extend the use of ‘authorisation’ to all (non Fiscal) post-
mortems, and to organ donation.  At the Health Committee meeting on September 
8, 2005, Professor McLean was ‘particularly pleased’ that the Bill had adopted the 
concept of authorisation rather than that of consent, because  ‘the concept of 
authorisation reflects more clearly than did the traditional concept of consent the 
location of the authority that we believe should be vested in people’. 66 Further, she 
was ‘delighted’ that the British Medical Association had withdrawn its concern that 
there should be absolutely the same approach throughout the UK and had 
endorsed the notion of authorisation. 67. 
There was an interesting exchange between the Deputy Minister for Health and 
Community Care and the Solicitor General during a meeting of the Health 
Committee at Stage 1.  The Minister, having defined ‘to authorise’ as meaning ‘to 
give legal authority and to enable’, added that ‘the Bill does not seek to narrow that 
down or to apply it in exactly the same way to each of the processes involved’.68 
The Solicitor General supported this approach, saying: 
 Authorisation is a generic, uniform concept, but it is subject to a variety of different 
 tests in  the legal context, some of which are more robust than others. It is a policy 
 issue whether the tests that are applied in a particular category are subject, for 
 instance, to witnesses or to subscription or to a variety of other tests. It has to be 
 a matter of what works in individual circumstances and what is practicable and 
 desirable.69 
Perhaps the most subtle, and potentially far reaching, distinction adduced by IRG 
was that ‘authorisation’ was not constrained by the requirement to have prior 
information, and thus would meet the situation in which [parents] did not wish to 
receive information about post- mortem examinations and/or the subsequent 
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removal and retention of organs and tissue, but did not object to these practices.70  
(Sensitivity to the needs of those who ‘did not want to know’ was a recurring theme 
within the legislative process in Scotland.  This is further discussed below).  The 
concept and use of authorisation was accepted by the Scottish Executive as 
representing ‘an active decision taken by someone in a position of control’71.  Its 
usage was emphasised by Lewis Macdonald MSP, the Deputy Minister, when he 
introduced the Bill during the Stage 1 debate in Parliament.72 
3.5.5 Age of legal capacity, and consent/authorisation.  
There is a significant difference in the detail about ‘authorisation’ that appeared on 
the face of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 compared to the way in which 
‘consent’ was dealt with in the Human Tissue Act 2004. 
During the many debates which led to the 2004 Act, there were several attempts to 
have made explicit in the 2004 Act what was meant by ‘consent’ and what 
information would be required to make it valid.  These attempts were resisted on 
the grounds that standards or conventions might vary over time73, and that it would 
be better to leave these matters to guidance from the Human Tissue Authority.  
Part 1 of the 2004 Act specified those activities for scheduled purposes which shall 
be lawful if done with ‘appropriate’ consent.  There were separate groups of 
sections which specified the circumstances supporting ‘appropriate consent’ in 
adults74 and children, whether competent75 or incompetent76. 
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The comparable provisions in the 2006 Act reflected, first, that legal capacity to 
enter into any transaction in Scots law is reached at the age of 16y77; and second, 
that children over the age of 12y have legal capacity in certain respects, such as 
testamentary capacity, consent to the making of an adoption order, and ‘consent 
on his own behalf to any surgical, medical or dental procedure or treatment where, 
in the opinion of a qualified medical practitioner attending him, he is capable of 
understanding the nature and possible consequences of the procedure or 
treatment’.78   This had led IRG to recommend enthusiastically that there should be 
separate provisions in the human tissue legislation for children over the age of 12y, 
as compared to adults, and children under 12y.  This tripartite grouping was carried 
through into the Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill, where the concept was well 
supported, but carefully debated.79  The outcome was that the sections of the 2006 
Act which dealt with authorisation by a child over the age of 12y contained extra 
precautionary features, to the extent, for example, of defining the procedures to be 
adopted in the case of a blind 12y old who had to employ a signatory on his 
behalf.80 
3.5.6 Post-mortem examination as part of a continuum of care: ramifications for 
standards of practice. 
3.5.6.1 Hospital post-mortems. 
The recommendation by IRG which had perhaps the widest ramifications was that 
post-mortem examination should be treated as part of the continuum of care of a 
patient.  Accepting this concept led the Scottish Executive in late 2001 to ask the 
Clinical Standards Board, (which on January 1, 2003 merged with other bodies to 
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become a Special Health Board, named NHS Quality Improvement Scotland(QIS), 
and  charged with the setting and monitoring of standards throughout the NHS in 
Scotland81), to develop standards for hospital post mortem examinations upon 
which the performance of all hospital managements could be regularly monitored.   
The outcome was the publication in March 2003, three years before legislation, of a 
comprehensive document ‘Standards for Management of Post- Mortem 
Examinations’, which set out standards for: pathology practice for hospital post 
mortems; authorisation and information; storage handling and disposal; record 
keeping; education.82 These were the first set of regulatory and monitory standards 
that the Health Department required the services to comply with and in 2005 they 
remained the only set of standards that had a mandatory element to them.83  By 
the time that legislation had been introduced, local reports had already been 
published of performance against the 2003 standards, as had a national overview 
which drew together common themes from the local reports84 – the latter by a 
Project Group reporting to the NHS QIS Board on which, among others, the health 
professions, parents, and the laity were well represented.85 
The 2003 Standards document specified that both the post mortem examination 
and report should follow the [most recent] guidelines set by the Royal College of 
Pathologists.86  From the concept of extending a continuum of care to include post-
mortems, as recommended by IRG, came directly the importance of the hospital 
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maintaining good records, which, in the case of postmortems, required as set out in 
the 2003 Standards document ‘the retention and secure storage of tissue blocks 
and glass slides as part of the medical record of the deceased’87.  This was later 
provided for in the 2006 Act at s.28(3) and s.28(4).88 
With regard to standard authorisation forms and information leaflets, two sets 
were introduced by NHS QIS, based on draft proposals contained in IRG’s Phase 3 
Report89; one set for the parent/guardian of a deceased baby or child under 16y, 
and a second set for the nominated representative/nearest relative of a deceased 
adult.90  The Executive, according to a consultation paper from the Scottish 
Executive Health Department of April 2006, emphasised that the content of 
authorisation forms and information leaflets could be specified by Regulations 
under s.52 of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006; and the possibility that the 
Executive ‘may decide’ in the light of experience of using the forms, to incorporate 
them in Regulations, was repeated in the Health Department letter, promulgated 
throughout the NHS in Scotland to introduce the new legislation and its 
implications.91  In the event, to date no Regulations have been made.  Instead the 
use of standard forms and leaflets is the responsibility of the Chief Scientist Office, 
part of the Scottish Government Health Directorates.92 
In the rest of the United Kingdom, policy for consent for post-mortem examination 
is determined by the Human Tissue Authority’s  (HTA) ‘Policy on consent for post-
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mortem examination and tissue retention under the Human Tissue Act 2004’, and 
the related Codes of Practice.93 
3.5.6.2 Fiscal post-mortems. 
IRG had also recommended that standards for Fiscal post-mortems, both with 
regard to issues of communication and to the conduct of the examination itself, 
should be comparable to those for hospital post mortems.94 Follow up by the 
Scottish Executive and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) led 
first, in 2001 and 2002, to revised guidance to Procurators Fiscal regarding better 
communication95 and in 2007 to publication of a code of practice and a set of 
standards for forensic pathologists, agreed jointly with the Royal College of 
Pathologists.96  This joint document stated that ‘the Scottish Government and the 
College recommend that all pathologists follow the Guidelines on Autopsy Practice97 
published by the Royal College of Pathologists in 2002’.98 From this it followed that 
tissue blocks and slides should be retained following Fiscal post-mortems as part of 
the medical record of the deceased, and, without further authorisation, could be 
revisited at a later date if need be, for purposes of [refining the] diagnosis- exactly 
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the scenario which had been described with approval by IRG in relation to cot 
deaths99.  This endorsement by the Scottish Government of professionally derived 
standards and practices was strengthened when, the decision having been taken by 
COPFS to invite tenders to supply a forensic pathology service on a national basis 
throughout Scotland, the Invitation to Tender document issued by COPFS stated 
that ‘all autopsies should be performed ...following best medical practice and, 
where appropriate, which are in accordance with any guidelines issued by the Royal 
College of Pathologists and the Scottish Executive Justice Department’.100 
 The 2006 Act provided that, as soon as ‘the manager of the establishment where 
the examination was carried out’ received notice from the Procurator Fiscal that 
tissue samples were no longer needed to be retained for his purposes, the samples 
‘fell to be retained’ as part of the medical record of the deceased person101 and 
may be used for diagnosis, audit or obtaining information relevant to the health of 
another person (or, with authorisation, for education, training or research).102  
This close working in Scotland of the Executive, COPFS and RCPath towards a 
common goal and agreed standards stood in striking contrast to the disjunction that 
occurred in England between the passage of the Human Tissue Bill and the revision 
of the Coroners’ Rules.  In the House of Lords, during Second Reading of the Human 
Tissue Bill, Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve put a question: 
 I ask the Minister why this Bill has been brought forward before legislation to revise 
 the Coroners' Rules.... Why was it thought more urgent to reorganise the vast 
 range of uses of human tissues taken from patients for clinical reasons than to 
 clarify and limit coroners' authority to determine subsequent use of tissue 
 lawfully removed post mortem? If we are worried about the events of Alder Hey—
 clearly we have reason to be—our first move should surely be to address those 
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 issues rather than to write new laws for the entire range of pathology services for 
 living patients within and beyond the NHS... 
 It has been said that this Bill constructs a sledgehammer to crack the proverbial 
 nut, but that, unfortunately, it misses the nut. I do not think that we can reshape 
 the hammer to  ensure that it really hits the nut because for that we would also 
 need to reform the Coroner's Rules, but I hope that with close attention we may be 
 able to do a little to mitigate the damage potentially caused by hyper complex 
 legislation.103  
In reply the Minister, Lord Warner, was able only to say: 
 The noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, asked why the Bill is coming before the coroners’ 
 legislation.  We are working closely with colleagues in the Home Office on that.  As 
 I said, the revised Coroners’ Rules will be brought forward.  I assure Noble Lords 
 that we will ensure that those new rules are wholly consistent with the Bill. 104 
In a later commentary, Professor Sir James Underwood, who had been President of 
the Royal College of Pathologists (PRCPath) during the passage of the Human Tissue 
Bill, was particularly critical of ‘the imperfect dovetailing’ of the Coroners Rules (as 
amended) with the Human Tissue Act 2004, which represented, in his view, ‘a 
lamentable flaw’ in the new legislation.  ‘The Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 
deals in a more integrated manner with post-mortem examinations ordered by a 
Procurator Fiscal.’105  The Coroners (Amendment) Rules 2005 were presented only a 
few weeks before they were due to come into force.  Coroners were informed by 
circular about the amended Rules on May 10, 2005, only 21 days before the 
mandatory implementation date. 106  Because of this short notice, Sir James, as 
PRCPath, appealed to the Home Secretary for a postponement of the 
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implementation date, but his letter was never acknowledged.107  Within a few 
weeks, responsibility for coroners had moved to the Department for Constitutional 
Affairs. 
3.5.7 Tissue from the living. 
The major problem which had been identified in both Bristol and Alder Hey (the 
proximate origin of both the 2004 and 2006 Acts) was the absence of ‘consent’.  
This had led to consent becoming ‘the golden thread’ which ran through the Human 
Tissue Bill, and resulted, as discussed in Chapter Four, in hundreds of hours of 
meetings, briefings and adversarial debate seeking to modify this blanket 
requirement in a number of specific circumstances.  Many of the arguments in 
Westminster related to exemption from the need for consent as provided for in the 
Human Tissue Bill to be applied to the taking and use of ‘surplus’ tissue from the 
living.  This problem did not arise in Scotland, because the Scottish Bill contained no 
provisions concerning surplus tissue. The Scottish Executive’s Policy Memorandum 
on the Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill  as it related to surplus or residual tissue  ‘*saw+ 
no need to introduce measures more stringent than those which apply to the 
consent a living person gives to the carrying out of an operation’.108   In support of 
this stance, the Memorandum stated that these proposals had been included in the 
Executive’s pre-legislative consultation and that no representations objecting to the 
proposals had been received.109  In fact the prior consultation had not asked any 
specific questions about surplus tissue.  Instead the consultation paper had stated, 
as an apparent matter of fact, that ‘*t+issue donation from the living is quite 
different from live organ donation.  Bone and other tissue is often regarded as a 
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waste product in that it would normally be discarded’.110  The consultation paper 
had indicated that the Executive would rely on standard authorisation forms and 
patient information leaflets on the use of ‘surplus’ tissue which were being 
developed by the Scottish Medical and Scientific Advisory Committee. These 
documents were to be scrutinised by the Health Department to ensure that the 
contents were broadly consistent with the arrangements for such tissue in the 
Human Tissue Bill, taking ‘full account’ of the relevant points raised in the debates 
on the Bill in the Westminster Parliament.111  
In the Scottish Parliament, in the Stage 1 debate, the proposed approach to tissue 
from the living was judged by Brian Adam MSP to be ‘one of the reasons why the 
Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill is so much better than the Human Tissue Act 2004’.112 
To date I have been unable to find evidence of any external advice to the Scottish 
Executive regarding the need, or not, for new legislation on tissues from the living.  
During his speech, Brian Adam MSP (who was a member of the Health Committee 
which had produced the Stage 1 Report on the Bill) also said: 
 I wish to talk about what is not in the Bill, probably as a consequence of the very 
 sensible procedures that we have adopted. In the early stages, thought was given 
 to the need for authorisation or consent...to be given for the use of ante-mortem 
 material for any purpose(my emphasis). That purpose would have had to be 
 specified every time that a person went to the doctor and had a blood specimen 
 taken...I am delighted- as, indeed, are many people in the medical and associated 
 professions- that we dropped all that nonsense.113  
The implication is that at sometime early in the drafting or consultative process, 
advice, perhaps from the medical profession, was received and marked.  
Alternatively, it may be that the protracted debates in Westminster on the need for 
legislation on living tissue had an influence in Scotland, if indirectly.  Indeed, Lord 
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Turnberg’s speech at Second Reading in the House of Lords could have been taken 
as a template for the later Scottish decisions: 
 The Bill very reasonably and rationally distinguishes between tissues and organs 
 taken from dead bodies and samples taken from living patients at operation—
 appendices, tonsils, cancers and the like. One might think that all that was needed 
 in the Bill was a stringent set of regulations for post-mortem organ retention in 
 response to the Alder Hey and Bristol scandals, and that the useful research of 
 tissues taken at operation could have been left out of the Bill. 
  After all, if one wants to do research now on such tissues, one must always have 
 ethics committee approval, and that will be given only where consent has been, or 
 will be, obtained from patients, or where the tissues have been anonymised;114 
 To which the Minister, Lord Warner, responded, invoking attitudes of the public 
and researchers to tissue from the living which were at variance with the evidence I 
have been able to identify115 116: 
 Arguing the distinction between tissue from the deceased and from the living 
 overlooks the fact that the public do not always make that same distinction.  
 A number of noble Lords have asked why we cover tissue from the living and do 
 not just concentrate on the coroner's area and tissue from deceased people. That 
 assumes that the present arrangements are satisfactory... They are muddled, and 
 they cause concern for many medical researchers.117 
3.5.7.1 Sources of prior advice? 
In some ways, the elusiveness to me of detectable sources of prior advice to the 
Scottish Government on tissues from the living is comparable to a similar absence 
of detectable sources from the Chief Medical Officer’s Advice on the Removal, 
Retention and Use of Human Organs and Tissue from Post-mortem Examination 
which was presented to Parliament in Westminster in January 2001.  That 
document baldly stated as ‘background’ that ‘questions have also arisen about the 
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importation of human material for teaching purposes, the commercial use of tissue 
and the controls on taking, using and storing tissue and organs removed from the 
living both for therapeutic or research purposes’(my emphasis).  That is the only 
sentence in the report to give support to the CMO’s ‘Recommendation 6’ that ‘as 
soon as possible, there should be a more fundamental and broader revision of the 
law, encompassing the taking, storage and use of human tissue from the living (my 
emphasis) and the dead and introducing an independent system of regulatory 
control’.118  
Contrary decisions about living tissue having been taken, apparently behind closed 
Departmental doors in Edinburgh and London, the practical consequences were: in 
Scotland, standards for taking and using tissue from the living became the 
responsibility of the Chief Scientist Office, through its clinical and research 
governance arms.  Throughout the rest of the United Kingdom, responsibility came 
to rest with the Human Tissue Authority. 
3.5.8 Awareness of parental sensitivities. 
Throughout the process which led to the 2006 Act, there were a striking number of 
references to the importance of being sensitive to the wishes of those parents and 
relatives who did not object to post-mortem examination but who did not want to 
be given information.  This concern appeared in the IRG Preliminary119 and Final 
Reports 120, was repeated during the proceedings of the Health Committee121, 
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featured in the Policy Memorandum for the Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill122, and 
eventually found its way into guidelines123. 
As far as I have been able to determine the origins of this approach lay in written 
and oral evidence given to IRG by parents and members of the lay public, for 
example ‘Permission should be asked prior to post-mortem being carried out, but it 
is not necessary to go into details.  This could involve too much information and 
could be distressing’.124   The authors of one letter, a Mr and Mrs D Knowles, he a 
moral philosopher and she a school teacher, whose baby had died of congenital 
heart disease, particularly impressed the Review Group, and they were invited to 
expand on their thoughts in oral evidence.  Mr and Mrs Knowles had previously 
written: 
 [We] have followed the press reports [about Bristol] and listened to interviews with 
 relatives of dead children and representatives of parents’ groups, all of whom have 
 deplored the practice of removal, retention and disposal of organs without full 
 consent being given to these processes at every stage.  We thought that these 
 parents’ groups were not speaking for us...  
 The Bristol inquiry report said it could not square the circle of meeting the 
 demands of the parents who do not want to know and the parents who do, and so 
 decided the issue in favour of those who do (or rather, those who said 
 retrospectively that they would have preferred full knowledge and the 
 opportunity of informed consent). 
 The Scottish Review Group can do better than this.125 
IRG took the views of Mr and Mrs Knowles very seriously.  The transcript of the 
exchanges during their oral evidence ran to 18 pages and 13,500 words.  The 
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message which the Group accepted was encapsulated by Mrs Anne Knowles when 
she said: 
 There may be other people who do want [to have full information] and I think that 
 has to be a very personal thing which is why if you have a code of practice it has to 
 be sensitive to a huge spectrum of people's emotions and sensitivities.126 
I believe that the Knowles evidence, given so impressively, is likely to have been a 
significant factor in the ‘authorisation/consent’ discussions within the Group, and 
led to the recurring references throughout  to ‘those who do not wish to know’, 
described above, and which was captured in the Policy Memorandum.127  [Knowles 
later expanded his ideas and made an alternative proposal to ‘an oppressive code 
of practice’ in a thought provoking paper which involved ‘a practice of 
agreement’.128] 
4. Summary and overall conclusions. 
Professor Sir James Underwood, Past President of the Royal College of Pathologists, 
a man who had been closely involved with the genesis of the Human Tissue Act 
2004 and who had served on the Human Tissue Authority wrote in 2009 that: ‘The 
Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 is a more proportionate response to the past 
problems arising from post-mortem organ retention’129; a view which was also 
taken by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos 
(Draft) Bill 130.  I have come to share that view.  
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The Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 has a number of significant differences from, 
and consequences of, the Human Tissue Act 2004, particularly in regard to the 
concept of authorisation, retention of tissue blocks and slides for diagnostic 
purposes, aligning of standards for hospital and Procurators Fiscal post-mortem 
examinations, and the use of surplus tissue and other tissue from the living.  If there 
was a central driver to the shape of the Scottish legislation, I believe it may be 
found in the conclusion reached early in the deliberations of IRG that post-mortem 
examination should properly be regarded as an integral part of patient care which 
continued after death. The conduct of post-mortems was an issue of clinical 
governance with ultimate responsibility for the process resting with the chief 
executive of the relevant NHS Trust.131  The need to retain good clinical records 
(‘tissue blocks and slides’), the development of clear standards and audit of 
performance followed logically thereafter. 
As to comparison of processes between Edinburgh and Westminster, two factors 
stand out.  The first is procedural, and relates to the extensive early scrutiny which 
is built into the Scottish Parliamentary system; and which led in the specific 
instance to the extensive work of the Health Committee during Stage 1 and to its 
Stage 1 report, prior to the first debate ‘on principles’ in the Scottish Parliament.  
The second is also to an extent procedural, but perhaps also cultural, and relates to 
the openness and the thoroughness of the consultative process at all stages, from 
Independent Inquiry to Parliamentary Act.  Nothing illustrates this better than the 
seriousness with which the views of two, thoughtful, bereaved parents were taken. 
Last, it is impossible to say whether or not the absence of Ministerial hyperbole in 
the early stages of the Scottish organ ‘scandal’, in comparison to the public attitude 
struck by the Rt Hon Alan Milburn MP to Alder Hey, had an influence in the manner 
in which officials, professionals, and parents’ representatives went about their work 
subsequently.  If such influences existed, they must surely have favoured the more 
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Northerly events.  This view may have been shared by Baroness Cumberledge who, 
during Second Reading of the Human Tissue Bill in the House of Lords, said: 
 Looking back at what happened, it is interesting that the concern was centred on 
 post-mortem practice, whereas much of the Bill is not about post-mortem practice 
 but ante-mortem practice.  I very much agree with my noble friend Lord Jenkin, 
 who said that when the issue blew up the Government's response exacerbated the 
 situation... as legislators, do we not have to be careful not to over-react but to get 
 the balance right?132  
                                                     
132
 (2004) 664 (Parl. Deb., Hansard, 5th series), HL 399. 
 
 
 
293 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
Further analysis, conclusions and recommendations.  
1 Recapitulation. 
The purpose of this Thesis has been to examine, through analysis of the 
contribution of forces, interests, issues, organisations and individuals,  the 
development of policy and associated legislation over the past half century 
regarding human tissue, and in particular the research use of tissue.  This Chapter 
attempts to summarise and further highlight the important factors and to reach 
some overall conclusions.  
 The approach, it is submitted, has been aided by having used throughout the 
Thesis a ‘systems’ and ‘framework’ methodology. The justification for its use is 
several-fold.  Drewry presented his ‘systems’ model as being a useful means of 
comparing the law-making systems and processes of different countries.1  England 
and Scotland have different legislative systems; and a comparison of social attitudes 
and relationships in the UK between 1961 and 2000 appeared at times to be a 
description of the prevailing culture of two different countries.  The methodology 
has had the further advantages identified by Hogwood and Dunn: it is dynamic, aids 
the identification and study of interactions, and is flexible, in that it allows existing 
knowledge to be systematised without precluding the integrating of future 
insights.2 
 Drewry emphasised that the systems approach encouraged questions rather than 
pretending to provide cut and dried answers.3  This has certainly been the case in 
the present study, although the possibility that some answers have emerged along 
the way is not precluded! 
2 Further analysis. 
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2.1 Factors operating on both sides of the English- Scottish border as ‘inspiration’ 
for new legislation. 
2.1.1 ‘Normal’ post-mortem practice, including organ ‘collections’, combined with 
misunderstanding of an ‘uncertain’ law. 
The Bristol, Redfern and Isaacs inquiries revealed, with regard to post-mortem 
examinations, a set of practices, relationships and beliefs that were to be found 
throughout the UK.  Before the Human Tissue Act in 1961, pathologists had been 
used to removing organs at post-mortems that appeared to be of interest for 
research or teaching purposes.  In addition, by the late 1950s the feasibility had 
arisen of taking tissues for the emerging science of transplantation.  Although the 
passing of the 1961 Act imposed a discipline on transplantation practice, the 
customary habit of retaining tissues of interest continued in the decades thereafter, 
little influenced by the Act.  It was to an extent learned behaviour, with doctors in 
training following the example and the practices of earlier years set by their seniors. 
The revelation in 1999 by Professor Robert Anderson of the existence of organ 
‘collections’ was a seminal moment.4  In addition, there was widespread ignorance 
or at least misunderstanding of the relevant law, which, from the evidence that the 
Royal College of Pathologists felt it necessary to reissue Bernard Knight’s 1985 
guidance in 1990 (Chapter Two, 3.3.2), persisted into the 1990s.5  The Human 
Tissue Act 1961 was found by Bristol to be ‘obscure, uncertain and arcane’, but this 
‘fact’ was not offered by that Inquiry as a mitigating factor in favour of doctors 
within the ‘social and ethical time bomb’ which was said to have existed. In 
Scotland, the Independent Review Group (IRG) also found evidence of a 
paternalistic attitude of doctors towards post-mortem examination but ‘no 
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evidence that past practice was motivated by anything other than the tradition of 
medicine in seeking to improve care of future patients’.6 
Within my present studies I found evidence (see Chapter One, and published 
elsewhere7), that the Ministry of Health’s instructions to Parliamentary Counsel in 
1960 for the Human Tissue Bill had identified the requirement that both ‘retention’ 
of tissue and ‘consent’ of relatives should be provided for in the draft legislation, 
but that, after correspondence between Counsel and Ministry officials, both terms 
had been omitted from the Bill and subsequent Act.  ‘Tissue retention’ and 
‘consent’ became the central issues in the headline-provoking inquiries 40 years 
later.  It is therefore at least arguable that their omission from statute was a 
contributory factor to the ‘misunderstanding’ of doctors of the law relating to 
retention of tissue from coronial autopsies8.  Of course this explanation could not 
be applied to those doctors who admitted privately to having never read the 
provisions of Human Tissue Act 19619, but might at least have influenced the 
teaching of junior colleagues by those who had done so. 
The variation in practice within coronial ‘fiefdoms’ revealed by the inquiries cannot 
have helped doctors towards a uniform understanding of the law. In Redfern, 
‘slackness’ of coronial procedures was found to be a contributory factor.  In Isaacs, 
the Coroner’s Office in one district had been actually responsible for identifying to 
the clinicians cases which might be suitable for brain research.  Further, the author 
of Isaacs was satisfied from indirect evidence that some coroners had asked 
pathologists to refrain from mentioning retention in their post-mortem reports.  In 
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Bristol there was conflicting evidence given by clinicians and the then current 
coroner as to what guidance the previous coroner had given. With regard to 
Scotland, I have been able to find only indirect evidence within the IRG report 
which pointed to some inconsistencies of practice of Procurators Fiscal in the 
past10, but gave no hint of complicity or a ‘blind eye’ having been turned. 
2.1.2 Issues of communication and consent. 
All the Inquiries revealed that there had been a lack of awareness among the public 
of what a post-mortem examination entailed, and that even where ‘consent’ 
(technically ‘non-objection’) had been recorded it could not have been, in many 
instances, an informed decision.  Doctors freely admitted to having used 
euphemisms or imprecise language when seeking consent, their honestly- held 
motivation having been to spare grieving relatives further distress.11  This 
motivation was accepted in Redfern and the Scottish IRG Report, within an 
approach labelled ‘paternalistic’ and judged to be outmoded in the year 2000.  The 
harsher analysis of Kennedy and colleagues in Bristol, that doctors had shown 
‘arrogance born of indifference’, was sharply rebutted by the President of the Royal 
College of Pathologists as an ‘ill considered opinion’.12  Pathologists had long 
believed that organ and tissue retention was an integral part of the post-mortem 
process, a point emphasised by Bennett.13  A joint report from the Royal Colleges as 
early as 1991 had advised that obtaining ‘permission’ for a post-mortem should 
include information about the benefits for ‘teaching and research’.  It further 
advised that the consent form ‘must allow relatives to permit a full autopsy 
                                                     
10
Scottish Executive Health Department. Independent Review Group on Retention of Organs at Post- 
Mortem.  Final Report.  November 2001, Appendix 2 (‘The Preliminary Report of February 2001’), 9.2 
(90), p103. 
11
 The Inquiry into the management of care of children receiving complex heart surgery at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary: Interim Report: Removal and retention of human material. May 2000,  p29, para 
102. 
12
 Underwood JCE. Human Tissue Legislation in the United Kingdom: the need and prospects for 
amendment. Bulletin of the Royal College of Pathologists 2009; no.147: 198-202, at 198. 
13
 Bennett JR.  The organ retention furore: the need for consent. Clin. Med. 2001; 1(3): 167-171 at p 
169. 
297 
 
examination or to restrict the examination, or the use of tissue, in keeping with the 
Human Tissue Act 1961’.14 
Throughout the period 1960- 2000, the relevant professional bodies, such as GMC, 
RCP and RCPath operated on both sides of the border, and exerted a largely 
conservative influence- whether or not they fully merited Maurice Shock’s 
attribution of a motto ‘the status quo is the way forward’15.   I have tried in Chapter 
Three to place doctors’ ‘failures’ as revealed in the Inquiries within the failure of the 
profession to recognise that paternalism, even when it was benign, had become 
less acceptable in a society in which ‘patient/customer/client autonomy was 
emerging as the new order’16: thus leaving far behind Miss Pitt’s call in 1961 that 
[Parliament] must give the doctors what they required for improvements in 
treatment, education and research17.  While failure, or at least a tardiness, of 
doctors in the latter part of the 20th century to incorporate adequate information 
giving and consent seeking into their day to day practice was widespread, and 
caused understandable distress among individual parents, it does not fully explain, 
in my view, the explosion of public emotion generated by the revelations of, in 
particular, Bristol and Alder Hey- emotions which were undoubtedly a major 
‘inspiration’ for the legislation which followed.  Additional factors may have been at 
work, which are considered immediately below at 2.1.3 to 2.1.5. 
2.1.3 The collective pressure exerted by parents and relatives. 
Put starkly, parents were the true fons et origo of the 2004 and 2006 legislation.  
From Mrs Helen Rickard’s discovery in Bristol that her deceased daughter’s heart 
had been retained there arose the parents’ group, led by Mrs Michaela Willis, who 
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successfully lobbied the Secretary of State for Health to set up the Bristol Inquiry.  
That Inquiry shone a light on Alder Hey Hospital, whose parents’ group, PITY II, 
created headlines and inexorable pressure for a further Inquiry.  Parents’ groups 
elsewhere in England and Wales added their voices.  In Scotland, a single request 
from an [anonymous to me] mother to Yorkhill Hospital about whether there were 
any stored ‘tissues’ from her previous stillborn child led, within eight months, to 
demands to the Health Minister from a range of parents’ groups for an inquiry into 
organ and tissue retention. 
Into this brief account must be added the name of Mrs Elaine Isaacs.  Her 
persistence is seeking information about what had happened to the brain of her 
dead husband led to a nation-wide inquiry and the recognition that organ retention 
from adult PMs without consent had been a customary practice.  
2.1.4 The Press. 
That the press played a role in the ‘inspiration’ phase on both sides of the border 
cannot be doubted.  Ever since the recognition in 1840 by Thomas Carlyle of ‘the 
Fourth Estate’,18 numerous academic studies have confirmed the importance of the 
press in influencing public opinion19 20 21 22 23, itself an important trigger for new 
legislation in Drewry’s model.  In a fascinating study directly relevant to the press 
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coverage of the ‘organ scandals’, Mutz and Soss found that a newspaper campaign, 
although limited in its ability to bring about changes in the opinions of individual 
members of the mass public, had significant effects on citizens’ perceptions of the 
salience the community as a whole attached to an issue, and on their perceptions of 
the dominant climate of opinion.24  Williams and Calnan described three different 
functions which the media may perform within the mediation of contemporary 
experience.25    My review of the press output on the day following publication of 
Redfern revealed strong ‘consumerist’ tendencies, with a few laudable attempts in 
addition to ‘get behind the facts’.  It would be wrong to ascribe motives of ‘mass 
manipulation’ on the day- although one recalls the charge of at least one journalist 
that the Secretary of State had taken prior steps to ensure that the pre-report 
atmosphere was as highly charged as possible.26 The outrageous behaviour of one 
rogue pathologist, Van Velsen, and the sometimes (to my eye) intemperate 
language used in Bristol to describe doctors, also played their part. 
The press had also played a role, but a different one, in the genesis of the 1961 Act.  
First, in this period when the wonders of science were extolled, newspapers carried 
headline accounts about successful organ transplants which must have caught 
public imagination. [It caught the imagination of Miss Joan Vickers MP who 
suggested that the Human Tissue Bill should have been named the Human Aid to 
Medical Science Bill.27] Second, correspondence in the medical press around 1960 
about practical difficulties in undertaking kidney transplantation was picked up by 
the national press under such headlines as ‘Grafting operations raise problems.  
Legislation needed.’28  Third, there is evidence that officials, when preparing the 
case in 1960 for ‘tissue grafting’ legislation, had been imbued with a sense of 
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urgency, or at least unease, ‘because the interest in the subject indicated by recent 
articles in the medical and lay press make it not impossible that we may be 
challenged *as to the legitimacy of grafting operations+’29. 
2.1.5 A desecration of the dead, as a factor? 
The ‘stories’ of Bristol, Alder Hey, and Yorkhill carried lurid headlines.   Laurance 
asked rhetorically, in respect of the Alder Hey Inquiry, what was the appropriate 
emotional response to the grim revelations?  It seemed to him that the normal grief 
that bereavement brings to parents and relatives had become supercharged by the 
knowledge that a wrong had been committed.  All the pain of loss had been 
translated into anger at those responsible for what was portrayed as a desecration 
of the dead- and in turn to demands for retribution.30 
The area is complex, and a thorough review of attitudes to death, dead bodies, 
autopsy, dissection and burial is beyond the scope of this Thesis.  According to the 
historian Ruth Richardson, dissection represented to popular belief a gross assault 
upon the integrity and identity of the body and upon the repose of the soul, each of 
which- in other circumstances- would have been carefully fostered.31  Today, 
attitudes are ambivalent.  To some, ‘they’re just dead bodies’, with a view that 
what happens to the body after death is of no consequence after life has left it.32  
Yet a hospital Chief Executive in Bedford was forced to resign in 2001 after seven 
corpses had been stored on the floor in the hospital chapel because a broken door 
had rendered the auxiliary mortuary unusable, and photographs had appeared in 
the press.  Relatives were ‘understandably distraught’.33  Savalescu, reminiscing in 
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another context, expressed well the belief that pervades all cultures, albeit with a 
variety of modes of expression, that ‘we should show respect for the dead’.34  
Bristol and Alder Hey had an extra dimension in that most of the organs belonged to 
children, and their taking perhaps emphasised the tragic and emotional aspects of 
their premature death. 35  This view is supported by a substantial academic 
literature. 36 37 38 39 40 41 42  
2.1.6 Medical science and society. 
As discussed, particularly in Chapter Three, by the 1990s ‘the *role of+ the doctor 
was different, the patient was different and medicine was different’43, changes to 
which doctors were slow to respond: while science (as examples: the feasibility of 
tissue banks; genetic diagnosis) was progressing inexorably, albeit without 
unquestioning public trust.44  
2.1.7 A wish for recompense and retribution? 
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The financial settlements made to parents in England (Chapter Four, 1.2.7) and in 
Scotland Chapter Five, 2.2.2) are recorded in this section as ‘inspiration’ factors, in 
the sense that they represented yet another commitment by government to right a 
wrong.   In passing one may also note the difference in ‘style’ between a litigious 
approach in England and a blanket compensation scheme adopted by the Scottish 
Executive. 
 2.2 Cross-border differences acting within the ‘inspiration’ phase for new 
legislation. 
2.2.1 The ‘in-tray’. 
I proposed in Chapter Two, that, in the absence of systematic post-legislative 
scrutiny in the 1960s to 1990s (a usual state of affairs at that time), there would 
nevertheless have been at least an erratic flow of information back to the Ministry 
of Health and its successor Departments as to whether or not the objectives of the 
Human Tissue Act 1961 were being achieved and whether any problems had 
occurred; information which might, or might not, have been a stimulus to further 
action.  This I termed the ‘in-tray’. 
Although the 1961 Act applied throughout the UK, and although certain contents of 
the in-tray were relevant nation-wide (for example, difficulties in interpreting ‘such 
reasonable inquiry as was practicable’; a wish by some, including the MPs discussed 
in Chapter Two, to increase organ donors by opt out legislation; increasing 
awareness in Parliament of public opinion), all the individual cases of contravention 
of the provisions of the 1961 Act, as revealed by my searches in The National 
Archives at Kew (with files from1980 being the most recently declassified), occurred 
in England (see Chapter Two: Couve de Murville; Ford; O’Sullivan; McEldowney; 
ignoring by Regional Medical Officers and their officials of DHSS circular HC (IS)156, 
revealed at the time of the ‘pituitary collection headlines’) – all of which, together 
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with the pressure of Sir Gerald Nabarro and colleagues in Westminster, had led 
officials to draft amending legislation.45 
 In contrast, a conscientious search of files in Edinburgh of the National Archives for 
Scotland, using the same search terms as used in Kew, revealed no such examples 
of errant doctors or transplantation irregularities.  (These Archives contained copies 
of the draft proposals for amending legislation drawn up by officials in London in 
1970-71, a legal opinion for the Scottish Home and Health Department about the 
legality of obtaining pituitary glands at post-mortem46 and a copy of the Scottish 
version of an NHS circular sent to all Health Boards in 197547 following the 
problems with the MRC’s Human Pituitary Collection).  
2.2.2 The Reports, and early government response. 
More direct differences, and certainly pertinent to a comparative analysis of the 
‘inspiration’ phase in Scotland and England, can be found in the Inquiry reports 
about organ retention, both in the scale and practice of retention and in the 
language used.  Consider first the language of the Bristol Interim Report: 
 We may regret that those standards were the product of a small group of 
 professionals talking to themselves. We may agree that they reflected a degree of 
 professional arrogance. We may lament that they displayed a lack of interest in,  or 
 paternalism towards, the views and feelings of parents.  But that was how things 
 were48;  
phrasing interpreted by a legal correspondent of a medical journal that ‘’doctors’ 
arrogance born of indifference’ was to blame49, and described by the President of 
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Royal College of Pathologists as ‘the strident and almost sneering tone of the 
Report’.50 
Next, the findings with regard to medical practice at Alder Hey Hospital (which had 
been aggravated by coronial ‘slackness’ and wide ranging failures of management) 
were believed by Redfern to reveal that:  
 [t]he practice [of organ retention without consent] arose from a sense of 
 paternalism on  the part of the medical profession which served to conceal 
 retention in the supposed best interest of the parents’51; ‘a further aggravating 
 feature has been Professor Van Velzen’s behaviour... He must never practise 
 again.52 
In contrast, the Independent Review Group found with regard to practice:  
 [n]o evidence in Scotland of the shocking practices discovered at Alder Hey53; 
 [a]bsolutely no evidence of any cases of retention of a body’s entire set of 
 organs54; in some cases [hearts and brains] may not yet have been used for 
 education or research purposes, but this does not mean they will not be used for 
 these purposes in the future.  Their potential value is considerable55; 
and with regard to the conduct of doctors: 
 [i]n the past, the medical profession has taken a paternalistic attitude towards 
 post-mortem examinations56...Nonetheless, it should be stated that we have found 
 no evidence that past practice was motivated by anything other than the tradition 
 of medicine in seeking to improve care of future patients57.  
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I believe it plausible to suggest that the readership of these Reports, which would 
have included, as appropriate, the Secretary of State for Health in England and the 
Minister for Health and Community Care in Scotland,  could have been ‘inspired’ 
towards different responses.  
2.2.3 The Human Tissue Act 1961 was not listed in Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 
1988.58 
It is possible that the decision of the Scottish Parliament to take its own line was a 
product of nationalism and the calendar.  The passing of the Scotland Act 199859 
was followed by the election of the first Scottish Parliament on May 6, 1999, with 
assumption of full legislative powers on July 1 of that year.  Thus, when events at 
Bristol and Alder Hey were revealed, and subsequent revelations at Yorkhill 
Hospital and elsewhere in Scotland followed, they came to the attention of a young 
Parliament with no ‘baggage’, faced with an issue upon which the power to 
legislate had been devolved, and with a desire to fulfil the First Minister’s wish that 
the Parliament ‘*should strive+ to do right by the people of Scotland; to respect 
their priorities; to better their lot; and to contribute to the commonweal’.60  This 
hope was reflected in the ‘delight’ of Brian Adam MSP in the Stage 1 debate on the 
Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill that ‘on this occasion the Executive has chosen not to 
go down the harmonisation route [with the Westminster Parliament] but to deal 
with the situation in our own way.  We have our own practices and our own needs’. 
61  Perhaps the youth of the Scottish Parliament and its absence of ‘baggage’ may 
be exemplified by another contributor to the Stage 1 debate, Helen Eadie MSP: ‘In 
the past six years, there will have been moments when individual MSPs have felt 
that the legislation they were passing was the most important of all.  The part of 
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the bill that deals with organ retention that can lead to transplantation is, for me, 
the most critical that we have ever passed’.62 
The passage of the 2006 Act, although important, was achieved through ‘standard 
procedures’, and fitted within a more general perspective of the work of the 
Scottish Parliament during its first decade published in 2009:  
 The imagery of the new [political process] may have been overdone, but that does 
 not mean that no progress has been made in realising some of the optimism and 
 idealism that accompanied the establishment of the Scottish Parliament.  [T]he mix 
 includes real positives: in opening up the parliament to citizens and interest groups 
 (not just ‘the usual suspects), in taking equal opportunities more seriously, in 
 moving some way to using the parliament’s committees to realise the founding 
 principles, and in holding government to account.63 
2.3 Factors important in ‘deliberation and formulation’. 
 I have been able to verify this process in some detail with regard to the Human 
Tissue Act 1961, through papers in The National Archives identified in Chapter One.  
In my study of the 2004 and 2006 Acts direct scrutiny of recent internal 
Departmental or Cabinet papers was not possible because they will remain 
classified at least until 2034- 6.  Nevertheless, it has been possible to construct a 
coherent account of the process, for the purposes of comparison, from publicly 
available documents supplemented by specific requests under the Freedom of 
Information Acts for England and Scotland.  Significant differences emerged of time 
and place. 
2.3.1 The role, and perceived status, of the medical profession. 
A striking difference between the 1961 Act and the later Acts, and to an extent 
between the 2004 and 2006 Acts themselves, was in the role of the medical 
profession.  As discussed in Chapter One, during the period leading up to 1961 
doctors were in the driving seat.  Sir George Godber, the Chief (initially Deputy 
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Chief) Medical Officer for England, was at the centre, seeking the advice of 
Presidents of Royal Colleges as to whether it would be timely to introduce 
legislation, responding to lobbying from prominent medical scientists (including 
attending private lunches of the ‘great and the good’ at the Athenaeum), and 
making a major contribution to the content of a Bill ‘to give the doctors what they 
required for the improvement in treatment, education and research’64.  I have been 
unable to find evidence for any lobby or voice from the public as a significant part 
of these deliberations. 
In the process that led towards the 2004 Act, the Chief Medical Officer for England 
(‘CMO’: Professor, later Sir, Liam Donaldson) played a prominent but very different 
role from Sir George Godber: conducting a census of retained organs, issuing 
interim advice, and producing very influential Advice to Parliament65.  Although the 
latter document was entitled ‘*Advice from the CMO on+ the removal, retention and 
use of human organs and tissue from post-mortem examination’ (my emphasis), the 
advice extended more widely to include a recommendation that ‘as soon as 
possible, there should be a more fundamental and broader revision of the law, 
encompassing the taking, storage and use of human tissue from the living (my 
emphasis) and the dead and introducing an independent system of regulatory 
control’66.   I have found no evidence that the views of the medical profession had 
been sought in the preparation of that Advice; nor did they enjoy an ‘insider’ role in 
later consultations (see Chapter Four). Indeed it may not be too fanciful to describe 
doctors, as seen through official eyes, as a profession in disgrace at that time. [The 
profession itself was bewildered and defensive, and morale was sapped.67  It took 
many months before anything approaching a coherent medical voice began to re-
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emerge.] Again by contrast with 1961, in 2000 the voice of the public through 
patient groups and the media was heard by all.  
Although the evidence I have been able to obtain was indirect, it appeared that the 
medical profession was involved earlier, and more closely, in pre-legislative events 
in Scotland than was the case in England.  As outlined in Chapter Five, in late 2001, 
even before the Phase 2 recommendations of IRG had been received, the Scottish 
Executive had asked the then newly established NHS Clinical Standards Board (CSB) 
to take account of the recommendation in IRG’s Preliminary Report that post-
mortem examination should be treated as part of the continuum of patient care.  
The outcome was the publication of comprehensive regulatory and monitoring 
standards in March 2002 (made definitive one year later)68. The point of relevance 
to the present discussion is that the Deputy Chief Medical Officer for Scotland, Dr 
Janet Steele, and a senior official from the Executive were observers on the CSB, a 
body with a prominent medical membership.  It seems likely that these two officials 
would have been exposed to an understanding of ‘medical thinking’.  Perhaps it was 
for that reason that the Chief Medical Officer for Scotland allowed his Deputy to 
take the lead, in partnership throughout with senior officials, in the consultative 
stages of the legislative process.  It is plausible to suggest that, through knowledge 
gleaned from the work of CSB, Dr Steele and officials had developed networks of 
medical advice to whom they could turn.  In addition there was ample evidence of 
overt medical involvement in later stages, as discussed in Chapter Five and in the 
following paragraphs. 
 2.3.2 The scope and method of consultation. 
In the ‘deliberation and formulation’ phase of preparation of the 1961 Act, the 
consultations that took place were almost entirely with the medical profession, 
which is understandable in the context of legislation which was being planned as 
enabling, by legitimising then current practices.   Within the stage of ‘deliberation 
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and formulation’ of the 2004 and 2006 legislation, still further differences between 
Westminster and Edinburgh began to emerge. In Whitehall, as indicated above, the 
decision about the scope of a proposed revision of the law to encompass tissue 
from the living and the dead, and with the insertion of regulatory control, had 
apparently already been taken by the Department of Health by early 2001 as 
signposted in the CMO’s Advice, and had been endorsed by the ‘fundamental and 
broad review’ of the law on human organs and tissues undertaken by the 
Department of Health later that year.69  Only after that internal process had been 
completed did the formal consultation document Human Bodies, Human Choices 
(HBHC) appear. 70  A summary of the responses to the consultation was published 
by the Department of Health in April 2003.71  In September 2003, an eight page 
document, ‘Proposals for new legislation on human organs and tissue’ (‘Proposals’), 
was published under the names of the CMOs for England and Wales which stated 
that ‘through the consultation responses and associated workshops, together with 
a major national conference, a large degree of consensus developed’.72  The scope 
of the proposals ‘expected to be incorporated in the legislation’ was set out.  A 
further series of meetings was held with professional groups over the following 
month by way of explanation and foretaste before the Bill (‘the 2003-4 Bill’) was 
introduced in December 2003. 
In contrast, the Scottish Executive awaited the recommendations of the 
independent body which it had established, and the outcome of subsequent formal 
consultation, before determining the principles of the new legislation with regard to 
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post mortems.73  The consultation, as it turned out, revealed broad support for the 
approach.74  Again in contrast to the process in England and Wales where the 
publication of responses to HBHC and a national conference was followed by the 
Proposals document as a fait accompli, in Scotland there was a second round of 
formal consultations [on all three major strands of the eventual Bill.  [For present 
purposes the discussion is confined to issues concerning PMs].  This second round 
confirmed that the principles which would underpin the new legislation would be 
those identified by IRG, and sought further views on specific issues.  Most of the 85 
bodies consulted were those as might be expected (for example, Department of 
Health, Crown Office (Edinburgh), BMA, Church of Scotland, NHS Trust Chief 
Executives, Royal Colleges, Scottish Organisation in Relation to Organ Retention 
(SORRO), Scottish Cot Death Trust).  However, also on the list of those consulted 
were several named individual University Departments of Pathology, 
Neuropathology, and General Practice, whose Heads had a special interest or 
expertise of direct relevance to the inquiry.  By these means it could be said that 
the views of the medical profession were well heard.  The Scottish Executive went 
still further in obtaining the views of pathologists and keeping them informed.  
During the ‘formulation’ stage of the Bill (‘the 2005-6 Bill’), Will Scott, senior civil 
servant in the Executive, attended several meetings of the Scottish Council of the 
Royal College of Pathologists, where he sought advice and answered questions.75  
2.3.3 Role of ROC and IRG. 
The composition of membership of the Retained Organs Commission76 (ROC) and 
IRG was remarkably similar.  The most interesting comparative point in the present 
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analysis is how each government used such a group of all the talents.  [My ability to 
compare the two bodies has been limited by the more ready availability of all the 
IRG papers, in contrast to ROC files. The latter have been electronically  archived 
within the Department of Health files in the National Archives, and their algorithm 
has a cut off at least one level higher than is to be found in the IRG files. As a result, 
ROC papers of potential relevance to my studies have been inaccessible.] 
On the evidence available to me, ROC’s main tasks were to oversee the return of 
retained organs and tissues to families, address the question of historical and 
archived organ collections, and to advise Ministers about changes needed in the 
law relating to post mortems and organ retention’77.   ROC’s formal advice, issued 
in June 2003, was concentrated on three specific areas: the legal status of tissue 
blocks and slides78; the use and disposal of unclaimed and unidentifiable human 
remains79; and a regulatory framework for museums, archives and collections of 
bodies and their parts80.  In Scotland, in contrast, the advice of IRG (and another 
expert independent body, the Scottish Transplant Group) was acknowledged and 
used by the Scottish Executive as a major determinant of the scope and content of 
the legislation.81 In addition, IRG, an investigatory and advisory body, in practice 
made major contributions to the management of parental grief and the repatriation 
of organs and tissue- a task on a different scale, though no less important, than that 
faced by ROC. 
2.3.4 The contribution of parents to deliberation and formulation. 
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Both ROC and IRG worked extensively and intensively with grieving parents- work 
which led to the primacy of respect for parents’ views through the concept of ‘the 
golden thread’ of consent in England, and ‘authorisation’ in Scotland.  In addition, in 
England the National Committee concerned with Organ Retention (NACOR) [whose 
chair, Mrs Michaela Willis, also served on ROC] had input to Department of Health 
deliberations throughout all phases of legislation.82  In Scotland parental groups 
gave written and oral evidence to the Health Committee during Stage 1 proceedings 
of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill, discussed further below.  
In Westminster during Second Reading of the Human Tissue Bill, the Parliamentary 
Under Secretary for Health, Dr Stephen Ladyman MP, gave a revealing glimpse of 
the continuing influence of parents as he tried to defend the Government’s 
rescinding of a previous commitment to allow pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, 
saying: ‘*w]e therefore had to make a judgment call- do we balance the need for 
scrutiny against the needs of the families who are demanding that we make 
progress? We decided that making progress was more important than publishing 
the Bill in draft’83.  This sensitivity to parents’ continuing ‘demands’ is a further clear 
indication that parental contact with Government was being maintained up to that 
time at the highest level. 
Chapter Five highlighted that, at all stages of the legislative process in Scotland, 
there had been an overt sensitivity to the wishes of those parents and relatives who 
did not object to post-mortem examination but who did not want to be given 
information.   I proposed that this had had its origin in the work of IRG and 
specifically, in written and oral evidence given to the Group by certain articulate 
and persuasive parents. It was pointed out by IRG that the process of authorisation, 
unlike consent, did not require the prior giving of information, and that this could 
be of help to those ‘non objectors who did not want to know’.   I have little doubt 
that similar views were held by some parents in England (and indeed were 
                                                     
82
House of Commons Library.  The Human Tissue Bill.  Bill 9 of 2003-04. Research Paper 04/04, 
January 9, 2004, p40, citing: NACOR: Initial comment on the new Human Tissue Bill. December 8, 
2003; and p40, para 2. 
83
 (2004) 416 (Parl. Deb., Hansard 6th series), HC 1043. 
313 
 
articulated in a few of the many letters to the Press following Alder Hey84 85), but I 
have been unable to detect that their view was influential throughout the 
‘formulation’ stage in Westminster.  Instead, calls for ‘informed’ consent prevailed 
uniformly.   
2.3.6 The role of officials. 
As seen in Chapter One, one was able to appreciate, through archival papers, how 
all the factors which had contributed to inspiration and deliberation came to be 
concentrated on the desks of officials in the ‘Bill team’ whose job it was, with 
Ministers, to formulate Instructions to Parliamentary Counsel and engage in an 
iterative process thereafter.  This exercise was and is both practical and intellectual.  
Close scrutiny revealed why, from time to time, there could be a connection 
between a lack of nails and lost kingdoms.  It is worthwhile to recall an internal 
Ministry memorandum from 1960 concerning the use of tissues from bodies 
subject to coroners’ post mortem examinations, and written following a meeting 
between officials and the Minister about the draft Bill and a subsequent 
conversation with an official from the Home Office.   
  Provided the consent of the coroner is obtained in each individual case, the Home 
 Office would not see any objection to the removal of tissues for therapeutic, 
 educational or research purposes, either before, during or after a post mortem 
 examination ordered by a coroner.  You [SD Musson, Principal Assistant Solicitor of 
 the Ministry of Health’s legal division+ consider that this is already covered by the 
 terms of the draft bill but that we would want to ensure that, in such cases, the 
 necessary consents were obtained under clause 1.86  
One may only speculate what might have been a different long term outcome had 
Musson’s insight been incorporated into legislation.  The general point is clear.  The 
astuteness of officials can be a contributory factor in the legislative process. 
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The lack of access to archived papers from the 2004 and 2006 legislative processes 
makes it more difficult to assess in any detail the contribution of officials.  Two 
figures can be discerned.  In Scotland, Mr Will Scott of the Scottish Executive was 
identified at a meeting of the Health Committee as being ‘responsible for the part 
of the bill that deals with transplantation and post-mortem examination’87.  He 
earned the gratitude of the Scottish Council of the Royal College of Pathologists for 
his contributions.88  He was the signatory of the consultation letters on 
transplantation and post mortems.  He was almost certainly the point of liaison 
between the Scottish Executive and the Department of Health on the emerging 
legislation (information obtained under FOIA)89.  It seems likely that Will Scott’s 
contribution to the 2005-6 Bill must have been considerable. 
In the Department of Health, officials are numerous.   With regard to the Human 
Tissue Bill 2003-4, Mr Hugh Whittall was identifiable, through documents released 
through the Freedom of Information Act, as the Bill manager.  In a presentation on 
the ‘likely contents’ of the draft Bill to the Human Genetics Commission, in which 
Whittall understandably spoke of ‘we’, and ‘the Department’, he gave the nearest 
account I have been able to find to explain why the span of the legislation was to be 
so broad (see Chapter Four, at 2.2.2). He described an essentially internal official-
driven process90 which appears to have been an important factor in the 
‘deliberation and formulation’ phase of the 2003-4 Bill.   
Drewry emphasised that the boundaries between his various stages of the law-
making process were often blurred.  Pre-legislative scrutiny sits conceptually on the 
cusp between ‘formulation’ of a draft Bill and ‘legitimation’.  In Scotland it is built 
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into Stage 1 of the Parliamentary passage of a Bill.  In Westminster, its usage is 
optional and if it occurs, it takes place before a Bill is introduced. 
2.3.7 Pre-legislative scrutiny. 
As part of the package of modernisation proposals agreed by the House of 
Commons in October 2002, the Government made a commitment to publishing 
more of its Bills in draft and submitting them to a parliamentary committee for pre-
legislative scrutiny. This, it was said, would allow thorough consultation on the Bill 
while it was still in a more easily amendable form, and make it easier to ensure that 
both potential parliamentary objections and stakeholder views were elicited.91 In 
the Cabinet Office’s Guide to legislative procedures, it is stated that ‘*w+hen seeking 
bids for legislation, the Chair of the Legislative Programme Committee will ask 
Ministers to consider the Bill’s suitability for publication in draft’92. 
One may speculate as to why the Secretary of State, Rt Hon Alan Milburn MP, might 
have declined this option.   He had already made tough and uncompromising 
statements about the issues, and there had been a long standing commitment to 
parents which reached back to the CMO’s Summit in January 2001 (‘never again’), 
and which was later reiterated by Stephen Ladyman at Second Reading.  By his 
demeanour throughout the preliminaries, I suspect that Mr Milburn would not have 
been interested in hearing parliamentary objections prematurely which might have 
forced compromise, and he certainly did not wish to listen to medical stakeholder 
views. [It is even arguable that his uncompromising stance over a Bill with such 
wide-ranging provisions over tissue from the dead and the living was but one 
example of government’s determination, as identified by Brazier and colleagues, to 
‘control’ the medical profession.93]  It is certainly arguable that, if pre-legislative 
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scrutiny had occurred, as indeed had been committed to by Hazel Blears MP in 
2003, much parliamentary time would have been saved and the need for heated 
debate obviated.   
Chapter Five (at 3.5.2) described the importance of the Committees of the Scottish 
Parliament.94  The activities of the lead committee for a Bill, although strictly 
speaking part of the legitimation process, include a significant proportion of those 
functions of a pre-legislative committee commended by the Cabinet Office Guide as 
desirable.  Chapter Five also described in some detail the range of bodies and 
persons who gave written and oral evidence to the Health Committee.  It is 
sufficient here to commend the open and discursive nature of the meetings, which 
began with the Convener inviting each witness ‘to state briefly their interest in the 
bill, make a brief comment on the bill - whether they support, are neutral about or 
oppose it - and raise any other issues that need to be flagged up95; and concluded 
with the invitation that ‘if the witnesses think of something once they have left, 
they should feel free to get in touch with us again. The clerks will always accept 
follow-on evidence from witnesses’96.  This approach allowed the Health 
Committee to submit an authoritative report to the Parliament which 
recommended that the general principles of the Bill be approved, subject to a series 
of recommendations about how it might be improved and about action to be taken 
to support effective implementation.97 
The importance of the Committee Report to the business of the Parliament in the 
Stage 1 debate was captured by Brian Adam MSP when he said: ‘Today, we are 
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debating a committee's stage 1 report on a bill. It might be better in terms of our 
procedures, and potentially less contentious—although the bill is not particularly 
contentious—if the committee convener were to lead the debate on the 
committee's stage 1 report *rather than the Minister+’98.  He was only gently 
rebuked by the Minister to the effect that the debate was on the Bill and that the 
Committee Report was an important contribution. 
2.4 Legitimation, in theory and practice. 
2.4.1 Overview of the legitimation process: 1961, 2004 and 2006 Acts. 
To Drewry, ‘legitimation’ was Parliament’s main legislative function- ‘a process 
which helps to secure public acceptance of, and obedience to, the legislative 
actions of the state’.99  According to this model, Parliament impinges hardly at all in 
the phases of ‘inspiration’; and has only a limited role in ‘deliberation and 
formulation’ through (limited) debates on white papers and (chance) social 
intercourse between MPs and Ministers.  The process of ‘deliberation’ occurs 
earlier in the legislative process as a complex decision making structure involving 
interplay among political parties, pressure groups, Departments and the Cabinet, all 
subject to a variety of social and political forces.100 The 1961 Act followed Drewry’s 
overall pattern, with all party support.  All the ‘work’, which focused almost entirely 
on transplantation and in a sense extended the Corneal Grafting Act 1952, had 
been done during the phases of deliberation and formulation, within which there 
had been very significant medical input.  Legitimation in Parliament, as the Bill 
passed through both Houses, was largely a process of approval and commendation. 
 Drewry gave as an exception to the usual pattern of ‘legitimation’ the passage of 
the annual Finance Bill, where much was formulated in great secrecy, and with non-
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government bodies strictly excluded.  This gave peculiar importance to its 
Parliamentary stages, during which substantial changes were sometimes made 
following pressure group lobbying of a kind which in the case of most other bills 
would have happened much earlier.101  In some ways, the passage of the 2003-2004 
Bill resembled Drewry’s description of the Finance Bill, in that substantial changes 
were eventually made, and government concessions grudgingly granted, as a result 
of intense lobbying from the medical and scientific community late in the legislative 
process. 
Heywood, in a consideration of ‘group politics’, described ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, 
based on the status that groups had in relation to government and the strategies 
they adopted in order to exert pressure.  In this account, insider groups enjoy 
regular privileged and usually institutionalised access to government through 
routine consultation or representation on government bodies.  Governments may 
also be inclined to consult groups that possess specialist knowledge and 
information that assists in the formulation of workable policy.  In contrast, outsider 
groups are consulted at best irregularly and not at a senior level: they are forced to 
‘go public’ in the hope of exerting indirect pressure on the policy process.102  
According to Drewry’s legislative model, insider groups are able to make their 
contribution in the early, deliberative and formulating phases, while outsiders 
contribute later, if at all. 
In the passage of the 2004 legislation, the medical profession played the ‘outsider’ 
role, while parents’ groups were ‘insiders’- a role reversal from what might have 
been expected as a generality.  Parents exerted a powerful influence from the 
beginning of the process, while the medical and scientific professions tried to exert 
influence through a lobbying campaign which lasted throughout the eight month 
legitimation phase of the Bill’s passage through Parliament.   The absence of pre-
legislative scrutiny, a mechanism which allows both insider and outsider input, 
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played its part.  [It might be argued that medicine as an institution had begun to 
lose its insider status many years before for reasons discussed in Chapter Three. 
The circumstances of Bristol and Alder Hey, and public reaction, may have been the 
final determinants of outsider status]. 
The legitimation process in the Scottish Parliament, as judged by the passage of the 
2006 Act, conformed in some ways to the Drewry model, in that the provisions of 
the Bill were largely determined in the deliberation and formulation stages, and 
which included what appeared to be thorough consultation procedures.  Parents’ 
groups were ‘insiders’, as in England, but the medical voice was also heard. The 
tone of the Stage 1 and Stage 3 debates had an air of fait accompli, with, at the 
same time, an awareness of the need to ensure the acceptance of the Scottish 
people.  However, the inclusion of the work of the relevant Parliamentary (in this 
case Health) Committee as the beginning of the legitimation phase, with papers and 
detailed discussions with witnesses being freely available in the Official Report, 
gave a role to Parliament which could be replicated in Westminster if a process of 
pre-legislative scrutiny were to become the norm. 
2.4.2 A comparison of the structure of the 2003-4 and the 2005-6 Bills. 
I submit that the comparative structure of the Bills may be a guide to the thinking 
behind their respective evolutionary phases.  Both governments began with a 
problem arising from post mortems. The Scottish Executive appears throughout to 
have kept the needs of the service as template, while attending to defects in 
legislation (and clinical practice) revealed by analysis of the problem, and attending 
to any necessary consequential amendments.  The resulting 2005-6 Bill was 
structured round ‘activities’: Transplantation; Post Mortems; Anatomy.  In contrast, 
the UK Government appears, from the structure of the 2003-4 Bill, to have been 
driven throughout by a need to answer first, and serially, the anxieties and wishes 
of bereaved parents and relatives. (see Chapter Four 3.4.2.1) As a consequence, in 
order for a reader to find the provisions regarding a clinical activity, for example 
transplantation, one would have been required to infer/hypothesise from clause 
1(1) that organ transplantation might be an activity lawful with ‘appropriate’ 
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consent, and that it might be a ‘Schedule 1’ activity.  Schedule 1, Part 1, indeed 
listed transplantation as the eighth (of eight) purposes ‘normally requiring consent’.  
Part 2, clause 11, of the Bill confirmed that the proposed Human Tissue Authority 
had within its remit ‘the use, for a scheduled purpose, of ‘relevant material’ which 
has come from a human body. Clause 29 prohibited trafficking in organs, and clause 
30 imposed restriction on live donor transplantation. 
2.4.3 Legitimation in respect of certain provisions: a comparison between 2004 and 
2006 Acts.  
As a general point, the requirement under Rules for the Executive in Scotland to 
publish a Policy Memorandum alongside a draft Bill makes it clear to the reader 
what are the underlying principles and objectives in the Government’s collective 
mind.  Having to rely on Explanatory Notes in the case of a Westminster Bill is less 
satisfactory, especially when the legislation has not been the subject of prior Green 
or White Papers. 
2.4.3.1 The need for broad congruence throughout the UK. 
There is ample evidence that the Scottish Executive was aware of the need for, ‘as 
far as possible’, a consistent approach within the legislation in Scotland and the 
remainder of the UK. (Chapter Five, 3.2.10, 3.5.1).  This was achieved in large part  
by ‘the close working of all the health departments on the primary legislation and, 
even more so, on the regulations and codes of practice that underpin them’.103 
Divergence of approach appeared regarding tissues from the living and in provisions 
for tissue blocks and slides.  
 2.4.3.2 Tissues from the living. 
With regard to the topics that generated protracted debate, lobbying and 
negotiation in Parliament with regard to the 2003-4 Bill, there was much focus on 
Part 1, Clause 1 and Schedule 1 which, collectively, provided for ‘purposes normally 
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requiring consent’.104  The debate eventually centred on tissues from the living, and 
in particular on the need for consent: before using ‘surplus tissue from the living’ 
for research; and for carrying out ‘education on research techniques’ using clinical 
specimens.  The first matter was only ‘resolved’ in the months after the Committee 
Stage in the House of Commons, and the Bill subsequently amended to allow 
anonymised tissue to be used without consent and with the approval of an Ethics 
Committee, as a result of a confidential meeting on March 9, 2004 between the 
Minister, Rosie Winterton, and stakeholders from the research and academic 
communities.105  The second matter, which arose from the practical day to day 
difficulty in a pathology department of differentiating between education in 
diagnostic techniques, which, in the draft Bill, did not require consent, and 
education in research techniques (on the same tissue specimen) which did require 
consent, was settled only after the government had to respond to defeat in an 
amendment in the House of Lords brought by Baroness Neuberger.106  
In Scotland, the need for debate on these issues did not arise, because the 2005-6 
Bill had made no provisions concerning surplus tissues from the living.  Instead the 
Scottish Executive’s policy was to leave these matters to guidance, and an 
appropriate authorisation form where necessary.107   
2.4.3.3 Retention of tissue blocks and slides. 
2.4.3.3.1 Scotland. 
Perhaps no single issue illustrated better the differences in the legitimation phase 
of the 2003-4 and 2005-6 Bills than ‘the retention of tissue blocks and slides’.   As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the 2006 Act provided that samples of tissue or of an 
organ removed during a properly authorised [hospital] post mortem would form 
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part of the medical record.108  Further, the 2006 Act made provision for the 
retention and further use of samples from Fiscal post mortems, which would be at 
variance with the provisions of the 2004 Act.  As described in the Explanatory Notes 
to the 2006 Act: 
 Part 3. Tissue sample or organs no longer required for Procurator Fiscal purposes: 
‘provides for tissue samples no longer required for the Fiscal’s purposes to be 
retained as part of the deceased’s medical record and used without authorisation 
for diagnostic and audit purposes, and for such tissue samples and organs no 
longer required for the Fiscal’s purposes to be used, with authorisation, for 
education, training or research.109 
The Health Committee had been ‘generally content’ with the Executive’s plans to 
issue guidance on how surplus tissue was to be dealt with, and ‘accepted the broad 
principles and specific provision in relation to tissue samples or organs no longer 
required for Procurator Fiscal purposes’, including that authorisation should be 
sought for the purpose of education, training or research, but not for diagnosis or 
audit. 110  As described in Chapter Five, these principles were expressed by specific 
provisions in the 2006 Act. 111 The only contribution in the Parliament on the 
subject of tissue retention and use came from Susan Deacon MSP (the by then past 
Minister for Health and Community Care who had established the IRG) who was 
‘pleased that the bill makes provision for sensitive and sensible arrangements for 
the use and storage of tissue samples’.112  
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Key to the decisions made in Scotland was the close working between the 
legislators, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, and the Royal College of 
Pathologists to ensure common standards as between hospital and Fiscal post 
mortem examinations.  This had embraced the concept, originally proposed by IRG, 
that an autopsy was an extension after death of clinical care, and that retention of 
tissue samples formed part of the clinical record.  It followed that, to ensure 
appropriate standards, retained tissue should be available, without further 
authorisation, for the purposes of audit or diagnostic review.   
2.4.3.3.2 Remainder of UK. 
At Second Reading of the 2003-4 Bill in the House of Lords, Baroness O’Neill of 
Bengarve had asked the Minister to explain why the Bill had been brought forward 
before legislation to revise the Coroners Rules, saying: 
 It has been said that this Bill constructs a hammer to crack the proverbial nut, but 
 that, unfortunately, it misses the nut.  I do not think that we can reshape the 
 hammer to ensure that it really hits the nut because for that we would also need to 
 reshape the Coroners’ Rules.113 
In response the Minister, Lord Warner, said only that Home Office Ministers had 
confirmed that amendments to the Coroners’ Rules would be produced later that 
year and that the Government would ensure that these new Rules were wholly 
consistent with the Bill.114  
Later, during Third Reading, Baroness Finlay had proposed an amendment which 
would have permitted tissue blocks and slides from coronial post mortems to have 
been retained after the coroner was functus.115 She cited as examples where access 
to retained samples would be useful: wrongful convictions, serial failures of care, 
and comfort to families if new genetic tests could later illuminate the cause of an 
unexplained infant’s death (note: the latter scenario overlaps ‘Sudden Infant Death 
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Syndrome-see next section).   The Minister, Lord Warner, asked for the amendment 
to be withdrawn in a response which filled some three columns in Hansard.  He 
described the amendment as wholly undermining the fundamental principle [of 
consent+ on which the Bill was based.  He called in support a ‘powerful’ letter from 
PITY II, the parents’ support group from Liverpool, which had registered specifically 
and in the strongest terms their objections to the proposed amendment.  He also 
quoted from an ‘unsolicited’ letter he had received from the Chair of the Retained 
Organs Commission to the effect that ‘extending powers to dispense with consent 
will simply be counterproductive and may result in further and damaging disputes 
between families and professionals’.116 
In contrast to the position in Scotland, the Coroners (Amendment) Rules 2005117 
*which were introduced in a ‘peremptory’ manner118, and without any prior 
consultations with the pathology profession], having made clear the responsibility 
of the Coroner to notify the pathologist (and inform the family) of the period for 
which he required the retention of material for his purposes under the Coroners 
Act 1988119, required that, and the end of that period, the retained material must 
be returned to the appropriate person (as specified), disposed of lawfully by the 
pathologist, or retained with the consent of the appropriate person (as specified) 
for medical research or other purposes.120  
Putting the above points from the Coroners (Amendment) Rules 2005 into practice 
would require close working between pathologists and coroners.  Five years later, 
in late 2010, Redfern 2 found it necessary to take the view that ‘coronial and 
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pathology practice should be standardised, effective management ensured and the 
*necessary+ framework strengthened’.121  
2.4.3.3.3 Implications for Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (‘SIDS’). 
The difference between Scotland and England regarding retention of tissue blocks 
and slides has practical consequences in respect of SIDS, to which both IRG 
(directly) and Baroness Finlay (indirectly) had drawn attention.  SIDS is not a 
diagnosis of the cause of death: it means that the specific cause of death has not 
been ascertained despite thorough investigation.  Retention of tissue could allow 
the cause of death to be revisited in the light of advances in medical knowledge.  
On the other hand (although perhaps distressing to contemplate), parents who 
have knowingly contributed to their infant’s death, but which has been attributed 
after autopsy to SIDS, might be less likely to agree to the prolonged retention of 
material evidence which could be reviewed.122  There is no evidence that there was 
a different attitude to the specific issue of SIDS parents during the legitimation 
process in Scotland and England: rather that in Westminster, adherence to the 
‘fundamental principle of consent’ trumped Baroness Finlay’s arguments; while in 
Scotland, the implications for SIDS emerged as a by-product of a process with 
origins in quality assurance.  
The emergence later of the Coroners (Amendment) Rules 2005 was not preceded 
by public debate or records accessible to me.  One may conjecture that, if the case 
of SIDS had been given specific consideration, an argument could have been 
constructed to say: ‘The Coroner has accepted the diagnosis of SIDS; the police 
have said they have no further interest; the body should be returned to the parents 
for burial.’  
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3. Overall conclusions. 
The 1961 Act was of its time.  It came into being to support the wonders of science, 
and the prevailing mood was perfectly captured by the wish of Miss Joan Vickers 
MP that the associated Bill should be named the ‘Human Aid to Medical Science 
Bill’.123 Throughout the legislative process the ‘requirements’ of the medical and 
scientific community were dominant, and the views of the public were not sought.  
Over the next quarter century, shortcomings in the wording of some of the 
provisions of the Act were revealed through practical problems in the practice of 
transplantation.  There were further developments in science, as predicted by 
Baroness Summerskill in 1961, such as to make the provisions of the Act gradually 
less adequate to the task.  There was ignorance of the content of the Act by the 
medical profession, for which they were later criticised severely.  But this 
ignorance, or at least ‘blind eye’, was not exclusive to doctors.  The findings in this 
Thesis point also to deficiencies in coronial practice at different times in different 
places to which, for example, Mr Michael Redfern QC and Dr Jeremy Metters, HM 
Inspector of Anatomy, drew attention although, unaccountably to me, with dilute 
criticism only. 
These circumstances in sum, as I have tried to argue in Chapters Two and Four, 
would have led to a perceived need to modify the law at some point. 
The proximate triggers to new legislation- the illegal actions of a rogue pathologist 
(Van Velsen), and disclosure of the widespread practice of pathologists of retaining 
organs and tissues without express consent- were of different orders of culpability 
in my view, and would have benefited from individual consideration.  Instead, as 
discussed in Chapter Four (at 1.1.2.1 et seq), the findings came to be seen as a 
whole, with escalating consequences. 
Dick Van Velsen’s practices were genuinely shocking as well as illegal, and were 
indefensible, not only to the press and public, but to the medical profession as 
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well.124  In contrast, the widespread ‘routine’ practice of organ and tissue retention 
at PM without express consent might have been interpretable as [another] example 
of benign, misplaced or out of date paternalism, which had persisted, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, within a medical profession which, in Irvine’s words, had ‘strongly 
defensive attitudes and very little insight into the profound nature of the changes 
that had taken place all around us’125.  The view that the 1961 Act was ‘toothless’ in 
not providing a sanction for non-compliance126 (and by implication that such a 
sanction might have prevented routine tissue retention, if not Van Velsen’s actions) 
is arguably misplaced.  The weight of evidence from the Inquiries and the 
immediate aftermath support a view that doctors (save Van Velsen) did not 
‘transgress’ because of a cavalier disregard for a law [of which they were, in fact, 
ignorant].  Their response of bewilderment was not one of being found guilty of 
breaking the law but of genuine shock that their practice was not approved of.  
What they had lacked was appropriate education and training127 128 (See Chapter 
Four, especially 1.1 3.2). 
Of all the factors identified in section 2.1 of this Chapter as operating on both sides 
of the English-Scottish border as ‘inspiration’ for new legislation, two stand out.  
The first, ‘pressure exerted by parents and relatives’ is linked to the second, 
‘desecration of the dead *children+’ (see also 2.1.5, this Chapter).  With regard to 
the latter, it is poignant now to recall the moving words of Lord Balniel who made 
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such a sensitive contribution to the Second Reading of the 1960 Bill which brought 
about the 1961 Act with its subsequently revealed shortcomings: 
   [The Bill] touches on some of the most deeply felt instincts of man; instincts that 
 say that the human body, once life has been extinguished from it, should be 
 treated with the utmost dignity and respect, and that, pending interment or 
 cremation, it should be left in peace.129  
Chapters Four and Five have assembled evidence that parents lobbied, were 
consulted and listened to, and continued to have input and influence throughout 
the legislative process- indeed came to be regarded as very significant ‘insiders’, 
whose views and wishes trumped others (see Chapter Four, especially 2.3, and 
Chapter Five, 2.1.1.2, 3.2.3).  The evidence for the influence of parents was most 
directly observable in England, while in Scotland it appeared to operate particularly 
through the work and influence of IRG. Parents, as recorded in the transcript of the 
CMO’s Summit in January 2001, spoke of ‘the one common factor between us is 
that we have all suffered the grievous loss of a child’ and ‘the one overriding 
emotion that we all have is the pain caused by the lack of respect and dignity 
shown to our children’.130 The chair of NACOR, Michaela Willis, spoke of changing 
future practice in a manner which strongly suggested that her organisation was 
already party to, and influencing,  the planning of government policy ( see Chapter 
Four, 1.2.2). Further evidence throughout Chapter Four strongly points to this 
influence having continued subsequently. 
It has been relatively straightforward, if fascinating, to explain the vertical axis, 
1952-2006, of this Thesis.  The past is another place with different mores and 
relationships.  It has been more difficult to explain why two parts of the United 
Kingdom, albeit with two legislatures, produced significantly different outcomes. . 
My hypothesis (see Introduction, 1.2.2) was that answers might lie within a greater 
understanding of the processes by which new legislation had occurred, the climate 
of the time and the institutions and even individuals who had been involved.  
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Of these possibilities, the climate in 2000, as described in Chapter Three, did not 
recognise geographical borders [except that, from indirect evidence adduced in 
Chapter Five, the institution of medicine in Scotland may not have had such 
opprobrium directed towards it compared to that in England; and there was close 
working as between the Executive, the Crown Office and RCPath, with no evidence 
of comparable relationships in England].  With regard to individuals, it is difficult to 
overlook the contributions of Professor (later Sir) Ian Kennedy, and the reactions of 
the Secretary of State, Rt Hon Alan Milburn MP, although it is difficult to quantify 
their overall influence.  With regard to Kennedy, it may not be fanciful to draw a 
continuous line from his trenchant criticisms of doctors in his 1981 Reith Lectures, 
through his adverse critique of medical self regulation in the 1990s, to the harsh 
wording of the findings in Bristol and the recommendations in that report about 
future regulation and changes in the law.  The more measured tone of the IRG 
report in Scotland may be contrasted (whose chair, Professor Sheila McLean, is also 
a noted critic of the medical profession131).  With regard to Milburn, one must await 
the availability of official papers under the ‘30 year rule’ before assessing his 
contribution (and, as an aside in 2010, whether or not there were elements of 
‘forced choice’132 operating in 2001).  For the present, it is sufficient to note 
Milburn’s obvious anger, and, to some, his hyperbolic133, hysterical and 
overwrought134 language, as compared, again, to the more measured tones of his 
counterpart in Scotland135, as proxy for his likely influence during the legislative 
phases. 
                                                     
131 McLean, Sheila A.M.  A patient’s right to know: information disclosure, the doctor and the law.  
Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1989. 
132
 Lodge M, Hood C.  Pavlovian policy responses to media feeding frenzies?  Dangerous dogs 
regulation in comparative perspective. Journal of contingencies and crisis management 2002; 10 (1): 
1-13. 
133
 Hoffenberg R.  Medical arrogance. Clinical Medicine 2001; 1(5):330-340. 
134
 Department of Health.  Transcript of Chief Medical Officer’s Summit.  Thursday January 11, 2001. 
CMO 
134
 The Times (London).  Feature:  Overwrought response.  January 31, 2001. 
135
 Scottish Parliament.  Official Report. Human Tissue (Scotland) Bill, Stage 3. February 2, 2001, col. 
1124. 
330 
 
It is to a comparison of processes that I turn finally, and propose that herein lies the 
major explanation for the different legislative outcomes in England (with Wales and 
Northern Ireland) and Scotland, at least with regard to my primary focus on 
research.  [With regard to more general aspects of the 2006 Act, Scotland was 
fortunate in being able to rely on the provisions of the 2004 Act to regulate DNA 
analysis, and, through the Human Tissue Authority, to regulate organ 
transplantation from living donors. This enhanced the opportunity for focus in the 
2006 Act]. Within my analysis of Scotland in Chapter Five, two particular processes 
stood out to explain the differences between the 2004 and 2006 Acts: the 
thoroughness of [overtly broad based] consultation and the thoroughness of the 
work of the Health Committee, during Stage 1, in de facto pre-legislative scrutiny – 
both built into the Scottish Parliamentary legislative systems. It was the differences 
between the 2004 and 2006 Acts with regard to research that impressed the Joint 
Committee (Chapter Five, at 4.) in favour of the Scottish formulation136, and it was 
the nature of the consultations and ‘pre-legislative’ scrutiny in Scotland which 
appears from my studies to have determined the approach to research in the 2006 
Act.  I recognise that consultation may be easier in an electorate of 5 million, as 
compared to 55 million.  Pre-legislative scrutiny, by contrast, is a matter for 
Parliament. 
4. Recommendations. 
With diffidence, I hope that the studies in this Thesis may contribute specifically to 
any wish of Government and the medical/scientific professions to review their 
processes of consultation and negotiation prior to developing new legislation with 
an impact on research; and more generally to the case for more regular use of pre-
legislative scrutiny of Bills at Westminster.  In making the latter proposal I find that I 
am in good company.  Chris Mullin MP, the much admired and independently 
minded Member of Parliament for Sunderland South, was uniquely granted the 
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privilege of a valedictory speech to the House of Commons as recently as March 25, 
2010. He closed with the following words: 
 Finally, a word to the coming generation of politicians.  I have one simple message: 
 take Parliament seriously. If we, the elected, do not, why should anybody else? By 
 all means one should support the programme on which one's party was elected, 
 but we are not automatons. We are not sent here merely to be cheerleaders, or to 
 get stiff necks looking up at the fount of power. We are here to exercise our 
 judgment-to hold Ministers to account for the powers they hold. And that means 
 proper scrutiny. It means insisting that Ministers engage seriously with Parliament, 
 and that they are open to dialogue. It means, so far as possible, insisting that the 
 Government publish legislation in draft so that it might be improved before it is set 
 in stone.137 
It is to be hoped that Ministers also were listening attentively. 
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